


SWOT 3

Cross-border Co-operation in Europe: a Comprehensive Overview



ISIG Institute of
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Cross-border Co-operation in Europe : A Comprehensive Overview

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for the

Council of Europe



SERIES

1. Swot Analysis and Planning for Cross-border Co-operation in Central European Countries (SWOT 1)
2. Swot Analysis and Planning for Cross-border Co-operation in Northern Europe (SWOT 2)
3. Strategies and Euroregions for Cross-border Co-operation in Balkan and Danube European Countries
4. Cross-border co-operation in Europe: a comprehensive overview (SWOT 3)

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Foreword

This study has been prepared by ISIG - Istituto di Sociologia Internazionale di Gorizia (Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia), Italy at the request of the Council of Europe. Its purpose is to provide an overview of the scientific assessment of the state of cross-border co-operation between European states in the geographical area of Central, Northern and South Eastern Europe carried out in the first three volumes¹ of the series. It applies the so-called SWOT methodology according to the specific parameters developed by ISIG to assess the extent and depth of cross-border co-operation thus giving both a quantitative and qualitative appraisal. This is followed by the identification of the most appropriate “strategy” recommended in order to achieve the best possible cross-border co-operation (removing obstacles, skipping threats, exploiting opportunities, healing weaknesses).

The interest of the Council of Europe for trans-frontier co-operation dates back to the 1980’s with the adoption of the European Outline Convention on Trans-frontier Co-operation between Territorial Authorities or Communities (Madrid Convention). In the subsequent years, the Council of Europe, through its intergovernmental committees – the European Committee on Local and Regional Democracy (CDLR) and the Committee of Experts on Trans-frontier Co-operation (LR-CT) – and various assistance and capacity building activities has actively promoted the adoption of the most suitable measures and policies to encourage and facilitate cross-border co-operation between local and regional authorities.

The series was published in the framework of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and comprises a SWOT analysis of cross-border co-operation between Balkan-Danube states published in 2005 with the financial support of Belgium, an updated version covering South-Eastern European states published by ISIG in 2011, a SWOT analysis of cross-border co-operation between Central European states and one on Northern European states (funded by Lithuania), both published in 2010.

The central theme of this volume is cross-border co-operation in those parts of Europe which were analysed in the previous three volumes and the best strategies to overcome existing obstacles and promote greater territorial cohesion. This volume is a comparison of all 55 cross-border areas placed in this macro-region. Prior to its publication, it was circulated to members of the CDLR for comments and the remarks made were taken into consideration.

In releasing this report, the Council of Europe wishes to put at the disposal of its member states an additional tool for assessing the state of cross-border co-operation between themselves and thus taking the appropriate policy measures in order to achieve the goal of a “ever closer union” between them that the Statute of the Council of Europe, to which they have subscribed, advocates (article 1).

¹ Swot Analysis and Planning for Cross-Border Co-operation in Central European Countries, Swot Analysis and Planning for Cross-Border Co-operation in Northern Europe, Swot Analysis and Planning for Cross-Border Co-operation in Balkan and Danube countries.

Cross-border Co-operation in Europe: A Comprehensive Overview

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Introduction

Cross-border co-operation has many meanings and many goals. Someone has described it as a sort of overcoming of sedimented fractures in the history of states, someone else highlights it as a system of pointless efforts since borders no longer exist in Europe (the EU), others maintain that with cross-border co-operation the regional continuity being generated is reducing the Westphalian principles of state sovereignty. And there are those who would lay claim to yet other positive and negative values of cross-border co-operation.

What supports the conviction that such co-operation is very useful is on the one hand the evidence that borders have not disappeared, as testified for instance by the requests for the suppression of the Schengen rules, and on the other hand, the persuasion that regional continuity across one or more borders emphasizes economic development, mutual understanding and the belief that pluralism is something very positive and constructive, and brings uniqueness, to these border areas.

This is the basic theme of this report, as it was for the three reports that preceded it.

Indeed, the first three volumes² have dealt with the specific analysis of each macro-area included in the border region once marked with the “amber road” and now with the Central Europe ranging from Norway-Russia to Bulgaria-Turkey.

This volume deals with the comparison of all 55 cross-border areas, placed in this macro-region.

The central theme (*chapter three*) of this volume is cross-border co-operation in that part of Europe which for nearly sixty years lived the experience of real socialism, along with dependency on the USSR (the case for many of these states). It is a part of Europe which is located horizontally (west-east) between the border areas Austria-Italy and Ukraine-Russia, and vertically (north-south) between Norway-Russia and Bulgaria and Greece-Turkey. In fact, this study begins with an *analytical* description of cross-border co-operation for each of the border areas already carried out in the three volumes relating to the macro-regions: Baltic and Eastern Europe, Central Europe, the Balkan-Danube Europe. The analytical description of this co-operation focuses on the transborder geographical, historical, institutional aspects, the SWOT variables, the design of strategies and Euroregions appropriate to the situations of each area.

Starting from what has been done for each area, the heart of the study is therefore *comparison*.

Firstly a comparison is carried out between the cross-border areas of each of the three macro-regions considered in order to highlight the specific, operational, appropriate action strategies to emphasize or create co-operation as appropriate. Secondly, for all areas considered, the comparison is developed in more quantitative terms but also theoretical terms. We have already pointed out that the comparison requires measurement, and therefore the quantitative

² Gasparini A., Del Bianco D. (2010), *Analysis and Planning for Cross-border Co-operation in Central European Countries*, Council of Europe, Isig; Strasbourg, Gorizia. Gasparini A., Del Bianco D. (2010), *Analysis and Planning for Cross-border Co-operation in Northern Europe*, Council of Europe, Isig; Strasbourg, Gorizia. Gasparini A., Del Bianco D. (2011), *Strategies and Euroregions for Cross-border Co-operation in Balkan and Danube European Countries*.

methods, as the units of analysis (in our case the 55 cross-border areas) are numerous. Measurement reduces the complexity of co-operation and its indicators in a single numerical index. The starting point is the comparison of levels for 55 areas of co-operation, represented by the mean of 53 indicators (including 1 and 10). Clearly there are regional areas with low levels and high levels of regional co-operation. Then, the ten dimensions of the indicators of co-operation are compared. These dimensions relate to many macro-conceptual aspects of co-operation. They are identified as “internal” or “external” for each of the 55 cross-border areas, and in general are higher in the areas in the macro-region of Central and Baltic Europe and less high in the Balkan-Danube region; and higher for the internal dimensions and less high for the external (national and international) dimensions.

For the conceptual dimension, this is followed by a comparison of SWOT variables for the 55 cross-border areas and the actions strategies. Among these is that of *strengthening* as prevalent (first), and that of *control of negatives* (fourth). Finally, we compare the types of Euroregions that are most effective for each area: the most widespread are cross-border Euroregions and Euroregions of macro-infrastructures. This is compared following the “Euradria theorem”.

In this volume the focus of the comparison of cross-border co-operation in 55 areas is preceded by two chapters: the *first* one methodological on the SWOT analysis and the *second* one on the theoretical design of the Euroregion. Addressing these two parts is important not only to transmit the novelty of such method and theory, but mainly to give the opportunity to understand the concepts and terms used in chapter three, of the comparison of cross-border co-operation among the considered areas so far invoked.

The *first chapter* is dedicated to the method followed in the analysis of cross-border co-operation in each area and in the comparison of these 55 areas. To say that the SWOT analysis was “used” is simplistic, since if it is represented by the midpoint of the method, other technologies also precede and follow. In fact, the rationale of this complex methodology is to uniformise the 55 areas and then to proceed to the comparison. Of course this is valid if uniformity is possible, and we have verified that uniformity is possible.

The first *step* of the methodology consists in the “reproduction” of the complexity of co-operation for general *dimensions*, which we call *conceptual dimensions*, and within these dimensions in their “reproduction” in *concrete indicators*. Through this process we enter into the operational aspects of cross-border co-operation.

The second *step* of the methodology is the evaluation of each of the 53 indicators depending on whether they are very important, and therefore they configure as strengths (S), weaknesses (W), opportunities (O) and threats (T) (and therefore positive/negative, internal/external of the area), as a positive or negative “halo”, as non-influential on the co-operation. In this step the synchronic SWOT analysis (i.e. current) but also projected towards the future, is in place.

The third *step* of the methodology has to do with the *action strategies* (which we have defined in six types), and therefore with the more acute forecasting (or creation) of the co-operation.

Finally, the fourth *step* is the institutionalization of this co-operation through instruments that daily protect and support the population and the actors in co-operation. These instruments are the “Euroregion” and the EGTC as a body with legal personality. This Euroregion is

articulated into three types, proposed for each area, depending on the state of co-operation that exists.

Finally, *chapter two* theorises and designs the Euroregion, as a complex institution that assumes three complementary or overlapping conformations, depending on the location of the areas and in particular aiming at the CBC. And as a result, the theory but also the design of the Euroregion takes on three forms: cross-border Euroregion, Euroregion of functional networks, Euroregion of macro-infrastructures. The three Euroregions respond to situations and solve different problems in different border areas, and therefore differ depending on the types of areas, periods of co-operation, the extent of the area, population density, prevailing networks, the structured institutions, objectives and functions to be carried out, the period needed to achieve them. This diverse conceptualization and design respond to different needs as well as alternatives. But most of all, the three types of Euroregion isolate the structure, because the goals that they pursue can be radically different, and can find solutions according to structures variously organized and therefore less bureaucratic, with low cost, and with life cycles with different duration. As we can see, the three types of Euroregion are variously integrable, so that the (apparent) complex Euroregion can in reality have a slim and simple structure for the achievement of specific objectives and functions.

In summary, therefore, the first two chapters (SWOT analysis and Euroregion) are the explicit references to cross-border co-operation, to be compared in chapter three.

Chapter One

SWOT Analysis

for Measuring Cross-border Co-operation

and for Planning Interventions

1. Introduction

SWOT analysis was born in those strategic planning offices created by enterprises in order to rationalize market reality, bringing together the elements that make it analytically functional, and identifying the most appropriate actions to be undertaken in order to limit the effects of negative elements and to maximize the possible effects of positive ones. In the case at hand, SWOT analysis is crucial because it attains sets of heuristically relevant indicators from cross-border co-operation processes. The elements of the up-to-date analytical scenario thus delineated can be modified so as to positively influence future scenarios. Cross-border co-operation is bound to benefit from careful strategic planning, as well as from practical actions organized by a Euroregion body for trans-frontier areas.

Thus, the main function of SWOT analysis is to determine rationally a cross-border region's future prospects, set between an operational present (*current scenario*) and a future predominantly marked by cross-border co-operation fostering local development (*latent scenario*) (Gasparini 1988). The SWOT method involves both an analysis of what occurs and, above all, of how we want it to occur, between time t_0 and time t_1 .

These being the conditions, co-operation might well result from the ideology of empathic and expressive action, which commonly lead to expect something more from a common effort in relations and networking. As true as this may be (*ideological matrix*), SWOT analysis, action and strategies within the Euroregion, all do in fact challenge the ideology itself, by assessing the capability of producing an ontological transformation of values and culture in practical terms. This could not in any case take place without a mixture of concrete action and ideological drive in order to reach, on either side of the border, the shared targets of the two cooperating regions.

SWOT analysis furthermore “unmasks” ideological interpretations of cross-border co-operation, given that it is based on a very concrete system of indicators: it can identify the factual processes by which a particular co-operation is carried out, and, above all, provide reliable relations between indicators and forecasts.

2. Cross-border co-operation: theoretical elements and internal/external functional aspects

Cross-border co-operation is the active outcome of the proximity of cultural diversity. That is, it stems out of the differences between distinct sovereign areas; while these variations generally appear in legal, administrative and economic regulations, or in the cultural and linguistic reconstruction plans of those nation-state that favour the strengthening of stereotypes in relation policies, here instead, such factors are exploited with creativity, which in turn thrives on diversity itself, providing new opportunities to establish relations, and to benefit from advantages that would not exist in the absence of differences between sovereign areas.

Therefore, on either side of the border the two sovereign areas have to partially sacrifice their autonomy and act pragmatically as regards concrete everyday economic, social or cultural issues (see Gasparini 1996). In these cross-border regions, sovereignty concerns central national issues or national politics alone, while in regional matters, the sense of sovereignty has been lost (it is no longer possible to say “yes or no”, “all or nothing” with respect to this or the other region).

In this way, the cross-border region becomes a transition area, as the territory takes on a new meaning (Badie 1996) which differs from that of the national system, in such a way that national regulations are worth less than elsewhere in the country. Moreover, the transition is continuous, being based on the balance between the actions of the bordering population and the administrative, institutional and economic regulations, which must themselves be constantly adjusted according to this precarious equilibrium, made unstable by the passage of time and by changes taking place within the countries to which the two cooperating regions belong.

Cross-border co-operation is thus caught up in a perpetual instability, due to local internal factors, which constantly change and, remarkably, offer advantages which could not be possible without co-operation. Such co-operation is faced with endless challenges coming from the countries involved (which, as legal systems, fear impending self-determination, or that the national borders to be redrawn into regional ones, etc.); these challenges put to the test the will towards co-operation of the bordering population, and may well engender frustration.

Having thus defined cross-border co-operation, we can better understand its importance by distinguishing between its endogenous and exogenous dimensions (within and without the cross-border area), evaluating above all those dimensions which extend beyond the regions involved, finding their *raison d'être* in the two or three nations themselves, in their internal and bilateral policies.

Dimensions with operational implications:

1. Propensity towards cross-border co-operation
2. Level of training and coordination
3. Cross-border relations in each activity sector
4. Institutional obstacles for cross-border co-operation
5. Economic obstacles for cross-border co-operation
6. Socio-cultural obstacles for cross-border co-operation
7. Institutional factors for effective cross-border co-operation
8. Administrative factors for effective cross-border co-operation
9. Economic factors for effective cross-border co-operation
10. Linguistic, cultural and historical factors for effective cross-border co-operation

2.1. *Internal dimensions and indicators*

The first endogenous (*internal*) dimensions concern the existence of a basic form of collaboration, based on products derived from *the active collaboration found in a civil society*: such collaboration is of deep importance and it is considered essential, as it produces results otherwise impossible to obtain. As far as this research is concerned, there are two such dimensions:

1. *Propensity towards cross-border co-operation.* This is defined by indicators which refer to operators in industry (1), commerce (2), culture (3), institutions (4). In short, a high propensity for cross-border co-operation in all four operator types, means that there are realistic opportunities to develop stable co-operation.

3. *Cross-border relations in each activity sector.* These relations are expressed by the indicators of relations among institutions (9), planning and environment (10), transports and telecommunications (11), work and economy (12), tourism (13), culture and education (14), everyday services (15). The indicators specify the connection among civil societies on either side of the border. Such aspects represent the structural (but local) side of the propensity towards co-operation indicated by Dimension 1. If there is already such a structural dimension (number 3), the following dimensions will be easier to obtain.

A less relevant *second level* of endogenous dimensions is represented by two other dimensions, concerning the *characteristics of institutions* and the *context*.

2. *Level of training and coordination.* These indicators define the *characteristics of institutions* and their personnel. The indicators highlight the formation of local élites (5), the coordination among different local and national administration sectors (6), the coordination between local organisations and social and economic stakeholders (7), the coordination among central administrations (8).

9. *Economic factors for effective cross-border co-operation.* This dimension describes the context in which cross-border co-operation should take place.

These indicators detect whether or not borders act as a “filter” (44), if the economies are integrable (45), if economic action is not exclusively oriented towards the centre of the national system (46), if there is a significant participation in programmes such as Phare, Interreg, etc. (47), and if road, rail and waterways are in good conditions (48).

A *third level* of internal dimensions, still less central than the previous ones, consists of two further dimensions, which relate to the cultural *context* of the cross-border area. Such cultural dimensions are considered to be less relevant than economic policies, assuming that cross-border co-operation is predominantly linked to business interests and to basic services, rather than to cultural and linguistic attractions and values (which nevertheless play a remarkably positive role). The latter may form subsequently; in fact, stereotypes and linguistic matters can be developed or solved according to varied and complex modalities, as each of the national areas might have to deal with its own specific issues.

6. *Socio-cultural obstacles for cross-border co-operation.* These obstacles are evaluated according to their impact on cross-border co-operation. The indicators taken into account are as follows: negative national and/or regional stereotypes (31), language barriers (32), weak or no reaction to proposals for socio-cultural co-operation (33).

10. *Linguistic, cultural and historical factors for effective cross-border co-operation.* This is another cultural dimension of the *context*. Its indicators outline a specific situation, that is, the existence of a common historical *background*, free from stereotypes (49), a common language or widespread knowledge of each other’s language (50), the ratification of the 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of

National Minorities (51), a tradition of co-operation (52), good transboundary transport routes (geomorphology, passes, types of transportation) (53).

List 1 – SWOT analysis indicators, according to conceptual dimensions

1. Propensity towards cross-border co-operation
 1. Of manufacturing industry operators
 2. Of commerce operators
 3. Of socio-cultural operators
 4. Of institutional operators
2. Level of training and coordination
 5. Training of local bodies
 6. Coordination between different national and local administration sectors
 7. Coordination between local bodies and social and economic stakeholders
 8. Coordination between central administrations
3. Cross-border relations in each activity sector
 9. Institutional relations
 10. Environment and territory planning
 11. Transports and telecommunications
 12. Economy and work
 13. Tourism
 14. Education and culture
 15. Everyday services
4. Institutional obstacles for cross-border co-operation
 16. State centralisation
 17. Lack of adequate structures for cross-border co-operation
 18. Differing competence on either side of the border
 19. Restrictive regulations on cross-border relations
 20. Lack of credibility from co-operation organisations
 21. Low mutual knowledge and trust
 22. Insufficient financial resources
 23. Different political-ideological orientation
 24. Weak or absent reaction to opportunities for cross-border co-operation
5. Economic obstacles for cross-border co-operation
 25. Uneven development levels or rates
 26. Technology gap
 27. Business shutdowns due to overcoming competition
 28. Labour market protection
 29. Customs and fiscal issues
 30. Weak or absent reaction to opportunities for cross-border co-operation
6. Socio-cultural obstacles for cross-border co-operation
 31. Presence of national/regional negative stereotypes
 32. Language barriers
 33. Weak or absent reaction to opportunities for cross-border co-operation

7. Institutional factors for effective cross-border co-operation
 34. Signatory of the European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation (Madrid, 21 May 1980)
 35. Signatory of the additional 1995 Protocol to the Convention of Madrid
 36. Signatory of the second 1998 Protocol to the Convention of Madrid
 37. Internationally recognised borders
 38. Good institutional and legal framework (EU requirements)
8. Administrative factors for effective cross-border co-operation
 39. Official definition of cross-border areas
 40. Non-centralised countries with relevant government powers devolved to local authorities
 41. Local authorities entrusted with foreign relations
 42. Local authorities with competent management
 43. Local authorities with autonomous financial administration
9. Economic factors for effective cross-border co-operation
 44. Presence of positive “filter” borders in both countries
 45. Integrable economies, characterised by complementary features
 46. Economic action not exclusively oriented towards and depending from the central administration
 47. Significant participation in Interreg/Phare projects
 48. Efficient and well-connected road, rail and waterways
10. Linguistic, cultural and historical factors for effective cross-border co-operation
 49. Common historical background and absence of stereotypes
 50. Common language or widespread knowledge of the neighbouring country’s language, at least on one side of the border
 51. Ratification of the 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
 52. Tradition of co-operation
 53. Good transboundary transport routes (geomorphology, passes, transports)

2.2. *External dimensions and indicators*

The exogenous (external) dimensions of co-operation in cross-border areas concern national, European and international conditions, which may favour or not the development of co-operation in a cross-border area. There are four external dimensions, and they are thought to have a progressively lower gradient of direct influence on a specific co-operation process. Such declining gradient does not result from the last dimension (in the presentation) being essential as a general (European) framework, but it implies that other dimensions are necessary, in order to activate the specific mechanisms of co-operation.

5. *Economic obstacles for cross-border co-operation.* This dimension is based on countries’ complementary development levels in a specific cross-border area. The selected indicators are: differing economic development levels/rate (25), technology gap (26), reluctance due to overcoming competition (27), labour market protection (28), customs and fiscal issues (29), weak or absent reaction to opportunities for

economic co-operation. All of these obstacles generate from the lack of balance between the two cross-border areas.

4. *Institutional obstacles for cross-border co-operation.* These obstacles as well result from unbalance between cross-border areas. The indicators are: state centralisation (16), lack of adequate structures for cross-border co-operation (17), differing competences on either side of the border (18), restrictive regulations on cross-border co-operation (19), lack of credibility from co-operation agencies (20), low degree of mutual knowledge and trust (21), insufficient financial resources (22), different political-ideological orientation (23), weak or absent reaction to opportunities for institutional co-operation (24).

8. *Administrative factors for effective cross-border co-operation.* This dimension concerns the relation between local borderland administrations and the powers yielded to them by central authorities. This shows in the relations between the two bordering areas, and in the connotation of the area, which can be contiguous to the border, or wider, to the point of including several regions in order to carry out special functions (for instance, macro infrastructures). The pertinent indicators for this dimension are: official definition of cross-border areas (39), non-centralised countries with local administrations granted with wide decisional powers (40), local authorities charged with foreign relations (41), local authorities with competent management (42), local authorities with independent financial administration (43).

7. *Institutional factors and international relations.* This dimension concerns the accession of the two countries to conventions and international protocols, as well as clean acceptance of its status of borderland region. The pertinent indicators are: signature of the 1980 Convention to Madrid (34), signature of the 1995 Additional Protocol to the Convention of Madrid (35), signature of the 1998 Protocol II of the Convention of Madrid (36), international recognition of borders (37), good institutional and legal framework (38).

2.3. *Measurement of indicators*

SWOT analysis is based on two sets for the evaluation of variables: one is concerned with positive (*Strengths and Opportunities* for the cross-border area) or negative (*Weaknesses and Threats*) variables, while the other identifies variables as either internal or external to the cross-border area. In order to locate variables within a SWOT framework, it is necessary to first measure them, as SWOT only takes into account extreme values, either positive (SO: strengths, opportunities) or negative (WT: weaknesses, threats).

Measurement is carried out as follows:

First of all, each indicator is evaluated according to “very high”, “high”, “medium”, “low”, “very low” values; the modalities of cross-border sector activities (Dimension 3) instead are evaluated as: “co-operation” in a sector on either side of the border, “consultation”, “information exchange”, “no relations”, “competition”. A symbol is associated to each evaluation and modality: “++”, “+”, “±”, “-”, “- -”; an ordinal scale, formed by the numbers “2”, “1”, “0”, “-1”, “-2”, is then applied as a convention to each of these symbols.

Measures of indicators:

Evaluation of intensity and modality		Symbol	Numeric value
Very high	Co-operation	++	2
High	Consultation	+	1
Medium	Information exchange	±	0
Low	No relations	-	-1
Very low	Competition	--	-2

2.4. SWOT analysis methodological process

SWOT framework is based on detecting the *dimensions* and the *internal indicators* of a cross-border area, and the *external* ones referring to central governments or Europe, in order to subsequently *measure* the indicators, allowing to evaluate them as positive or negative, according to the intensity of their presence. There are *variables*, self-explanatory in their (positive or negative) presence; there is “*noise*” (*halo*), which consists in existing indicators with low intensity, and thus not capable of generating a context; and finally, there is *neutrality*, in the presence of indicators of medium or poor relevance, which as such, have no influence on cross-border co-operation, *in the present scenario as outlined by SWOT analysis*.

It is finally possible to define SWOT variables, and redraw the previous table, in order to show a possible SWOT scenario outline:

Cross-border area for co-operation

Measure of indicators		Internal	External
+2	SWOT variables	Strengths (S)	Opportunities (O)
+1		Positive context	Positive context
0		“neutral” (non-relevant)	“neutral” (non-relevant)
-1		Negative context	Negative context
-2	SWOT variables	Weaknesses (W)	Threats (T)


By this complex data processing, SWOT analysis allows to define the conditions of cross-border co-operation in a specific area, and at the same time, it helps to highlight any potential for co-operation, by operating on the given elements so as to emphasise strengths (S) and opportunities (O), while limiting the negative effects of weaknesses (W) and threats (T).

2.5. Action strategies

Action strategy needs to be rationalised within the frame of a scenario, outlining the future by which, starting from the present situation, the area can establish effective cross-border co-operation. The chosen *strategy*, the one considered to be the most appropriate for a specific future target, is the primary tool for action, and the general frame within which decisions are made. On the other hand, when dealing with several realistic options for cross-border co-operation, it becomes necessary to devise differing action strategies. In this research, *five types of strategies* are taken into account.

- a) **First strategy: Strengthening strategy.** This strategy is based on the strengthening of positives, both internal and external to the cross-border area, assuming that by so doing, negatives will be critically abated and bypassed or absorbed by positives.


This strategy is expressed in the following diagram:



Such strategy should be applied where it is possible to act on already large, strong, stable strengths (S) and opportunities (O), so as to spur the rest of the system, transforming or mitigating the weight of few and irrelevant weaknesses (W) and threats (T).

b) *Second strategy: Overcoming strategy.* This strategy is more cautious and systemic, and less expansionist than the first one. Applying a reverse logic, it acts on positives (strengths and opportunities), in order to decrease if not deactivate internal negatives (weaknesses). The aim of this strategy is to preserve and balance stakeholder participation, preventing major internal fractures.


This strategy is expressed in the following diagram:



Besides applying this strategy to a rational development plan backed by political will, it is more generally appropriate where together with evident and substantial obstacles, there are also enough widespread strengths (S) and opportunities (O) to overcome the existing weaknesses (W).

c) *Third strategy: Mobilisation strategy for context control.* This strategy emphasises the effect of strengths (S) and opportunities (O) on the negative (T) context, which poses serious challenges to the establishment of a positive system.


This strategy is expressed in the following diagram:



This strategy is appropriate where external threats (T) are so overcoming or widespread, that it becomes necessary to exploit strengths and opportunities in order to limit the influence of external threats (T).

d) Fourth strategy (Combining the second and the third strategies): negatives control strategy. This strategy is based on the joint action of strengths and opportunities (O) in decreasing weaknesses (W) and threats (T), therefore abating overall negatives.


This strategy is expressed in the following diagram:



This strategy is suitable where both weaknesses (W) and threats (T) are strong. In this markedly negative environment, all available resources, limited as they might be, have to be employed to tackle heavy unbalance and counteract negatives.

e) Fifth strategy (Combining the first and the third strategy): joint internal-external coalition for context control. This strategy consists in employing available strengths (S) and opportunities (O) of sufficient level, in order to face consistent threats (T); this is made possible by the absence of influential weaknesses (W) in the cross-border area.

This strategy is expressed in the following diagram:




This strategy is applied where there are plenty of positive strengths and opportunities (O) (more specifically, if pro-activeness is wide-spread), and weaknesses (W) refer to non-relevant elements. In this case, strategy focuses on decreasing those threats (T) which might affect the present positives.

f) Sixth strategy: recourse to local and central will due to lack of positive condition. This strategy consist from the recourse to the local and central “will”, that is

created from nothing positive situations for establishing the bases of the cross-border co-operation in two divided/united border areas. The strategy is residual to the others, as there are no conditions for applying one of the first five strategies or a combination of those.

This strategy is presented in the following diagram:



The sixth strategy is applicable when there are no strengths (S) and opportunities (O), and instead there are only weaknesses (W) and threats (T). Naturally there can be *halo* positive variables and the local and central will can start from, emphasizing, this vague positive situation.

2.6. Euroregions and EGTC

The Euroregion is an action strategy frame involving a single institutional actor with a specific administration system. As such, it is *beyond* a network of connected relations, expressed by many actors, operating according to a transparent context of action and planning, shared among and by the actors themselves.

Euroregions have already been discussed in their present general features and in the framework of the European Group of Territorial Co-operation (EGTC) - a tool established by the European Union for its member States and territorial authorities.

Irrespective of the legal solutions applicable to actual Euroregions, it has been already shown how, according to their function, there can be three Euroregion types, possibly one within the other. The *Cross-border Euroregion* carries out co-operation functions between contiguous border areas. The *Functional Network Euroregion* cooperates with distant actors who are linked by networks of resources and exchange of connections, and therefore includes wider areas than the former Euroregion does. The *Macro Infrastructures Euroregion* is made up of several cross-border regions, and focuses on local enhancement by providing macro infrastructures for transports, technology, and macro organisations for general social functions (schools, large enterprises, and so on).

Our aim with Euroregions is to assess to which extent the measurement of the 53 indicators of the 10 conceptual dimensions of cross border co-operation offers insights for the creation of one, two or three cross-border area Euroregions, institutionalising the co-operations taken into account. The final number of Euroregions is going to be determined by which functions are most needed in order to implement overall co-operation. There are 46 pertinent indicators

for Cross-border Euroregion, 34 for the Functional Network Euroregion, and 12 for the Macro Infrastructures Euroregion. Euroregions are most needed where the total indicator mark is particularly low: for instance, on the Austrian-Czech border the mark for the first type of Euroregion is 3.2 out of 10, for the second kind is 3.6, and for the third one is 3.1. In this case, it is necessary to create all of the three Euroregions.

Chapter Two

The Euroregion as an Institutional Technology for Planning and Managing the Cross-border Co-operation

1. The Euroregion as an administrative technology for managing the cross-border co-operation

Talking about Euroregion as a technology implies a definition of the concept technology, applied a variation of the context in one state or another. Moreover many macro theories of society conceptualize technology as a *prime mover* in the evolution of the society itself (Goldschmidt 1959; Lenski 1970; White 1959; Frisbie, Clarke 1979: 591-613). We can define the technology (Gasparini 2000: 199)³ as an integrated set of techniques, composed of apparatus, labour organizations, technical behaviour and related sub-layer given by the cultural context, having the capacity to reorganize life (or at least the central segments) of one system. Following this definition, the input in a context of a port, an industrial system (large or atomized), a new city, a tax-free zone, and even of an administrative structure called Euroregion, represents an innovation that brings a new way of interpretation of the relations and to manage the capacities in realizing the local development, to select new cultural, political, economic and social “species”, and in definitive to proceed with new objectives for transforming the community.

Interpreted in this sense, the Euroregion represents an administration that contributes to forming, and disseminating, new objectives, new culture, new professionals, new *élite* and social classes, new micro and macro organizations, new structures, new objectives and new functions.

To that we have to add, however, that the Euroregion is not a panacea of unilinear effects and valid for everything, but on the contrary there are many types of Euroregion, with different structures adapted for periods, places and very different situations.

We analyse this complexity of Euroregion in the following sections.

2. The many definitions of Euroregion

The Euroregion may be defined as the cross-border areas’ thrust towards an institution that helps improve co-operation and foster development in those areas that would, otherwise, be destined to remain in a marginalised condition and be hindered in their possibility of ensuring a good quality of life for their inhabitants. This co-operation process has begun in areas on the margins (borders) of rich countries (such as Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy), hence, they were marginalised in relation to the centre of these nations (von Malchus, 1973: 179). Through co-operation also, these peripheral areas gained their own centrality, in the first place of economic nature, by establishing connections and collaborating with the cross-border regions of neighbouring countries. Under these conditions, the process may be extended to all border areas, and even more so to the Balkan-

³ The author has extensively used the concept of “technology” to define the souls of the city, to define the past and the future of Trieste and other cities, to individualize the obtrusiveness and the control of technology, transforming it into innovation; for exploring the possibility of developing border cities through a university and Euroregion, etc.

Danube areas, where development can guarantee political stability, a break from the temptations to base social relations on excessive ethnicity and the strengthening of national loyalties at local level. However, if the Euroregion expands, it takes on different characteristics in *time and space*. In *time*, because Euroregions can be the starting point of a cross-border co-operation previously set in motion by private actors, in which case, the process was relatively linear and developed over time, aiming at the institutionalisation of co-operation; but Euroregions may also come into being under conditions of *non*-pre-existing co-operation, and instead, be the very driving force behind it; in this case, then, the Euroregion will fulfil more complex functions than the previous one. In *space*, because Euroregions are more (interregional) or less extended (up to 25 km on both sides of the border) depending on the major or minor functions they have to fulfil. Let us consider, then, these differences in terms of three functional types, hence, of three spheres of action: each of them will be either more or less relevant in the eighteen border areas analysed depending on the weakness of one of the functional spheres. The advantage of taking into consideration simultaneously the three types of Euroregions within the whole of a specific cross-border area is that the functions relative to each type of Euroregion require the specific local support of a specific institutional and political apparatus. Therefore, the advantage is in combining the diversity of the many border areas and the different ways to conceive borders (Gasparini 1999b: 12) into a single model including the different answers to be provided, if necessary, at different times.

First type of Euroregion. It is a Euroregion intending to provide the area with *macro-structures* or political agreements for cross-border co-operation, designed to link the area with international hinterlands. The goal of this type of Euroregion is to provide the area of road and ports macro-infrastructure (harbours, motorways, airports), structures that may favour co-operation in the border regions, mutually compatible national legislation and cross-border agreements between countries and/or regions. These objectives may be pursued by Euroregional bodies (Presidents' Conferences, for example), taking the initiative in matters of legislation through conventions and decisions on operational interventions.

The second type of Euroregion's objective is to implement *co-operation by means of functional networks*. Its basis are the institutions favouring the establishment and stabilisation of ties, companies, firms, administrative institutions, cultural institutions, associations, mass media, etc. From these ties, triggered by this Euroregion's institutions, stem the networks of relations qualitatively influenced by what is exchanged: money, information, culture, support and so on.

The goal of the *third type of Euroregion* is that of *contiguous co-operation*. This is closely linked with the community, the creation of a cross-border area specialised in some economic function (for example, winter tourism, universities, "minor tourism", etc.) and the intense involvement of the population.

To imagine a cross-border co-operation managed by any one of these three types of Euroregion it is to think that, in each of these cross-border areas, there can always be at least one of these types, if not all three of them.

This depends on the environmental conditions of the Euroregion; let us take into consideration, for example, the two extreme cases. On one hand, in those areas where the cross-border region is integrated in a consolidated system of road and communication infrastructures and where the functional advantages of co-operation between institutions and organisations in the cross-border area are also integrated, it is useful to exploit the full

potential of the Euroregion of the third type and overlook the institutional aspects of the first and second type because, given their functional irrelevance, there would be the disadvantage of the institutional bureaucratisation of these two types of Euroregion, which could trigger sterile competition (indeed due to this very lack of an original function). On the other hand, in those areas where the cross-border region is far from infrastructures and where the inhabitants have long lived without the functional need for those on the other side of the border, all three types of Euroregion become a necessity, to include “strong” and indispensable functions for the development and welfare of the cross-border area. In this case there are multiple Euroregional institutions acting autonomously, but according to models of complementarity and coordination (as identified by Pegoraro and Rinella in the *principle of subsidiarity*), according to which, secondary institutional actors must be enabled to carry on with their initiatives in line with the *dimension* of the pursued objectives and the *efficiency* of the actions taken (2000a: 258).

3. The Euroregion: where?

International conventions, signed protocols, literature on the subject and experience indicate that Euroregions are usually established mainly in those border areas economically and socially marginal in relation to the state system. This stems from the idea of *indicative planning*, elaborated after the World War II and often comprising local “development poles”: these are triggered by the public sector (central or local) through incentives (lower interest rates, tax exemptions, facilitations of various kinds, recognition of depressed area status, etc.). The “development poles” policy was promoted to establish centralities in marginal locations.

The Euroregion following this logic aims to avoid labour force migration by promoting, through employment policies, a quality of life which it would otherwise be anti-economic to foster. In this context, cities that are not very large in terms of inhabitants, have a great degree of social and functional heterogeneity in relation to their low demographic density. The ISIG research, carried out in 1995 (Gasparini 1999a: 4), shows that in Europe the average population in the border cities goes from 76,656 inhabitants in the German cities, to 12,357 in the Norwegian cities. Euroregions do not usually comprise large cities or state capitals (except for the case of Copenhagen or Bratislava), and if they do, then the Euroregion is mainly involved in the management of large infrastructures (airports, harbours or other) and, therefore aims to exploit the advantages coming from the shared use of highly expensive infrastructures.

Many elements, then, concur in justifying the “where” of a Euroregion:

- 1) to increase the advantages that local development (cross-border) may draw by attracting and combining resources on both sides of the border, versus the advantages offered by the state alone. This happens as the border loses its fixed characteristic (stemming from reluctance to co-operate, need for control, strict selection) and becomes a “virtual” barrier with ever decreasing economic relevance;
- 2) to avoid that the loosening of the political border be followed by the strengthening of the internal border between the areas included in the Euroregion and the strong areas of the country itself, thus preventing the concept of Euroregion from entering into conflict with the concept of nation;

- 3) to achieve harmonisation with the European principles, in order to enjoy their protection and exploit the advantages to be drawn from EU programmes;
- 4) to enjoy cultural, historical and social similarities with the communities and populations on both sides of the border.

These principles are valid in general terms, because in the Balkan-Danube area this is true especially in the case of long-established borders (drawn no later than the end of World War I). On the contrary, along more recent borders, established after the fall of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, there is a lack of border awareness, the boundary is used to emphasise state identity and therefore there is less propensity towards cross-border co-operation.

However, in the cross-border area there is bound to be at least one of the three types of Euroregion, and this happens on the basis of pre-existing conditions. The adoption of the first type of Euroregion is fundamental for the establishment of the other two types, however the first type itself may be a further element of support for the other two.

4. The Euroregion: when?

Another point in the Vademecum indicates the moment in which, i.e. “when”, it is possible to establish a Euroregion.

From the history of Euroregions it is possible to notice that the Euroregion is the last step in a three-phase process.

The *first* phase is characterised by cross-border co-operation between private citizens and private bodies, aiming to create the conditions to develop their activities, that is, to create micro-centralities in the area to serve as context for enterprises.

The *second* phase sees the introduction of cross-border co-operation among local institutions, to create centrality in the marginal locations to support private firms’ networks. At this level, one notices already the importance and need for loose relations between local institutions at the micro-level, and for close relations in the single tasks, actions and interventions.

The *third* phase entails a cross-border co-operation that is clearly steered by the Euroregion’s institutions. In other words, the Euroregion, at this stage, has its own institutions diversified according to functions and structured in organisational systems with different training times and operating times.

Actually, the establishment of the Euroregion does not have to necessarily take place in the third phase, but also immediately, as a first phase, should the three-phase process involve long implementation times, especially if co-operation along a border is difficult due to ethnic or political reasons.

The difference between “third phase” Euroregional institutions of countries with a history of co-operation and “first phase” Euroregional institutions of countries where collaboration is recent lies in the functions that they will fulfil. In the latter case, when the beginning of co-operation coincides with the establishment of the Euroregion, the *when* begins with the Euroregion of the first type (*macro-structures* and political agreements), the prerequisites for the Euroregion based on *co-operation by means of functional network* develop later, and only afterwards the Euroregion based on *contiguous co-operation* may be established.

Activation times differ from cross-border area to cross-border area. This means, among other things, that the establishment of a Euroregion may also begin directly with the second type if not the third.

5. The area of the Euroregion

Another item in the Vademecum of the “good” Euroregion is the area of the Euroregion itself. How extended should it be? An initial answer would be that it depends on the functions one expects it to fulfil: at least three functions were identified already in the planning phases of the *Euradria* (between Friuli-Venezia Giulia/Italy, Slovenia and Carinthia/Austria). The *first* is that of contiguous co-operation (contiguity Euroregion – third type), the *second* is that of precise relations between organisations and institutions (functional networks Euroregion – second type), the *third* is that of macro-infrastructures (macro-Euroregion – first type).

The definition of the area of the cross-border Euroregion by *contiguity* takes on several meanings: 1) of the people who in this contiguous area develop strong relations (high emotional intensity) and weak relations (low intensity but widespread); 2) of the communities next to one another (villages, small towns, towns, small cities) enabling the development of networks (roads, cultural activities, combined institutional actions, etc.); 3) of the economic activities, whose dynamism make the area attractive and therefore foster tourism (along with structures for tourism and environmental improvement, for example).

To fulfil the contiguity function (Euroregion of the third type), the planned Euroregion has to be small, i.e. the small area comprising both sides of the border. Functional networks (Euroregion of the second type) are independent from the area, therefore this type may also be greater in size. The Euroregion of macro-structures or cross-border agreements (first type), on the contrary, requires very large areas, so that the agreements and the macro-structures may ensure concrete advantages for the population and the economies within this area. Then, it is possible to deduce that a Euroregion of the first type contains a smaller Euroregion of the second type and several Euroregions of the third type.

Lastly, the extension of the area is linked to a further factor, i.e. to the time of establishment of the Euroregion; if it was recently established, the tendency will be to have it develop fast, the main function being that to emphasise the shared cross-border context, while if the Euroregion is an old one, then the tangible functions translating into direct actions prevail and therefore its area of the Euroregion is relatively contiguous and not too big.

6. Demographic density

To ensure the type of relations required by contiguity (Euroregion of the third type) and therefore to ensure the community-effect to the system of strong and weak ties, the demographic density must not be very high. This means that if the communities are not demographically big and relations between the people from contiguous communities are sufficiently intense; people in a community know what happens in those nearby, certain portions of the population know each other at least by sight, and with some they even hold relations.

The demographic density in the other types of Euroregions has a lesser impact on the success of the Euroregion itself. This holds true especially for the Euroregion of structures and infrastructures (first type), which may have a very low demographic density since it encloses scarcely populated lake and mountain areas.

7. Internal and external networks

The networks of relations differ in each type of Euroregion analysed, especially at the level of intensity.

In the Euroregion of structures and macro-structures (first type), the networks connect communities, villages, small towns and cities rather than institutions, private citizens and associations; furthermore, they link the internal elements of the Euroregion's system with one another, but in particular, they link these elements with the outside, producing, within the Euroregion and its hinterland, different degrees of centrality (regional, national, international, global) with the outside.

In the Euroregion of functional networks (second type), the networks connect points (enterprises and institutions) thus giving origin to systems differing in resources, services and exchanged information. These networks are mainly inside the Euroregion and are such as to create co-operation between operational organisations.

Lastly, as to Euroregions of contiguous co-operation (third type), the concentration of mainly economic activities in a small area leads to the specialisation of the area and of network systems (network of relations) integrated enough to highlight the contiguity of the businesses and of the infrastructures connecting them. Consequently, this amplifies the area's capability to attract "clients" from ever-wider circles.

This may be further clarified, going back to the economic functions foreseen for such Euroregions as the one planned between Italy, Slovenia and Austria (Gasparini 2000a). Alpine tourism (Tarvisio-Kranjska Gora-Arnoldstein), along with specific professional training, tourism-related handy crafts and industry and the organisation of free-time cultural events, lead to the establishment of an integrated network among the actors involved, making the area attractive to the outside and many *hinterlands* such as Europe of the planes, central-eastern Europe, and the Mediterranean. At the same time, in the southern part of this Euroregion (Natisone-Torre-Tolminotto), the functions become specific of quality-based agricultural enterprises, local tourism for the improvement of small towns and road links, actions for the appreciation of the agricultural and local cultures (museums), natural parks, railway itineraries, etc. All these functions lead to a network of widespread and congruent relations, forming a hinterland comprising the areas of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Slovenia and Austria. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the two areas considered (Tarvisiano-Kranjska Gora-Arnoldstein – north – and Natisone-Torre-Tolminotto – south) fulfil complementary tourist functions combining the respective *hinterlands*, so that the first area enjoys the nearby *hinterland* of the second area and vice versa.

8. Necessary institutions for the Euroregion

Institutions differ for each type of planned Euroregion.

The *Euroregion of infrastructures* and political agreements (first type) operates through the following three institutions: 1) *Permanent conference of the Presidents of the regions*, convening periodically and in any case, either when decisions must be taken or to assess the status of co-operation; 2) *Work group*, consisting of regional officials who confer, prepare documents and identify problems; 3) *Pre-existing private structures or new structures established ad hoc*. These are established in order to plan and carry out the major projects identified by the permanent Conference at political level.

The implied strengths of this institutional framework are: 1) brief implementation times of the decisions, 2) high probability of success because the actors are few and guided by macro-political operative choices linked to real interests; 3) low need for new administrative structures, thus avoiding the introduction of further rules in the implementation process, with the consequent savings on unnecessary additional expenses.

The Euroregion of functional networks co-operation (second type) consists of the following institutions: 1) Conference of the presidents of trade associations and of public institutions operating in the regions within the Euroregion. These presidents are the networks' actors including the president of the regional council (or specific councillors of the regional government), the presidents of districts, chambers of commerce, trade associations, regional areas' mountain communities, the members of the Euroregion of functional networks and, first among them, the deans of universities. This body plans actions to support the networks, decides on concrete support, supervises the progress of the Euroregion, proposes corrective measures, etc. The General Conference discusses general policy, while operatively it branches out into Conference by functional sectors.

2) *Permanent coordination office*. This coordination is referred to the networks' nodes. The office has its own personnel and it may be linked to one of the Euroregion's institutional bodies.

3) *Private companies*. They plan and carry out actions of intervention specific to the field of the Euroregion's networks.

The implied strengths are: 1) brief implementation times of the decisions; 2) the high probability of success because the range of competencies is very wide: spanning from the awareness of reciprocal needs and necessity of intervention to the possible activation of instruments to foster a network of relations between businesses/institution and between these and outside enterprises; 3) the possibility, as well as clear necessity, of organising conferences for productive, cultural, administrative sectors aimed at the creation and promotion of functional networks; 4) the limited need to establish permanent administrative structures (Permanent office of coordination), that act as a link between the decisions of the Conference and the actions of the private companies; 5) the individual companies' competence to manage relations within networks and to favour their establishment. Funding of these companies may come from the single actors within the Conference and/or users of this informative/formative service of intervention.

The *Euroregion of contiguous co-operation* (third type) develops very complex functions, because it is directly linked to civil society and to the activation processes of resources through each other's knowledge and participation. A more in depth analysis of the nature of the foreseen institutions, namely, the *Assembly* and the *operative secretariat*, is therefore necessary

Indeed, the institutions typical of consolidated Euroregions are the Assembly, the Secretariat and the work groups. The Assembly is both a "chamber" and an "executive body".

As a "chamber" it may consist of a representative from each municipality of the Euroregion and representatives of volunteer associations and enterprises. Thus defined, the Assembly takes the shape of a federation of municipalities, civil society and citizens. The fact that the Assembly is so numerous is justified by several reasons: a) the involvement of civil society as a whole and of local agencies to establish and maintain reciprocal knowledge and cross-

border co-operation; b) the identification of the necessary steps to achieve this knowledge and co-operation; c) the identification of the priorities to satisfy these needs; d) the optimisation of the combination of needs to be met, observing the above mentioned priorities; e) the identification of the organisational instruments (especially organisations); f) conferring to these organisational instruments legitimacy, a domain and eventually the resources; g) the control of the effectiveness and efficiency of these instruments. In short, then, the Assembly as “Chamber” aims to foster a sense of belonging to the area and of indispensability of cross-border co-operation as well as indications on how to achieve it.

The Assembly, as generator of the “Executive body”, obviously may take the shape of a “council” or that of an operative structure acting by means of “work groups” (in different sectors) in close contact with the Assembly.

In short, this Assembly and the related “operational secretariats” do not necessarily imply a complex and stable administrative structure, on the contrary, they may be supported by pre-existing structures with a minimal increment of roles and personnel.

The Assembly (comprising “chamber” and “executive body”) and the secretariat must be structures that promote and control activities, projects and organisations of civil society (i.e. associations, cooperatives, enterprises and services). The “Assembly” and the “executive body” should especially promote, directly or indirectly, organisations ensuring that the needs of the Euroregions’ communities are met. Effective control of the fulfilment of this function is necessary, to ensure that the principles of equity and efficiency of intervention are at the basis of all actions.

The *Euroregion of co-operation by contiguity* is present in every cross-border area and it is also the most complex of the three, both because it encompasses many aspects of everyday life (economy, culture, politics, appartenance, etc.) and also because it must foster the activation and transformation of the many segments and many relational networks of civil society. That is why it is useful to recap, even briefly, and also take a look at the processes this Euroregion is actively involved in.

Similar organisations, through interaction, form stable networks within these relations (inter-organisational context). Relations, however, will differ if an organisation exercises a monopoly of the function in the Euroregion (this happens, for example, when there is a single agency or service: transport or professional training, for example) in which case it forms a *unified* inter-organisational context, or if this organisation is in a network of relations with similar organisations. In the latter case, the organisations can fulfil their functions, by acting singularly (*social choice*), or by delegating the fulfilment of part of one’s function to a new organisation (*federation*, as is often the case with the promotional or planning aspect of the product or offered service), or by forming a coalition with others to achieve immediate and specific goals (*coalition*).

Clearly, each of these procedures designed to fulfil the functions and to meet the needs of the Euroregion is matched by a type of network of different relations among the organisations themselves. It is evident as well that the Assembly-Executive body may be instrumental in favouring one or the other type of network of relations.

Furthermore, the most adequate answers for the establishment of a Euroregion come from volunteer associations, cooperatives, enterprises and cultural institutions, and since they express (or can express) new needs in new ways, they must be held in serious account and

with particular favour. However, they may be in competition, because depending on the different actors involved, there may be contrast concerning the objectives, the testing or researching methods of these objectives, etc. Yet, all of this is still useful to foster the establishment of these organisations.

These organisations, though, are too weak, because they are small and in their early stages, and all too often this weakness hinders and diverts their uniqueness. This happens mainly within the inter-organisational networks (consisting of all the organisations operating in the same sector), which they must enter into and come to terms with, while emerging and asserting themselves. These inter-organisational networks are a resource for the new organisations that share similar characteristics with the organisations already enclosed (Wiewel, Hunter 1985). Indeed, in the environment (in this case the Euroregion area) there are resources in terms of personnel and resources from agencies willing to provide funds; in the environment, the domain of the organisation is as well defined (what to do, for whom, where and why), therefore, the institutions of the Euroregion confer legitimacy to this type of activity.

The actual intervention of the Euroregion's institutions may place these associations in the condition to overcome the relational barriers hindering their formation, mobilisation and transformation in relation to the needs not yet met or newly arisen.

The three processes (formation, mobilisation, transformation) are relative to both old and new organisations as well as to inter-organisational networks of relations.

The problems related to the *formation* involve, in the first place, the creation of a network of relations which new organisations may easily access, enabling predictions on the effects of their activity. The function of the Assembly-executive body may be to allocate resources, in the form of funds, advice and information. Furthermore, the Assembly-executive body may acknowledge the *domain* (what to do, for whom, where and why) of the organisation, thus providing *legitimacy* to it and its actions.

In the *mobilisation* processes of organisations and networks the Assembly-executive body may point out the strategic value of certain solutions proposed for the Euroregion by the organisations, thus favouring its establishment or enlargement; but it may also intervene in cases of negative or "reluctant" behaviour, threatening them with sanctions.

The intervention of the Assembly-executive body is more difficult or not as visible in the processes of *transformation* of organisations and networks, because it takes place during the decision process and its implementation. This intervention is linked with the indirect results produced by the above-mentioned incentives and by others that will be discussed later; intervention is, instead, irrelevant as to the "technical" aspects of formation of the decision and its implementation.

Furthermore, the decision's formation undergoes deep horizontal influences from the environment of volunteer associations; these influences stem from the unclear boundary between associations, due to the fact that the director (and other actors) belongs simultaneously to many associations, economic enterprises and institutions. This is the complex way, through which a new organisation, as well as those already existing, may enter the network of inter-organisational relations, which, in turn, become more predictable as organisations steer more efficiently towards achieving the goal. This stimulating intervention of the Assembly-executive body reaches the goal to favour the actions of organisations,

including those emerging, resolving the *opaque environment* made up of non-consolidated and rather unpredictable relations – because the others’ plans are unknown) into an environment in which the reciprocal actions of each of these organisations, aimed at the fulfilment of the functions of the Euroregion, are clear to everyone.

In other words, the Assembly-executive body can favour the substitution of a basically competitive context, which Banfield (1961) calls *social choice* (according to which, each organisation acts to maximise its own interest), for one based on *complementarity* and *co-operation* with other organisations. To this end, resources, legitimacy and definition of domain, to which the Euroregional institutions contribute, enable the creation of a *transparent environment* by means of data banks, shared data systems and information on budgets and projects and their possible changes in the pursuit of the organisations’ individual objectives.

Such complementarity, then, takes on functional connotations (the activity of an organisation begins where that of another ended), or geographical connotations (different organisations cover different areas). However, it would be a mistake to believe that this context of complementary relations pervades the environment as a whole, and it would not even be desirable. Indeed, perfect complementarity may easily lead some organisations to hold a monopoly or an oligopoly of functions, defeating the intent to evaluate and plan multiple answers for the different needs of the many social groups in the Euroregion. What, at first sight, may appear to be competition, on the contrary, is simply the search for the most adequate answers to many different needs

In short, then, the Assembly-executive body fulfils the function to favour the formation, mobilisation and transformation of organisations and networks of relations in the Euroregion, establishing the conditions to diminish the “opacity” of the environment (institutions, volunteer associations and enterprises), thus laying the foundation of an environment based on complementarity and co-operation; co-operation may be positive or negative, the latter being between organisations which pursue different or contrasting answers but for different social categories.

The last aspect in the scenario involving the intervention of these Euroregional institutions is their capability to divert resources (funds, cultural heritage, abilities, information) from the outside to the community providing organised answers for the establishment and preservation of the Euroregion. This may be achieved by conveying and regulating into the Euroregional inter-organisational network the resources coming from region, state, central association and central institutions, but also from parts of internal or external organisations, like those present on the territory with their own branch offices. Clearly, “to convey” means, in this case, to confer these energies to the combination values/answers, and, therefore, to harmonise them with those actions already undertaken by pre-existing organisations on the Euroregional territory.

The Assembly-executive body, then, may undertake a series of actions to ensure interdependence between the organisations’ types and organisational elements in charge of providing answers: (1) controlling the basic answers, (2) stimulating the inter-organisational networks of the environments, fostering transparency in the creation of answers for the local needs identified, and (3) regulating the flow of external resources for the establishment of inter-organisational networks to provide the answers deemed indispensable by the Euroregional community.

9. The objectives followed by the Euroregions and governed by the élite

In several studies of the Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia (Isig) it appeared that the best conditions for connecting together the objectives of cross-border co-operation can be achieved by developing different types of Euroregions, which are differentiated by the objectives to be carried out and therefore each of them presents a government and a very simple *governance*. It is clear that the three types of Euroregion are not an alternative, they are complementary and placed in a sort of Russian (Matryoshka) doll, one inside the other.

To accomplish these objectives, we consider them according to the types of Euroregions that we have already defined, and on which we take the attitudes of the *elites* of economic, political and civil society in the border areas.

The main objective of this Euroregion is to cope with problems where the contiguity of social, economic and cultural spaces prevails. And in this contiguity activities aiming at creating conditions for people to take initiatives and actions are pursued, using the European Union calls, to cooperate for mutual understanding between the parts on the both sides of the border. Therefore, the *governance* does not organize and do not take the place of companies or associations, but proposes, assists, coordinates, develops ideas: the spirit that prevails is a kind of ideology of the collaboration/participation as source for a “new”, “complete” and “perfect” society. Even in the economic field can be exploited with the continuity in tourism and in the labour market.

Among the *elite* of economic, political and civil society, the main interest comes from the *elite* of the local authorities of the civil society, both for services and for institutions. The economic and political *elites* are more tepid in front of cross-border Euroregion, first for the fear that it creates a new bureaucracy. For the rest the two *elites* affirm different concerns: the companies think in terms of market that goes well beyond the area of this Euroregion; the local political *elites* (mayors, provincial administrations) fear for a collapse of their powers, while the regional administrative *elite* are more attracted by the news that this Euro-regional machine can introduces in the management of the public affairs.

The Euroregion of the functional networks is understood as virtual place in which the actors and institutions elaborate and/or enter networks of reciprocity relations. In other terms, it is dominated by the relation networks that non adjoining institutions such as medium-sized enterprises, provinces, chambers of commerce, universities develop. Therefore, it is an Euroregion of civil society actors.

The advantages of this Euroregion are multiple, and are acceptable from the most of the *elite*. The first advantage is from the fact that its *governance* is very simple, less expensive, and visible in its structure and therefore *produces transparency* over what is going on within the sectorial networks (universities, provinces, etc.) and between the intersectorial networks. This transparency naturally is very important in informing the network participants of the things that happen and of the actors' actions. It is made from a sort of *deliberative participation on organizational level*. All the *elites* are convinced by the goodness coming from the *Euroregion of functional networks*, in particularly the economic *elites* devoted to services (on first place the Chambers of Commerce), the regional and national political *elites*, and the regional and supra-regional civil society *elites*.

Finally the *Euroregion of strategies and macro-infrastructures* is the most vast one because includes many regions. The objective from that large dimension is justifiable from the fact

that this regards the *major strategies*, different infrastructures (corridors, ports, airports, railways), hospitals, universities: all these strategies and macro-infrastructures have the scope of making the cross-border areas more central in the European context. It is a centrality that is acquired for the global interest rather than for the functions of the civil society.

These characteristics of globalism and simple *governance* favour the consensus of all economic and political *elites*, and instead they create, as well, certain disregard from the part of the civil society *elites* (services, cultural institutions and organizations, in first place). In reality, one difficulty can instead come from the central governments of these border regions, and this because the Euroregion, configured like this, is very extended (in kilometres and inhabitants), however in particular because it occupies with the objectives that are perceived as in conflict with the national sovereignties from the states where those regions take place.

At this point, it appears that the three complementary euroregions, instead of only one, are due to the necessity to confront three types of *objectives* (*participation, transparency, strategy*). The motive is simple: the three euroregions (cross-border, functional networks and macro-infrastructures) are very efficient in achieving, individually, the three families of objectives, as it is not necessary to achieve all the three objectives. Their *governance* and organizational structure are very different for every objective and therefore putting them together can mean making the achievement of the objectives muddled and enormous, their cost in this sense can be very high for the community and the bureaucracy can be extremely complex. And besides the three goals (we repeat *participation, transparency, strategy*) have different periods of realisation, and also the individual Euro-regions can be disabled (or exceeded) in the case where the objective of the different types of co-operation is achieved.

10. Functions of the Euroregion

The functions of the *Euroregion of infrastructures* and of the *Euroregion of co-operation by means of functional networks* are evident and have clear features. Indeed, the main function of the first Euroregion is to favour co-operation and coordination within the macro-economic sphere of strategic investments. However, it does not involve only the economic policies, but the management of joint interventions for new and renewed macro-infrastructures as well.


In the second Euroregion the main function is to link points (private enterprises, local bodies, public institutions) into networks of relations, with specific economic, cultural, administrative, etc. functions. These points are located in the border regions and therefore form, among themselves, “functional networks”.

The *Euroregion of contiguous co-operation* is, without a doubt, the one with the most susceptible, delicate and complex functions.

Indeed, in this case, the cross-border Euroregion fulfils many functions: 1) to create and emphasise the *sense of belonging* to an area straddling a border, and *mutual knowledge* of the cultural, social and economic features; 2) to transform this knowledge into *cooperative action*; 3) to render this co-operation *indispensable*. Evidently, these functions position themselves at different stages of implementation and at different times, depending on the status of cross-border co-operation in the Euroregion. Obviously this status differs whether one considers the borders within the EU internal boundaries, the borders between Union and non-Union member-states, or borders between non-Union member-states. As to the countries, whose eighteen borders were analysed in this study, they are non- member-states and their standing with the EU differs greatly as well. Indeed there are short-term candidates, long-

term candidates but there are also countries who, to-date, are still not candidates. Clearly this status reflects itself on the attitudes and actions planned and/or developed in relation to the possibility for a “good” Euroregion.

In the case of the concrete area, the implementation times for the Euroregion of contiguous co-operation foresee a first function of 1) fostering active mutual knowledge aiming at 2) emphasising the indispensability of cross-border co-operation, especially at the economic level, in order to 3) achieve this co-operation by coordinating actions in the sectors of tourism, agri-tourism and services. One may expect as a consequence the outset of 4) a new sense of belonging to the area and the residing society, 5) further supported by cultural actions, which had already been undertaken from the alternate route of 6) the process of mutual knowledge, previously promoted in the first function. It is evident in the time schedule of these functions that there is a divarication, a return and a multi-functionality of mutual knowledge



11. Implementation times of the functions and of the institutions

The implementation times of the functions and of the institutions also vary and are somewhat complex depending on the type of Euroregion.

For the *Euroregion of macro-structures* the relationship between implementation times and institutions traces the one between situation and necessity. Indeed, where connecting infrastructures of the border area already exist, the “Conference of presidents” will be able to operate easily, either because a decision has already been made or because the decisional process has been previously tested (as it is possible to observe in the Hungary-Croatia border

area). Instead, in those areas where this co-operation of the structures is lacking, the establishment of the first type of Euroregion becomes a *necessity* (as indicated for the Bosnia&Herzegovina-Croatia, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”-Serbia and Montenegro, Greece-“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” border areas).

In the *Euroregion of co-operation by functional networks* they can easily be improved if they already exist (this applies especially to Bulgaria and the countries it borders with); implementation times may, instead, be longer for the institutions in border areas where functional networks between enterprises and territorial institutions are lacking (like Albania-“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Croatia-Serbia and Montenegro, Romania-Serbia and Montenegro, Albania-Greece).

The functions are fulfilled at different times also in the *Euroregion of co-operation by contiguity*, and its institutions may be established at different time intervals as well, but the context is more complex than the previous ones, and deserves a few specific comments.

Organisational segments, public or private, formed, mobilised or transformed by the work groups of the Euroregional “government”, may favour “active mutual knowledge”. This *knowledge is not mere transfer* of what there is on one side and the other of the border, *but above all* of what there can be. Knowledge implies *imagination and creativity for what may be achieved* by transforming the present situation. This active knowledge involves mainly the economic sphere, but also the cultural, social and services spheres. The activities of the above-mentioned organisational instruments are carried out in *conferences, joint projects, evaluations of possible and probable scenarios, establishment of joint volunteer associations and advisory support in examining combined data and possible cross-border projects*.

The second function, relative to the sense of *indispensability of co-operation*, consists of (1) the identification of institutional sectors planning or elaborating joint actions in terms of services and spatial planning to lend economic and tourist centrality to the area, (2) the identification of the sectors of indispensability, (3) the elaboration of indicators to prove, if not the indispensability, at least the usefulness, of co-operation. These segments of the function may be carried out by the “*secretariats*”, supported by the work groups operating within the “government”.

The third function involves *cross-border economic co-operation* and it is directly fulfilled by *enterprises* receiving professional, financial and practical advice to apply for EU funds or access professional training programmes.

The fifth function, as promotion of *cultural actions*, may be fulfilled by a coalition of municipalities or by single municipalities and volunteer associations.

Lastly the fourth function, relative to the *sense of belonging to the cross-border area*, though being a consequence of the preceding functions, must be supported by shared actions promoting single cultural-historical studies, common museums and shared elements. Furthermore, it needs the support of different administrative segments in each municipality, developing that exchange of information designed to render the activities and plans of other organisations “transparent” or, at any rate, to dissipate the stereotypes, which may only lead to a distorted perception of others.

12. The domain of the environment

Another element to be added in the Vademecum for a “good” Euroregion is the capability of the Euroregion to dominate its environment, or if it poses obstacles, to transform it to meet the needs.

By domain, is to be intended the (environmental) context of legislation, of political-administrative, financial, socio-economic and cultural actions in which each type of Euroregion is placed.

However, it is important to point out the possibility for the Euroregion not to be a simple passive receiver of all the pressures coming from the environment; on the contrary, the Euroregion itself may react and exercise pressure on the state, regional and local environment to make it “yield” to the Euroregion, thus, enabling the fulfilment of its functions to the utmost.

Often, the three types of cross-border Euroregion must exercise pressure at the: (1) *state level*, so that greater territorial competencies be transferred from the state to the Euroregion – bordering countries are either symmetrically federal or regionalised to a great extent – and local territorial authorities may have greater financial capability; (2) *at international level*, with the signature of significant multilateral agreements among the countries; (3) *at regional level* with policies designed to overcome prejudice on both sides of the border, and foster a cross-border “vision”.

13. The “algorithm” for the “good” Euroregion

At this point, it would be tempting to maintain that, to ensure the establishment of a “good” cross-border Euroregion one should follow a Vademecum with the objectives, the rules, the institutional, organisational and individual actions which may be summed up in an “algorithm” with the following operative dimensions:

The “good” euroregion function of (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11)

- 1 = type of Euroregion and/or combination of types of Euroregion
- 2 = where
- 3 = *when*
- 4 = *area*
- 5 = demographic density
- 6 = internal and external networks
- 7 = Euroregional institutions
- 8 = objectives and élites
- 9 = functions
- 10 = functions’ times and institutions’ times
- 11 = domain of the environment

These eleven operative dimensions are the basic core of what should and can be done to create a Euroregion, which realistically and convincingly pursues its objectives and where cross-border co-operation may be seen in action: a co-operation stemming from the awareness that only (or mostly) advantages may be drawn from it.

The institutionalisation of CbC:Scheme of the Euroregion

Elements	Euroregions		
	Macro infrastructures	Functional networks	Cross-border co-operation
Where	Isolated areas	Absence of a greater network	Anywhere
When	ASAP hen there are no existing infrastructures (immediate management of existing infrastructures)	Immediately when there are factors inhibiting the functioning or existence of networks	Improving the existing co-operation
Area	Large	Middle	Small
Demographic density	Low	Middle	High
Networks (prevailing)	External	Internal (but not too extended)	Internal and small
Institutions	Committee of presidents of Regions and Political Institutions	Committee of Presidents of large Institutions and network stakeholders (economic, cultural, etc.)	Local institutions and grass-root associations to activate, mobilise and transform at the local political and civil society levels
Objectives	Strategies	Transparency	Participation
Functions	To favour co-operation and coordination within the macro-economic sphere of strategic investments	To link the network stakeholders (private enterprise, local bodies, pubic institution) into networks of relations	a) To create and emphasise the sense of belonging and mutual knowledge; b) to transform this knowledge into co-operative actions; c) to render this co-operation indispensable
Timing for implementation	If the infrastructures do not exist, then this implementation is immediately necessary	Improvements if the networks already exists; establishment of networks when there are no	Depending on local situation
Domain	International, national (and regional)	Regional (and international)	Regional

Chapter Three

Comparisons:

Cross-border Co-operation in Europe

from Norway-Russia to Bulgaria-Turkey

1. An overall framework

So far we have developed and proposed an original methodological process to explain and analyse the level of cross-border co-operation between border areas, starting from the indicators of the conceptual dimensions, the variables SWOT (SWOT analysis), distinguishing between internal and external, and including them in a wider context and support that we called “halo”, drawing from these variables SWOT strategies of action, divided into six alternatives, and finally building tools of governance in these border areas, divided according to the objectives and needs, which we called Euroregion.

Secondly, this Euroregion, an institutional unit of governance has been defined in three forms: cross-border Euroregion, Euroregion of functional networks, Euroregion of macro-infrastructures. These forms are not alternatives but complementary. They differ in terms of the functions they perform, the needs they meet, the way they re-organise space and the timing within which they develop.. In Chapter Two we identified the conditions in which a “Euroregion” could be formed, even within the more specific European Grouping of Territorial Co-operation, the acronym of which is EGTC.

The methodological aspects of SWOT analysis (Chapter 1) and the institutional aspects of the Euroregion (Chapter 2) are used in the analysis of cross-border co-operation in 55 European border areas, spanning from Norway-Russia to Greece-Turkey. Almost all of these areas have been part of former socialist countries or are bordering with former socialist countries. Only two border areas are totally external to the macro-ex-socialist European regions, namely Italy-Austria and Greece-Turkey. The third chapter looks at the status of cross-border co-operation in these areas. It does not consider cross-border co-operation for each of the 55 areas, nor what should be improved nor even created, instead it compares the 55 areas to identify the prominent lines of co-operation in the geographical areas in which the positive or even negative connotations are assumed.

In other words, the method we are interested in using and developing is comparison, which should enable us to see where co-operation is prevalent or not so prevalent. It is clear that comparison, as the unit of analysis for the cross-border areas, can be done by selecting a number of criteria to measure and explain each of the 55 areas. This way, the information is quantitative rather than qualitative. In fact, it is easier to compare using quantitative data, rather than qualitative data, which is very complex and unique to each area.

The chapter also is divided into two sections. In the first we carry out an analytical comparison of the areas of each of the three macro-regions (Balkan-Danube Europe, Central Europe, Baltic and Eastern Europe). In the second section the general comparison is extended to the entire macro-region of Central Europe between the Russian-Scandinavian Europe (west and east) and Balkan-Thracian Europe (north and south).

2. Comparison of cross-border co-operation within each of the three macro-regions

2.1. The overview of strategies and policies for effective institutional transborder co-operation in the areas of the Balkan-Danube Europe macro-region

The Balkan Danube border area is highly heterogeneous in terms of the strategies to be implemented. On the one hand, weaknesses and threats outweigh possible strengths and opportunities (11 areas out of 19) and, on the other, areas (9) are characterised by a strong predominance of positive points (strengths and opportunities) over negative points.

As far as the former group is concerned, it is clear that policies which privilege positive variables and indicators which hinder the effects of the negative variables, especially by using alternative resources to face them, will be implemented. Therefore, the most widely spread strategy is the *fourth strategy*, which prevailed in 7 cross-border areas; the *third strategy* appears to be adequate in cross-border areas where there is a need to face external threats; and, finally, it appears that implementation of the *fifth strategy* is necessary for further strengthening the synergy among strengths and opportunities for facing external threats.

In the second group of border areas, implementation of policies prioritising on the “capitalisation” of existing positivity (*first strategy*) would seem appropriate, not only to improve cross-border co-operation but also to transform the *non-relevant* indicators into *halo* indicators or even into strengths and opportunities variables. This strategic lines appears the more feasible and relevant in the following cross-border areas: Bulgaria-Greece (41.5% of *non-relevant* indicators) and Bulgaria-Romania (37.7% of *non-relevant* indicators).

However, it would be useful to consider a further type of border. In addition to the eleven border areas facing negativities by using available strengths and opportunities in the cross-border area and using them differently from a relatively easy situation of cross-border co-operation, there are two cases where not even a single strength or opportunity was found and where existing SWOT variables are only negative. This has made introduction of the *sixth strategy* necessary.

This strategy is residual with regards to the other five strategies, and its potential may be activated *ex novo* by local and central (i.e. respective national states) decisions. The *local and central will* to take these decisions may be stimulated starting from the positive *halo* indicators and the *non-relevant* indicators in order to broaden the positive *halo* and/or even the positive SWOT variables.


A further consideration which emerges from the analysis of the Balkan-Danube border areas focuses on the possibility of activating Euroregions. Regardless of whether the implementation strategy aims at expanding or restraining negative factors, almost all the areas (21 against 22) imply the need to set up a *Cross-border Euroregion*. Moreover, the need to enhance networking and transparency among institutions and organisation falling within the field of activity of the *Functional networks Euroregion* appeared similarly widespread (19 against 22). Setting up a *Macro-infrastructures Euroregion* appears, on the contrary, is less necessary, although this type of Euroregion exists in twelve border areas. The Hungary-Romania border area is the only area where the setting up of some kind of Euroregion is less necessary. Both internal and external scores for this area are well above all over average scores: 7.7 (on a 10 theoretical maximum) for internal indicators and 7.5 for external indicators. This general data can be seen in Table 1.

Table 1 – Summary of SWOT analysis data

Cross-border area	Strategy	Euroregion			Marks of internal indicators	Marks of external indicators	% of non-relevant indicators
		Cross-border	Functional network	Macro-infrastructures			
AL-MK	1	x		x	<u>7.9</u>	5.5	0
AL-MNE	1	x	x	x	6.4	6.0	7.5
BIH-SRB	1	x	x	x	<u>7.2</u>	4.6	<u>20.8</u>
BG-GR	1	x	x	x	6.2	6.7	<u>41.5</u>
BG-RO	1	x			6.6	<u>6.9</u>	<u>37.7</u>
HR-MNE	1	x	x		<u>7.0</u>	5.9	15.1
SRB-MNE	1	x	x		6.0	5.7	13.2
GR-MK	1	x	x		6.4	5.6	11.3
H-RO	1				<u>7.7</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>18.9</u>
<i>Totals/Mean</i>	9	8	6	4	6.8	6.0	18.4
MD-RO	3	x	x	x	5.1	5.4	<u>41.5</u>
RO-SRB	3	x	x	x	<u>6.8</u>	<u>5.5</u>	32.1
<i>Totals/Mean</i>	2	2	2	2	5.9	5.4	36.8
AL-GR	4	x	x		4.9	4.0	0
BIH-HR	4	x	x	x	3.7	3.2	<u>28.4</u>
BG-TR	4	x	x		2.9	<u>5.7</u>	13.2
BG-SRB	4	x	x		<u>5.8</u>	4.2	<u>22.6</u>
HR-H	4	x	x	x	<u>6.0</u>	<u>4.7</u>	<u>22.6</u>
GR-TR	4	x	x	x	<u>6.0</u>	4.0	<u>30.2</u>
H-SRB	4	x	x		<u>6.5</u>	<u>4.7</u>	18.9
<i>Totals/Mean</i>	7	7	7	3	5.1	4.3	19.4
BIH-MNE	5	x	x	x	<u>5.8</u>	<u>5.8</u>	3.8
BG-MK	5	x	x	x	5.0	3.4	<u>15.1</u>

	<i>Totals/Mean</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>5.4</i>	<i>4.6</i>	<i>9.5</i>
HR-SRB		6	x	x	x	3.1	2.7	17
MK-SRB		6	x	x		<u>3.7</u>	2.7	<u>26.4</u>
	<i>Totals/Mean</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>3.4</i>	<i>2.7</i>	<i>21.7</i>
OVERALL TOTALS/MEAN			21	19	12	5.3	4.6	21.2

Diagram 1 – Localisation of strategies for Balkan-Danube Europe areas



Key:

- Strategy 1: strengthening
- Strategy 2: overcoming
- ⋯ Strategy 3: mobilisation for context control
- ⋯ Strategy 4: control of negatives
- Strategy 5: joint internal-external coalition for context control
- Strategy 6: initial recourse of the local and central will

Diagram 1 identifies, in conclusion, how the fourth strategy (but also the third and fifth strategies) appears appropriate, especially for the border areas between Northern and Danube Balkans and among the Southern Balkan regions of Turkey and Greece and Bulgaria and Albania. The same graph, however, also shows how the *first strategy* is predominantly appropriate for the Danube states from Hungary to Romania and, then, Bulgaria. It is also appropriate for the Adriatic and southern part of the former-Yugoslav Federation, starting from Bulgaria going up to Albania passing through “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. An only apparently anomalous element is the positive level of co-operation between Bosnia and Serbia (which calls for the first strategy). All of this takes place in the border area (along the Danube and the southern part of the former Yugoslav Federation) which has experienced co-operation in relatively positive terms. This is the case between Hungary and Romania and between Romania and Bulgaria. For the other border areas co-operation is still positive due to the similar ethnic composition on both sides of the borders and peaceful cohabitation of the populations. In sum, the historical element of cohabitation, when the populations are either different or there is an ethnic continuity on each side of the border, has favoured the consolidation of positive SWOT variable and *halo* indicators: this was the case, as already said, in Balkan Europe and in that with single parts of former Yugoslav republics.

The last aspect of allocating a cross-border area with a single strategy is provided by two cases where a new, residual strategy needs to be introduced (the *sixth strategy*). This strategy foresees the intervention of the local and central will to capitalise on aspects which as of yet do not exist, or are (only a few) *halo* indicators or are still non-relevant. The areas where this strategy could play a substantial role are those areas characterised both in the past and (especially) in recent times by wars. This is the case for the border areas between Croatia and Serbia and between “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and Serbia/Kosovo⁴. These areas are characterised by a dramatic decrease in strengths and opportunities for cross-border co-operation. Within such contexts maintaining cross-border co-operation requires intervention and political will, especially at the local and national levels. This would, in turn, enable the establishment of a local propensity to constructive relations and, thus, a strong drive to enhance reciprocal knowledge, based on the revision of cultural interpretations, of history, of myths which need to be laid to rest or at least put into perspective.

2.2. *The overview of strategies and policies for effective institutional transborder co-operation in the areas of the Central European macro-region*

Among the five co-operation strategies applied to the nineteen cross-border areas of Central and Eastern Europe, the *first strategy* prevails, more oriented as it is towards the strengthening of positives. The area it concerns is located within the borders of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire (Diagram 13). The *first strategy* includes Italy-Austria and Italy-Slovenia, then it links Austria and Slovenia to Hungary, and finally reaches Slovakia and Czech Republic.

The *fourth strategy* is present in the outskirts of Central-Eastern Europe, where focus on controlling negatives is necessary. This peripheral region is banana-shaped and runs from Poland-Belarus, Belarus-Ukraine, Ukraine-Romania, ending with Ukraine-Moldova.

⁴ “All reference to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population, in this text should be understood in full compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and without prejudice to the status of Kosovo.”

The other strategies are related to individual buffer areas between the central part (*first strategy*) and borderlands (*fourth strategy*). The *second strategy* is appropriate for minimising or deactivating negatives in the Czech Republic-Austria, while the *fifth strategy* consists in an internal-external coalition aimed at context control (that is, threats), and it is applicable to Czech Republic-Poland. The comparatively moderate *third strategy* instead, aims at exploiting positives to control the context (that is, threats).

The main geographic clusters consist of a central *first strategy* area, and a peripheral *fourth strategy* one. In the latter, the marks of the 53 indicators are congruent with individual action strategies, and at the same time it seems that the institutionalisation of the co-operation is a consequence of the need for such co-operation. Table 5 shows how the first strategy extends over the areas with the highest average internal (7.5) and external (6.9) marks. This supports the vision according to which institutional structures for co-operation, in this case the Euroregion, generally take the form of a *Macro Infrastructures Euroregion*, a frame where each single area is included, together with other areas, within a much wider context. In theory, such Macro Infrastructure Euroregion could include all of the seven *first strategy* sub-areas. However, the *Cross-border Euroregion* is necessary only in certain areas (Austria-Slovakia, Hungary-Ukraine, Italy-Slovenia), while in the other areas stakeholders and civil society already provide adequate tools for co-operation.

The *fourth strategy*, which focuses on the control of negative factors, has to face poor marks both in internal indicators (5.6) and external ones (4.4). From an institutional point of view, such a scenario requires the use of all the three types of *Euroregion*, *cross-border*, *functional networks* and *macro infrastructures*, the last being possibly extended to other *fourth strategy* areas.

Finally, the *third* and *fifth strategies* are based on the control of a context (*threats*) suffering from an imbalance of positive marks in internal indicators (7.6 and 6.5) and negative external ones (4.8 and 4.4).


This situation shows how institutional structures tend to prefer the *functional network* or the *macro infrastructures Euroregion*, rather than the *transfrontier euroregion*, probably due to the fact that core issues have more to do with networks of non-contiguous elements and national centre policies rather than borderland local elements.

Besides the geographical distribution of strategies, this research shows how the institutionalisation of cross-border co-operation in the shape of Euroregions is not a constant and universal choice, and that its usefulness may vary with time. The type of Euroregion which is necessary today, might be deactivated once its function is outdated. In other cases, where co-operation already exists, Euroregions are not necessary at all, as for the case of Czech Republic-Slovakia, where none of the types of Euroregion is required: in this area the rupture dynamics which often affect frontier regions have never arisen, as Czechoslovakia collapsed only very recently. However, in an apparently similar case, involving Croatia and Slovenia after the end of Yugoslavia, all three Euroregions are presently needed.







Table 2 – Summary of SWOT analysis data

Cross-border area	Strategy	Euroregion				Possible EGTC	Marks of internal indicators	Marks of external indicators	% indicators	and no. non-relevant
		Cross-border	Functional Networks	Macro-infrastructures						
A-H	1			X		<u>8.1</u>	<u>7.2</u>	15.1	(8)	
A-I	1			X		7.0	<u>7.3</u>	5.6	(3)	
A-SK	1	X		X		6.7	6.7	1.9	(1)	
CZ-SK	1					<u>8.9</u>	6.1	24.5	(13)	
H-SK	1			X	X	6.8	6.6	17.0	(9)	
H-SLO	1			X	X	<u>8.6</u>	<u>7.7</u>	11.3	(6)	
H-UA	1	X		X		7.2	<u>7.0</u>	11.3	(6)	
I-SLO	1	X		X		6.7	6.3	18.9	(10)	
Totals/Mean		(3)	(-)	(7)	(2)	(7.5)	(6.9)	(13.2)		
A-CZ	2	X	X	X	X	5.1	5.7	26.4	(14)	
Totals/Mean		(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(5.1)	(5.7)	(26.4)		
A-SLO	3	X		X		7.3	5.7	13.2	(7)	
PL-UA	3		X	X		<u>7.9</u>	4.6	23.6	(13)	
SK-UA	3		X	X		7.5	4.2	7.6	(4)	
Totals/Mean		(1)	(2)	(3)	(-)	(7.6)	(4.8)	(14.8)		
BY-PL	4	X	X	X		5.1	2.9	16.4	(9)	
BY-UA	4	X	X	X		5.7	3.8	34.0	(18)	
HR-SLO	4	X	X	X		6.9	5.3	30.2	(16)	
MD-UA	4	X	X	X		4.4	4.8	9.4	(5)	
PL-SK	4	X	X	X		5.7	5.2	15.1	(8)	
RO-UA	4	X	X	X		6.0	4.6	25.9	(14)	
Totals/Mean		(6)	(6)	(6)	(-)	(5.6)	(4.4)	(21.8)		
CZ-PL	5		X	X		6.5	4.9	13.2	(7)	
Totals/Mean		(-)	(1)	(1)	(-)	(6.5)	(4.9)	(13.2)		
OVERALL TOTALS/MEAN						6.7	5.6			

Diagram 2 – Localisation of strategies for Central and Eastern Europe areas



Key:

- | | | | |
|---|--|---|---|
|  | Strategy 1: strengthening |  | Strategy 4: control of negatives |
|  | Strategy 2: overcoming |  | Strategy 5: joint internal-external coalition for context control |
|  | Strategy 3: mobilisation for context control |  | Strategy 6: initial recourse of the local and central will |

2.3. *The overview of strategies and policies for effective institutional trans-border co-operation in the areas of Eastern-Baltic European macro-region*

The Baltic Region is dominated by former USSR countries, as the only independent countries were Poland, Finland, and Norway. At present, the Russian Federation still has eight borders with the newly-formed independent Republics generated by the collapse of the USSR: Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania.

What are the conditions of cross-border areas in such a peculiar context? Are they capable of generating effective cross-border co-operation, and therefore of enhancing social and economic standards⁵?

Before analysing specific situations, a general outline can be drawn.

First, positives are widespread across most of the cross-border areas (among which are the essential ones such as propensity towards co-operation and linguistic and cultural factors), especially in those dimensions related to civil society (dimensions 1 and 3), coordination (dimension 2), economic, institutional and administration factors (dimensions 9, 7, 10), which result in being tightly bound to each other by strong correlation coefficients. The downside of this situation is its weak responsiveness to economic, socio-cultural and institutional obstacles (dimensions 4, 5, 6): the condition of these dimensions represents specific flaws within an overall positive scenario: certain obstacles, such as negative stereotypes and linguistic barriers, have proved to be able to coexist with positive co-operation patterns.

Furthermore, in the fourteen Baltic cross-border areas, the positives concern internal dimensions, while the negatives relate to external factors and to the internal-external interaction. The data depicts a lively scenario where local civil society follows freely chosen negotiation patterns and heads towards an effective and fruitful coexistence rather than being led by national political and ideological policies. Central administrations are perceived as distant, centralising (former Communist) systems, alien to local cross-border co-operation dynamics. In the short term, co-operation may even benefit from a rather unconcerned central administration, but in the long run, such an absence can frustrate and break the liveliness of a local civil society. Power devolution and autonomy seem to be a necessary step for preserving the positives of peripheral areas, and particularly cross-border areas.

One more element concerns cross-border co-operation in Russia-Estonia and Russia-Latvia. There are few strengths (S), weaknesses (W), opportunities (O) and threats (T), that is, all of the SWOT variables (applied to the 53 indicators). However, there are many positive and negative *halo* indicators. The *halo* is the object of SWOT analysis and its data source: a rich *halo* indicates what could be called *implicit power*, or else an evolving scenario, a *co-operation in progress*, due to be established in the medium term, because they involve cross-border areas that were formed only very recently.

An additional positive aspect revealed by the SWOT analysis is that the Baltic area boasts an overall positive score for transport routes, road, rail and waterways, and the freedom of movement of goods and people. The presence of small and large communication networks,

⁵ More on this topic in "Borders dividing and borders uniting Europe" by Alberto Gasparini (*ISIG Journal*, VIII-IX; 4, 1999-1, 2000).

inherited from a common past, and mainly plain area both favour the development of cross-border transport infrastructures. It appeared that this scenario might benefit from the intervention of the Macro Infrastructures Euroregion, especially in the development of strategic long-term planning.

Once the analysis suggests the intervention of a specific type of Euroregion, the strategies provide insight as to the scenario of the area in question. In the fourteen Baltic cross-border areas, the main strategic actions identified by the analysis are the creation of professional training courses, and the development of policies for addressing socio-cultural, economic and institutional issues.

Action strategies are equally distributed in the fourteen areas.

One of the most frequently suggested strategy is the *fourth one*, which focuses on existing positives in order to mitigate the effect of internal negatives (weaknesses) and external ones (threats). Action strategies are best if supported by the Euroregion frame (Cross-border, Functional Networks, Macro Infrastructures). Geographically, the fourth strategy prevails along the Russian borders, beginning with Norway, then Estonia and Latvia, and finally Belarus. The fourth strategy concerns the intra-Baltic area between Latvia and Lithuania. Overall marks in the fourth strategy areas are largely positive (Table 3), however while analysing specific internal-external dynamics, peculiar traits emerge. Internal action is needed especially in the Russia-Latvia and Russia-Lithuania areas, the last one scoring the lowest marks of all the fourth strategy areas (4.6). The borders between these two Republics and the Russian Federation are therefore characterised by a *co-operation in progress*, but more specifically, by very limited training resources as far as internal co-operation (SWOT variables plus *halo*) is concerned. However, in other fourth strategy areas, internal co-operation structures are positive, remarkably between Latvia and Lithuania (8.2), which confirms the even higher score between Latvia and Estonia, and testifies to the presence of a definitely positive internal scenario. Specific action is required only to some extent, as most strategies belong to the fourth type, and generally within the frame of the same Euroregion.

The application of the *third strategy* presents some differences and specific characteristics even in comparison to its implementation in the Central Europe and Balkan-Danube regions. The three areas that fall within the third strategy have the highest marks among the fourteen Baltic areas for internal co-operation, and the lowest marks external ones. Geographically, this zone represents the very core of the Baltic Region, represented by the axis Finland-Latvia and its several links with Russia. The highest SWOT score is found in Estonia-Finland (9.7 out of 10), but the surrounding area boasts similar top scores: 8.9 for Estonia-Latvia, 7.7 for Finland-Russia. However positive, this scenario requires the third action strategy in order to control strong negatives (T) deriving from external co-operation, which cause marks to be as low as 3.9 for Estonia-Finland, 3.4 for Estonia-Latvia, and 4.5 for Finland-Russia.

Analysis suggests that the third strategy is probably the most suitable to tackle polarized internal and external situation, by focusing on external factors to the benefit of internal cohesion. The third strategy borrows some guidelines of the first strategy, based on the strengthening of positives (which are already close to the top of the range) within each area. The *Cross-border Euroregion* does not seem to be an appropriate choice, as co-operation is already well-established among areas, while institutional tools are missing, preventing local organizations from creating straightforward, large-scale common planning (which are the main concerns of the *Functional Networks Euroregion* and of the *Macro Infrastructures Euroregion*).


The *second strategy* applies to only one area, Belarus-Latvia, due to the need to overcome internal negatives, identified by the prevalence of weaknesses over strengths. As shown, relations between Latvia and Belarus differ from those with Russia: here there are actual SWOT variables, although negative ones, a fact that implies the existence of an ongoing co-operation, regardless of its need for support and development. The marks indicate a balanced internal/external ratio (5.5, 5.9) with both values swinging between positive and negative. Finally, the joint action of *Cross-border* and *Macro Infrastructures Euroregions* should support the implementation of institutional co-operation policies.

The *first strategy* concerns three cross-border areas, where weaknesses and threats are minor, while strengths and opportunities are plentiful. Positive internal variables are widespread, which is an essential requirement for the establishment of long-term co-operation. The situation in these areas is not unlike that of the third strategy areas, with high internal marks counterbalanced by strong external negatives. First strategy areas represent the south-west of the Baltic Region: Lithuania-Russia (Kaliningrad), Lithuania-Poland, Ukraine-Russia; all areas with a history of co-operation and cultural exchange. In these cases, SWOT external variables have parallel values both for cross-border areas and for their national governments, as in the case of Lithuania and Poland. The most effective Euroregions for such a scenario are the *Cross-border* and the *Macro Infrastructures* ones; the first addresses civil society, the second tackles large-scale planning.







Table 3 – Summary of SWOT analysis data

Cross-border area	Strategy Best	Euroregion			Marks of internal indicators	Marks of external indicators	% of non relevant indicators
		Cross-border	Functional networks	Macro-infrastructures			
LT-PL	1	X		X	7.7	<u>7.2</u>	3.8
LT-RUS(Kaliningrad)	1	X		X	7.2	5.4	15.1
RUS-UA	1	X			7.6	6.0	18.9
Totals/mean		(3)	(-)	(2)	(7.5)	(6.2)	(12.6)
BY-LV	2	X		X	5.5	5.9	13.2
Totals/mean		(1)	(-)	(1)	(5.5)	(5.9)	(13.2)
EST-LV	3		X	X	<u>8.9</u>	3.4	13.2
EST-FIN	3		X	X	<u>9.7</u>	3.8	3.8
FIN-RUS	3		X	X	7.7	4.5	5.7
Totals/mean		(-)	(3)	(3)	(8.8)	(3.9)	(7.6)
BY-RUS	4	X	X	X	7.2	4.3	15.1
EST-RUS	4	X	X	X	5.4	<u>6.6</u>	13.2
LV-LT	4	X	X	X	8.2	4.7	1.9
LV-RUS	4	X	X	X	4.6	6.3	15.1
N-RUS	4	X		X	6.9	5.2	28.3
Totals/mean		(5)	(4)	(5)	(6.5)	(5.4)	(14.7)
BY-LT	6	X	X	X	3.9	3.6	22.6
PL-RUS (Kaliningrad)	6/(4)	X	X	X	4.2	5.4	20.7
Totals/mean		(2)	(2)	(2)	(4.1)	(4.5)	(21.7)
OVERALL TOTALS/MEAN		11	9	13	6.8	5.1	13.6

Diagram 3 – General strategies of actions for the improvement of the transborder co-operation



Key:

- | | | | |
|---|--|---|---|
|  | Strategy 1: strengthening |  | Strategy 4: control of negatives |
|  | Strategy 2: overcoming |  | Strategy 5: joint internal-external coalition for context control |
|  | Strategy 3: mobilisation for context control |  | Strategy 6: initial recourse of the local and central will |

None of the five available action strategies, based on internal and external SWOT variables, support cross-border co-operation in the two cases where there is a complete lack of variables themselves. In fact, in the Belarus-Lithuania and Poland-Russia (Kaliningrad) areas, there are no positive elements on which to base co-operation. This scenario seems suitable for the *sixth strategy*, the *residual* one, which focuses on the use of *local or national willingness* to face existing negatives. As action involves strategic planning in all of the ten dimensions, the propensity of national and local stakeholders is required, especially since these areas represent the final, “hard” borders between Europe and the Russian Federation/Belarus. Issues range from border policies to negative stereotypes and linguistic barriers. In this scenario, all of the three Euroregions seem to be essential to successful co-operation planning.

Co-operation levels can be analysed from a geographic and spatial perspective as well.

There is one *horizontal south-western region*, encompassing Lithuania-Poland, Lithuania-Russia (Kaliningrad), Russia-Ukraine: in this cluster, the first strategy can be effectively applied to further develop existing co-operation.

The other region, *vertical north-south*, including Finland-Russia, Finland-Estonia, Estonia-Latvia, is markedly polarized, with top levels of internal co-operation and very low external support, and could benefit from the third strategy as a means to control external threats.

A third region consists in the relations between former Soviet Republics Russia, Belarus, Estonia and Latvia. It has been shown how co-operation is still forming its basic structures in Russia-Estonia and Russia-Latvia: positive SWOT variables and *halo* can be included within the fourth strategy frame, in order to overcome internal negatives and external threats. A similar scenario concerns Latvia-Belarus, for which the third strategy seems the most appropriate for tackling existing internal weak points.

The last region consists of the southern Baltic areas, including Poland and Russia (Kaliningrad), and Lithuania and Belarus. In this scenario, co-operation does not refer to external/internal relations, as there are no positives on which to base development strategies, and it is therefore necessary to rely on local or national will.

3. Comparison of cross-border co-operation between the three macro-regions, including between Norway–Russia and Bulgaria-Turkey

The cross-border co-operation in 55 areas of Europe, ranging from the Aegean Sea to the Baltic Sea, is even more varied than that is considered here for the three macro-regions.


At this point we compare individual areas in particular, but also the regions of the Balkan-Danube, Central Europe, Northern Europe regions.

To do this we consider in general the following points: 1) the level of co-operation for individual areas, 2) the relevance of the ten-dimensional concepts in which practical co-operation is made concrete; 3) the geographical scattering of the conceptual dimensions of co-operation in 55 areas, 4) the geographical distribution of co-operation according to the internal and external aspects in each area, 5) the intersection between internal and external dimensions of the cross-border co-operation in each area, 6) co-operation SWOT variables for regions and for areas; 7) Euroregions and action strategies for the regions surveyed.

3.1. Levels of co-operation in various areas

The levels are between 1 and 10, where 1 indicates the absence of co-operation and 10 indicates full co-operation between the two sides that lie on the border between two states.

Diagram 4 – Marks of conceptual dimensions in cross-border areas. Spheres represent marks from 2 to 10



Between these two extremes, the threshold that separates the positive co-operation from the negative is at the level 5.5: co-operation is sufficient for anything above 5.5; anything below this parameter begins to become negative (or low).

On the other hand, this level of co-operation is the average of the 53 indicators, as we mentioned in the section on methodology.

Diagram 4 shows, of course, that full co-operation does not exist (9th or 10th level), but that there is a high level of co-operation. Expressed in figures the maximum level is 8.2 and covers the area of Hungary and Slovenia, but close to this maximum there are other areas of Central Europe (Austria-Hungary = 7.8, Czech Republic-Slovakia = 7.8, Hungary-Romania [Transylvania] = 7.7), and three areas of North-East Europe (Poland-Lithuania = 7.6; Russia-Ukraine = 7.6; Estonia-Finland 7.5). In contrast the lowest levels of co-operation are between Croatia and Serbia (= 2.9), but also with neighbouring areas, such as “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”- Serbia (= 3.3) and Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia (= 3.5).

As can be seen there are areas that have very positive and very negative levels in co-operation, which suggest very specific transborder areas: Central Europe and the heart of Eastern Baltic area are different from the area affected by the recent Balkan wars within the former Yugoslavia.

The diagram levels further show that co-operation is positive (greater than or equal to 5.5) in 36 areas, but negative (or significantly less) in 19 areas (below 5.5), which are mainly located in the cross-border areas of the Balkan-Danube area and in the Baltic region, on the borders between Belarus and Russia with the Baltic republics.

3.2. The level of co-operation for the conceptual ten-dimensions

In the previous section (3.1) the general level (and average) of cross-border co-operation in 55 areas was presented and discussed. What follows is an interpretation of these levels of co-operation in accordance with the ten-dimensional concepts in which the values of the 53 indicators are taken into consideration.

Table 4 – Marks (1 to 10) for conceptual dimensions of cross-border co-operation in cross-border areas

Conceptual dimensions of cross-border co-operation


Cross-border areas:		internal						external				area means
		I	III	II	IX	VI	X	V	IV	VIII	VII	
1.	Albania-Greece	8.8	6.0	2.9	3.8	3.8	3.8	2.8	1.9	5.7	5.7	4.5
2.	Albania-“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”	<u>9.4</u>	<u>8.4</u>	7.6	5.2	<u>10.0</u>	6.7	<u>7.2</u>	5.9	3.3	5.7	7.0
3.	Albania-Montenegro	6.5	5.7	5.3	4.3	<u>9.2</u>	7.1	6.0	4.6	3.8	<u>9.5</u>	6.2
4.	Bosnia Herzegovina-Croatia	4.1	2.3	1.8	2.9	3.8	7.1	4.8	3.8	1.0	3.3	3.5
5.	Bosnia Herzegovina-Serbia	8.2	7.4	5.9	5.2	7.7	<u>8.6</u>	<u>6.8</u>	4.3	2.9	4.3	6.1
6.	Bosnia Herzegovina-Montenegro	4.7	4.4	4.7	3.3	<u>10.0</u>	7.6	5.2	4.9	3.8	<u>9.5</u>	5.8
7.	Bulgaria-Greece	7.6	5.4	6.5	5.7	6.9	5.2	<u>7.2</u>	6.2	6.7	6.7	6.4
8.	Bulgaria-“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”	5.3	5.4	4.1	4.3	4.6	6.2	1.6	4.1	2.9	5.2	4.4
9.	Bulgaria-Romania	7.6	7.7	5.9	5.2	6.2	7.1	5.2	<u>7.6</u>	4.8	<u>10.0</u>	6.7
10.	Bulgaria-Turkey	2.4	2.3	2.9	2.4	3.8	3.8	<u>10.0</u>	4.1	2.4	6.2	4.0
11.	Bulgaria-Serbia	7.1	5.7	5.3	4.8	6.2	5.7	2.8	3.5	3.3	7.1	5.1
12.	Croatia-Hungary	7.1	4.4	5.9	4.8	6.2	7.6	<u>6.8</u>	5.4	1.9	4.8	5.5
13.	Croatia-Montenegro	5.9	5.7	5.3	<u>7.1</u>	<u>9.2</u>	8.6	6.0	6.2	2.4	<u>9.0</u>	6.5
14.	Croatia-Serbia	2.4	1.0	2.4	3.3	4.6	4.8	3.6	3.5	1.0	2.9	2.9
15.	Serbia-Montenegro	6.5	4.7	3.5	4.3	<u>9.2</u>	7.6	5.6	4.9	3.3	<u>9.0</u>	5.9
16.	Greece-“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”	<u>10.0</u>	7.0	4.7	2.9	6.9	7.1	3.6	<u>8.9</u>	<u>7.1</u>	2.9	6.1
17.	Greece-Turkey	6.5	6.4	7.6	3.3	6.9	5.2	2.4	4.9	4.3	4.3	5.2
18.	Hungary-Romania	<u>10.0</u>	<u>9.0</u>	6.5	<u>9.5</u>	3.8	7.6	5.6	<u>8.4</u>	6.2	<u>10.0</u>	<u>7.7</u>
19.	Hungary-Serbia	7.6	6.7	5.9	5.7	4.6	8.6	2.0	4.3	<u>8.8</u>	7.6	5.8
20.	“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”-Serbia	5.3	3.4	2.4	3.3	1.5	6.2	3.2	3.8	1.9	1.9	3.3
21.	Moldova-Romania	5.3	4.7	4.1	3.8	3.8	8.6	4.8	2.7	4.3	<u>10.0</u>	5.2

Cross-border areas:		internal						external				area means
		I	III	II	IX	VI	X	V	IV	VIII	VII	
22.	Romania-Serbia	<u>10.0</u>	5.7	5.9	<u>8.1</u>	3.8	7.1	3.6	3.0	5.2	<u>10.0</u>	6.2
23.	Austria-Czech Republic	6.6	7.1	<u>7.8</u>	3.3	2.5	2.8	3.3	4.8	<u>7.8</u>	8.2	5.4
24.	Austria-Hungary	<u>9.4</u>	8.1	<u>7.8</u>	<u>7.8</u>	7.0	8.2	6.3	<u>6.5</u>	<u>8.7</u>	8.2	<u>7.8</u>
25.	Austria-Italy	7.2	7.1	7.2	5.1	<u>9.3</u>	7.3	<u>7.0</u>	<u>7.0</u>	<u>7.8</u>	7.8	<u>7.3</u>
26.	Austria-Slovakia	7.2	3.0	<u>8.9</u>	6.9	<u>10.0</u>	6.4	6.3	4.3	<u>8.2</u>	<u>10.0</u>	<u>7.2</u>
27.	Austria-Slovenia	8.3	6.8	6.1	<u>9.1</u>	5.5	7.3	4.4	3.3	<u>7.3</u>	<u>10.0</u>	6.8
28.	Belarus-Poland	7.8	6.5	2.7	4.2	6.3	3.9	3.6	1.5	2.4	5.1	4.4
29.	Belarus-Ukraine	8.9	6.2	4.9	5.5	1.8	8.2	3.3	3.3	2.8	6.4	5.1
30.	Croatia-Slovenia	8.9	6.8	4.1	<u>8.2</u>	4.0	8.2	5.1	4.5	4.2	8.2	6.3
32.	Czech Republic-Slovakia	<u>9.4</u>	<u>9.4</u>	<u>7.8</u>	<u>9.6</u>	5.5	<u>10.0</u>	5.1	4.8	<u>7.8</u>	8.2	<u>7.8</u>
33.	Hungary-Slovakia	<u>9.4</u>	8.1	<u>7.8</u>	2.4	7.8	6.0	<u>8.9</u>	<u>8.3</u>	2.8	4.6	6.6
34.	Hungary-Slovenia	8.3	<u>9.0</u>	6.6	<u>8.7</u>	<u>9.3</u>	<u>9.1</u>	<u>9.3</u>	<u>7.0</u>	6.4	8.2	<u>8.2</u>
35.	Hungary-Ukraine	<u>9.4</u>	7.4	<u>8.3</u>	5.1	7.8	6.0	<u>7.8</u>	5.5	<u>8.2</u>	7.8	<u>7.3</u>
36.	Italy-Slovenia	8.9	6.1	4.9	<u>9.1</u>	4.0	6.4	6.6	5.3	5.5	8.7	6.6
37.	Moldova-Ukraine	7.2	2.6	2.7	3.3	2.5	8.2	6.3	3.5	2.4	7.8	4.7
38.	Poland-Slovakia	7.2	6.5	1.0	6.0	4.0	7.8	2.5	5.8	5.1	7.8	5.4
39.	Poland-Ukraine	<u>10.0</u>	<u>8.7</u>	<u>7.8</u>	7.3	7.8	6.5	3.3	3.5	5.1	7.8	6.8
40.	Romania-Ukraine	8.9	5.8	3.8	4.6	4.8	7.4	4.4	3.8	3.7	7.3	5.5
41.	Slovakia-Ukraine	<u>9.4</u>	7.5	<u>8.9</u>	6.9	3.3	8.2	2.1	2.5	4.2	<u>9.6</u>	6.3
42.	Belarus-Latvia	7.8	5.5	3.8	4.6	1.8	7.8	5.5	<u>8.0</u>	4.2	4.2	5.3
43.	Belarus-Lithuania	6.1	2.9	4.9	1.5	4.0	5.1	2.5	2.8	4.6	6.0	4.0
44.	Belarus-Russia	8.9	7.8	7.2	7.3	1.0	8.7	4.0	3.8	4.6	5.1	5.8
45.	Estonia-Latvia	<u>9.4</u>	<u>9.0</u>	<u>8.9</u>	<u>8.7</u>	7.8	<u>9.1</u>	1.4	1.8	6.0	6.4	6.9
46.	Estonia-Finland	<u>10.0</u>	<u>10.0</u>	<u>8.9</u>	<u>9.6</u>	<u>9.3</u>	<u>10.0</u>	2.1	1.8	<u>8.2</u>	5.5	<u>7.5</u>
47.	Estonia-Russia	5.5	4.9	5.5	4.2	6.3	6.9	5.1	<u>7.8</u>	3.7	4.2	5.4
48.	Finland-Russia	<u>9.4</u>	7.8	<u>8.9</u>	7.3	4.8	7.3	2.9	2.0	<u>8.2</u>	6.3	6.5
49.	Lithuania-Poland	8.3	<u>8.4</u>	<u>8.3</u>	<u>7.8</u>	5.5	6.9	<u>7.8</u>	6.3	<u>8.2</u>	<u>8.2</u>	<u>7.6</u>
50.	Lithuania-Russia (Kaliningrad)	7.8	6.1	6.1	6.9	7.8	<u>9.1</u>	4.4	3.5	<u>6.9</u>	<u>8.7</u>	6.7
51.	Latvia-Lithuania	<u>9.4</u>	<u>9.4</u>	<u>8.3</u>	7.3	1.8	<u>10.0</u>	2.5	2.5	<u>7.3</u>	<u>8.7</u>	6.7

Cross-border areas:		internal						external				area means
		I	III	II	IX	VI	X	V	IV	VIII	VII	
52.	Latvia-Russia	<u>4.4</u>	<u>3.9</u>	4.4	5.1	4.8	<u>5.5</u>	5.5	<u>7.5</u>	<u>3.7</u>	7.8	5.3
53.	Norway-Russia	8.9	6.8	<u>8.9</u>	6.4	<u>2.5</u>	7.3	4.8	2.8	<u>7.3</u>	<u>8.2</u>	6.4
54.	Poland-Russia (Kaliningrad)	<u>5.5</u>	<u>4.2</u>	4.4	<u>2.4</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>5.1</u>	4.4	3.8	<u>8.2</u>	6.9	<u>4.8</u>
55.	Russia-Ukraine	8.9	8.1	5.5	<u>4.2</u>	<u>9.3</u>	<u>10.0</u>	5.9	5.5	5.1	7.8	7.0
	Mean (m)	7.6	6.3	5.7	5.6	<u>5.8</u>	<u>7.2</u>	4.8	4.6	5.0	7.0	6.0
	Standard deviation (σ)	1.88	1.85	1.99	2.01	2.48	1.59	1.98	1.88	1.86	1.96	1.19

Key: marks in underlined bold indicate lowest means ($< m - 1 \sigma$)
marks in underlined italics indicate highest means ($> m + 1 \sigma$)

Diagram 5 – *Internal and external conceptual dimensions of cross-border co-operation according to their relevance for co-operation (high in central spheres, low in external spheres) and scores for the conceptual dimension*



Key:

CON – Internal context

ICA – Institutional characteristics

ACCS – Active characteristics in civil society

Isolate mark = general mark

First of three marks = Balkan-Danube Europe mark

Second of three marks = Central Europe mark

Third of three marks = Baltic-Northern Europe mark

The dimensions operating within the area (of which there are six) and the remaining four dimensions that are external to the same area have already been identified, as have the rules and policies of the central state and international organisations, in particular the European Union, and international agreements such as the Council of Europe’s Madrid Outline

Convention. In diagram 5 the boxes show the internal dimensions, and the circles show the external dimensions.

In the diagram the most effective dimension for promoting co-operation are located also in the centre of the internal and external areas.

The levels of co-operation, interpreted according to the usual scale between 1 and 10 of diagram 5, can be rewritten in the table below as follows:

Dimension per effectiveness		title	Levels between 1 and 10:			
			Europe			
Internal			In general	Balkan-Danube	Central	Baltic-orient
1	<i>Propensity towards CBC (1) (Active characteristics in civil society)</i>		7.6	6.7	8.4	7.9
2	<i>Cross-border relations in each production sector (3) (Active characteristics in civil society and institutional characteristics)</i>		6.3	5.4	6.9	6.8
3	<i>Levels of training and coordination (2) (Institutional characteristics)</i>		5.7	4.9	5.9	6.7
4	<i>Economic factors for effective CBC (9) (Internal context)</i>		5.6	4.7	6.3	6.0
5	<i>Socio-cultural obstacles for CBC (6) (Internal context)</i>		5.6	6.0	5.7	5.0
6	<i>Linguistic, cultural and historical factors for effective CBC (10) (Internal context)</i>		7.2	6.7	7.2	7.8
External						
1	<i>Administrative factors for effective CBC (8)</i>		5.0	3.8	5.6	6.2
2	<i>Economic obstacles for CBC (5)</i>		4.8	4.9	5.2	4.2
3	<i>Institutional obstacles for CBC (4)</i>		4.6	4.8	4.7	4.3
4	<i>Institutional factors for effective CBC (7)</i>		7.0	6.6	7.8	6.7

If the order of conceptual dimensions both internal (from 1 to 6) and external (from 1 to 4) indicates their importance for effective cross-border co-operation, they are even more effective if the first, both internal and external have a (very) high level. The table above, serves to identify the following points.

1) Given the levels of internal dimensions for all 55 areas, the highest and most important indicates the propensity towards cross-border co-operation of civil society (7.6 on a scale of 1 to 10). This dimension is followed by that of (positive) cross-border relations among productive sectors (6.3), and the dimension referring to the training and coordination among institutional actors (5.7). With regard to the internal dimensions, relative to the domestic context, the highest level is 7.2 for the linguistic, cultural and historical aspects fostering

cross-border co-operation, but its ability to affect co-operation within the area is not very high. In contrast the internal dimensions for economic and socio-cultural obstacles to co-operation are barely adequate: in fact both are equal to 5.6.

2) The internal dimensions of co-operation differ according to the macro-region. Their levels in fact are all positive in the border areas of *Central Europe*, and even the level of the propensity to cross-border co-operation is 8.4. Moreover, the macro-region is characterised by the high propensity to cooperate of civil society actors and the presence of economic factors enabling efficient co-operation.

The areas of the macro-region of the *Baltic-Eastern Europe* also display many positive aspects. They are mostly linked to its institutional characteristics (education levels and coordination between local governments on both sides of the border), and internal context factors such as language, culture and the historical on the basis of effective co-operation. In short, the Baltic border areas are well integrated both in terms of propensity, relations between the sectors, the good coordination between institutions and common history, language and culture (dimension 10), while these same factors are rather negative in the border areas between the Baltic and those in Eastern Europe (especially Belarus and Russia).

Finally, the cross-border areas of the *Balkan-Danubian macro-region* have lower values in six conceptual dimensions than the other two macro-regions, but also the values are negative as regards economic factors (4.7), training levels and coordination between local authorities and their personnel (4.9), and finally relations between the productive sectors on both sides of the border (5.4). In summary then, in the Balkan-Danube macro-region, despite positive cultural, linguistic, historical factors and the relative absence of negative stereotypes, the structural basis for economic and institutional cross-border co-operation are highly deficient.

3) The *conceptual dimensions of external border co-operation*, involving the support of the central government, the allocation of competences to peripheral areas, international organizations, are decidedly negative. These levels range from 4.6 to 4.8 and 5.0.

The only relatively high positive value concerns the institutional factors for effective cross-border co-operation (7.0), but we have already said that it is of minor importance for co-operation in comparison to signature of the Madrid Outline Convention and its protocols on cross-border co-operation signed by the states.

4) Among the three macro-regions of Europe there are no significant differences in the values for the four external conceptual dimensions in the border areas. Thus, factors such as state centralisation and the limited transfer of competences to local actors represent concrete obstacles to co-operation in the administrative, institutional and economic spheres. The only exception is the signature of international agreements on co-operation, which is very common and therefore positive, especially in Central European countries. However, as we have already said, signature of the Madrid Outline Convention and its subsequent protocols does not automatically mean an increase in co-operation. Signature does, however, create an awareness of the existence of cross-border co-operation problems.

3.3. *The geographical scattering of the conceptual dimensions of co-operation in 55 areas*

In relation to the geographical distribution of the conceptual dimensions for the 55 areas we want to understand the extreme values, that is the highest value and the lowest value for each dimension and the general average. The red circle indicates the border areas with the highest value, and the green circle indicates the border areas with the lowest value. The eleven diagrams below show the regions which are more or less extensive (? extend over a large area?), forming positive and negative areas. Obviously, the areas which are not covered by either of the circles are average values. They can be few or many. The following are descriptions of the different geographic distributions which can be seen.

3.3.1. *Higher values and lower values of the 10 dimensions in all 55 areas*

Diagram 6 outlines more concrete areas where the 10 dimensions in general have higher values and lower values. As has already been seen, the values are higher in the macro-region of Central Europe, but here we note that this is configured as a rectangle that goes from Italy to Ukraine and the Czech Republic and Slovakia to Romania. Then there are only a few islands with high values between Finland and Estonia, and between Lithuania and Poland.

At the opposite end, lower values in the dimensions of co-operation are found in Croatia and Bosnia and Serbia to Bulgaria and Turkey to Serbia at the centre. Even in these areas of low values, there are islands, which relate to the Baltic countries between the border areas of Russia (Kaliningrad), Poland, Belarus-Poland and Latvia. An isolated area is also on the Moldova-Ukraine border.

Finally, comparing scores on the 10 conceptual dimensions of cross-border co-operation, it appears to be “stronger” (i.e. more developed) in Central Europe. Balkan-Danube border areas consistently report lower scores and the situation in Baltic and Eastern Europe is less homogenous with a highly varying scores among different border areas.

3.4. *The geographical scattering of the conceptual dimensions of co-operation in 55 areas*

The geographical scattering of the conceptual dimensions for the 55 areas we want to understand the tails of the values, that is the highest values and the lowest values of all dimensions and the general average. The red circle indicates the border areas with the highest values, and the green circle indicates the border areas with the lowest values. The eleven diagrams below show the regions which are more or less extensive forming positive and negative areas. Obviously, the areas not touched by one of the two circles are average values, which can be few or many. We see each of the following geographic scattering.

3.4.1. *Higher values and lower values of the 10 dimensions in all 55 areas*


The diagram 6 outlines more concrete areas where the 10 dimensions in general have higher values and lower values. We have already seen that the values are higher in the macro-region of Central Europe, but here we note that this is configured as a rectangle that goes from Italy to Ukraine and the Czech Republic and Slovakia to Romania. Then there are only a few islands of high values between Finland and Estonia, and between Lithuania and Poland.

At the opposite, lower values in the dimensions of co-operation range from Croatia and Bosnia and Serbia to Bulgaria and Turkey to Serbia as the centre. Even in these low values, there are islands, and they relate to the Baltic countries between the border areas of Russia

(Kaliningrad), Poland, Belarus-Poland and Latvia. An isolated area is also on the Moldova-Ukraine border.

To sum up around the two areas denoted, Central Europe with high values and Balkan Europe with low values are to be added to some islands in Baltic and Eastern Europe, both positive and negative signs.

Diagram 6 – Mean of the highest and the lowest values of the 10 conceptual dimensions



Key: ○ the highest values
○ the lowest values


3.4.2. *Higher values and lower values of dimension 1, relating to “Propensity Towards CBC”*

As we know already, the propensity toward cross-border co-operation (CBC) attains in general and on average the highest level (8.4); yet if we look at individual areas, we note that the maximum value includes the transborder areas with maximum levels (equal to 10). These are represented as individual islands and can be seen between Finland-Estonia, Poland-Ukraine, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”-Greece, as well as the areas which form the crossroads between Hungary, Romania and Serbia. Diagram 7, on the other hand, highlights a lower level in the macro-region between Croatia-Bosnia and Herzegovina-Montenegro-Serbia-“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Bulgaria, Turkey: this shows that there is a vast area that includes the states resulting from the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Turkey. This area has a very low propensity to CBC.

Another clearly homogeneous region with a low propensity for cross-border co-operation lies between Russia on one side and Poland, Latvia and Estonia on the other.


In summary, areas with the highest propensity for cross-border co-operation include islands in northern Europe along the Danube and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”-Greece; while areas with the lowest propensity for co-operation are structured around areas of the Balkans to the borders with Turkey and around areas bordering Russia.

Diagram 7 – Highest and lowest values of the dimension 1: Propensity towards CBC



Key: ○ the highest values
○ the lowest values

Diagram 8 – Highest and lowest values of the dimension 3: Cross-border relations in each production sector



Key: ○ the highest values
○ the lowest values

3.4.3. Higher values and lower values of dimension 3, relating to “cross-border relations in each production sector”


Essential co-operation between territories on both sides of the border and beyond, does not arise merely because of a vague feeling of the same propensity to co-operation, but results from “real” relations among the economic sectors (trade, industry, tourism, services, planning, etc.). Diagram 8 shows that the highest values for economic relations includes the long area linking all the Baltic borders between Finland and Ukraine, through Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as the heart of Central Europe between Slovenia and Romania through Hungary, which is the average Danube Europe. Islands with higher values form for a specific reason: the border area between the Czech Republic and Slovakia is a border that still enjoys recent economic integration and the border area between Albania and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” has a common language.

On the opposite side, the Balkan states, including Croatia and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, as well as between Montenegro and Hungary have lower values for relations between productive sectors. This is because of the recent dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation. Moreover, very weak relations among actors in the productive sectors are identified in the following areas: Bulgaria-Turkey, Moldova-Ukraine, Austria-Slovenia, Poland-Russia (Kaliningrad), Belarus-Lithuania, Latvia-Russia.

3.4.4. Higher values and lower values of dimension 2, relating to “levels of training and coordination between local transborder entities”

Diagram 9 shows the areas with a maximum amount of training for officials of local authorities. These form a vertical axis that has at its base Austria-Hungary-Ukraine, and extends to the area of Norway-Russia. Within this axis lies the heart of Central Europe and the vertical Baltic-Scandinavian area.

Diagram 9 – Highest and lowest values of the dimension 2: Levels of training and coordination



Key: ○ the highest values
○ the lowest values

This indicates a strong inter-border co-operation at the administrative level of local authorities. Co-operation does not exist, or at any rate is very low, between local authorities in the former Yugoslav countries, Albania-“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Bulgaria-Turkey. There is also a lack of co-operation between local authorities regards some Polish borders with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Belarus.

In summary, these situations, both positive and negative, still show how historical and cultural experiences are reflected in the training and coordination between the administrative bases that make up areas neighbouring the border.


3.4.5. Higher values and lower values of dimension 9, relating to “economic factors for successful CBC”

Economic factors are very positive (diagram 10) in this case for Central Europe and some countries in the Baltic (Estonia-Finland, Estonia-Latvia, Lithuania-Poland). These economic factors are owing to local economic civil society, boundaries with positive “filters” in both countries, participation in Interreg projects and the existence of efficient and well-connected roads, railways, waterways. The latter structural aspect is obviously influenced by the fact that these are boundaries in lowland areas. By contrast, the mountainous areas of the Balkans, and countries in northern Central Europe where there are very modest economic factors, have the lowest values for cross-border economic factors.

3.4.6. Higher values and lower values of dimension 6, relating to “socio-cultural obstacles to the CBC”


Diagram 11 shows the values for cultural aspects that are obstacles to co-operation. These obstacles arise from the existence of negative stereotypes among the people living along the border, linguistic barriers and an inability to grasp the opportunities for co-operation.

Diagram 10 – Highest and lowest values of the dimension 9: Economic factors per effective CBC



Key: ○ the highest values
○ the lowest values

Diagram 11 – Highest and lowest values of the dimension 6: Socio-cultural obstacles for CBC



Key: ○ the highest values
○ the lowest values

However, diagram 11 shows that this kind of obstacle is non-existent in the western Balkans, and particularly in border areas between Montenegro and Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia, Albania, as well as between Albania-“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. Neither do these types of obstacles exist in the western part of Central Europe (Austria-Italy, Austria-Slovakia, Slovenia-Hungary), other Eastern areas (Ukraine-Russia) and around the Baltic (Estonia-Finland).

Language barriers, negative stereotypes and an inability to seize opportunities represent cultural obstacles in the Baltics and Eastern Europe, between Slovakia, Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania. In fact, in this case linguistic diversity is historically and currently a negative factor.


3.4.7. Higher values and lower values of dimension 10, relating to “linguistic, cultural and historical factors for an effective CBC”

This dimension is both very similar to the previous dimension and very different as it does not view linguistic, cultural and historical factors as obstacles or extreme differences, but rather as common to territories on both sides of the border, and therefore capable of making effective cross-border co-operation (CBC).

The result shown in diagram 12 indicates a homogeneous geographical distribution . It also shows the similarities and overlap in the lack of barriers, identified in paragraph 3.3.6.

The highest values for the cultural factors that make co-operation effective are found along the border between Slovenia and Hungary, Ukraine and Russia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, as well as in areas in the Baltic countries from Finland to Lithuania. The lowest values for these cultural factors affect the areas outside the Baltic (Russia and Belarus), but also the diversity that exists between Croatia and Serbia, and further down along the border which separates Greece and Bulgaria from Turkey, as well as the border areas of Bulgaria and Albania with Greece. Even in these areas there are differences in cultural factors that hamper the effectiveness of cross-border co-operation.

Diagram 12 – Highest and lowest values of the dimension 10: Linguistic, cultural and historical factors for effective CBC



Key: ○ the highest values
○ the lowest values

3.4.8. Higher values and lower values of dimension 8, relating to “administrative factors for a successful CBC”


For this dimension we go outside the border area. This external dimension represents administrative factors for effective cross-border co-operation and it corresponds to the internal dimension for vocational training and coordination between local authorities on both sides of the border (see diagram 9).

Comparison of the two diagrams (diagrams 9 and 13) confirms that these factors are complementary, as shown by both internal and external administrative factors of the border area.

In fact, even with these external administrative factors, the highest values include two areas: the first lies along one of the borders of Central Europe between Czech Republic-Slovakia and Hungary-Serbia, in the vertical and horizontal lines between Italy and Ukraine; and the second is the Baltic-Nordic area comprising Norway-Russia and Lithuania-Poland. The lowest values for these administrative factors are concentrated in the Balkans and in the area of Belarus-Ukraine-Poland-Slovakia-Hungary.

This trend of higher and lower values is understandable in view of the degree of centralisation of states and the transfer of competences, the ability to form international relations and financial resources for local authorities operating in the border areas.

Diagram 13 – Highest and lowest values of the dimension 8: Administrative factors for effective CBC



Key: ○ the highest values
○ the lowest values

3.4.9. Higher values and lower values of dimension 5, relating to “economic obstacles for the CBC”

The economy as an obstacle is a second external dimension for a border area. The economy is an obstacle, when on either side of the border development is unbalanced, there is a technological gap, strong competition, protection of the labour market, tax and customs barriers.

Diagram 14 shows that these obstacles are either non-existent or there are very few of them in the countries in the western part of central Europe (Italy, Austria, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia), but also between Poland-Lithuania, Bosnia and Herzegovina-Serbia, Albania-“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Bulgaria-Turkey, Greece-Bulgaria. The diagram also shows that where there are no economic barriers, there may nonetheless exist cultural obstacles to co-operation.

The lowest values for this dimension, namely the areas in which economic obstacles are stronger, are found in some countries in the Balkans, including the area between Greece-Turkey, but also in the border areas between Slovakia and the Czech Republic, Poland and Ukraine. Finally, economic barriers limit cross-border co-operation in the Baltic countries: of course these are the obstacles mentioned above.


3.4.10. Higher values and lower values of dimension 4, relating to “institutional obstacles for CBC”

Diagram 15 consists of the 55 cross-border areas according to the existing or non-existing institutional obstacles.

In fact the highest values are in areas where there are no or few institutional obstacles. The lowest values refer to situations in which the obstacles are greater.

The low presence of institutional obstacles is primarily true of countries of Central and Danube Europe, but also in the Baltic borders that were part of the former Soviet Union (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania with Russia and Belarus). In contrast between the Baltic Republics, there are no consolidated cross-border and peripheral institutions to date, and this mainly affects areas spanning Finland to Lithuania. For the other countries there are “islands” where there are strong institutional obstacles (Romania-Moldova, Albania-Greece, Belarus-Poland, Slovakia-Ukraine).

Diagram 14 – Highest and lowest values of the dimension 5: Economic obstacles for CBC



Key: ○ the highest values
○ the lowest values

3.4.11. Higher values and lower values of dimension 7, relating to “institutional factors for effective CBC”


Diagram 16 shows the cross-border areas in which treaties on transborder co-operation (the Madrid Outline Convention and its protocols, in the first instance) have been ratified by national parliaments of the two border areas (higher values), and border areas whose national parliaments have not ratified these treaties (lower values).

The countries with the highest values are Slovenia, Austria, Ukraine for Central Europe and the Balkan-Danube region including Croatia-Montenegro and Romania-Moldova horizontally and Bosnia and Herzegovina-Montenegro, Hungary-Romania and Bulgaria-Romania vertically.

Borders with the lowest values (owing to lack of signature of, or incomplete process of accession to, international treaties) are to be found in the Balkan peninsula between Croatia-Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia-Serbia and Greece-Turkey.

As we can see, the countries that have signed and ratified treaties and the countries that have not yet started this process are few in number, which means that the majority comprises countries that have begun this process in part on one side of the border and countries that may or may not have begun this process on the other side. On the other hand we must also add that the values of this conceptual dimension are quite high (7.0, between 1 and 10), so this majority of countries, whatever their particular situation with regard to the treaty process, have values which are fairly high, although not extreme (upwards or downwards).

Diagram 16 – Highest and lowest values of the dimension 7: Institutional factor for effective CBC



Key: ○ the highest values
○ the lowest values

4. The relationship between internal and external conceptual dimensions of co-operation in 55 border areas


Cross-border co-operation in the 55 areas of Europe, from the Mediterranean to the Baltic sea, is quite diverse, both on account of the internal and external aspects for the same area, where internal refers to the contents of this participation, and external characters mean the national and international context that either promote or restrict cross-border co-operation.

The marks for international co-operation are positive (ranging between 5.5 and 10) in 40 areas out of 55 (72.7%), while the marks for the external context for this co-operation are positive in 26 areas out of 55 (47.3% of areas). This means that the co-operation is local, and develops even if the stimuli from outside are limited. In addition every area in itself and in relation to the external environment, develops a significantly correlated relationship. That is, an external context favourable to co-operation corresponds to an increase in the co-operation inside the cross-border area, and vice versa: in fact, the correlation coefficient (r) is equal to 0.54.

This relationship between internal conditions (I) of the areas and external conditions (E) of the co-operation is summarised well in Tables 5, 6, 7, 8 and diagram 17.

In particular, Table 5, we can see the cross section of values for the internal and external dimensions (Table 6), the concrete areas located in each cell formed by internal and external mark (Table 7), and finally the geographical location of the intersection of both marks (internal/external) for all 55 border areas.

Diagram 17 – Positive and negative relations among internal and external dimensions, per cross-border areas



- Key:**
- | | | | |
|----|---------|----|---------|
| 1. | + I + E | 6. | - E |
| 2. | + I | 7. | - I |
| 3. | + I - E | 8. | - I - E |
| 4. | + E | | |

Table 5 – Mean marks (1 to 10) of internal and external conceptual dimensions in cross-border areas and SW/OT ratio

Conceptual dimensions

	Internal (SW)	External (OT)	SW/OT ratio
1. Albania-Greece	4.9	4.0	1.23
2. Albania-“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”	<u>7.9</u>	5.5	1.44
3. Albania-Montenegro	6.4	6.0	1.07
4. Bosnia Herzegovina-Croatia	3.7	3.2	1.16
5. Bosnia Herzegovina-Serbia	7.2	4.6	1.67
6. Bosnia Herzegovina-Montenegro	5.8	5.8	1.00
7. Bulgaria-Greece	6.2	<u>6.7</u>	0.93
8. Bulgaria-“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”	5.0	3.4	1.47
9. Bulgaria-Romania	6.6	<u>6.9</u>	0.96
10. Bulgaria-Turkey	2.9	5.7	0.51
11. Bulgaria-Serbia	5.8	4.2	1.38
12. Croatia-Hungary	6.0	4.7	1.28
13. Croatia-Montenegro	7.0	5.9	1.19
14. Croatia-Serbia	3.1	2.7	1.15
15. Serbia-Montenegro	6.0	5.7	1.05
16. Greece-“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”	6.4	5.6	1.14
17. Greece-Turkey	6.0	4.0	1.50
18. Hungary-Romania	<u>7.7</u>	<u>7.5</u>	1.03
19. Hungary-Serbia	6.5	4.7	1.38
20. “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”-Serbia	3.7	2.7	1.37
21. Moldova-Romania	5.1	5.4	0.94
22. Romania-Serbia	6.8	5.5	1.24
23. Austria-Czech Republic	5.1	5.7	0.89
24. Austria-Hungary	<u>8.1</u>	<u>7.2</u>	1.13
25. Austria-Italy	7.0	<u>7.3</u>	0.96
26. Austria-Slovakia	6.7	<u>6.7</u>	1.00
27. Austria-Slovenia	7.3	5.7	1.28
28. Belarus-Poland	5.1	2.9	<u>1.76</u>
29. Belarus-Ukraine	5.7	3.8	<u>1.50</u>
30. Croatia-Slovenia	6.9	5.3	1.30
31. Czech Republic-Poland	6.5	4.7	1.38
32. Czech Republic-Slovakia	<u>8.9</u>	6.1	1.46
33. Hungary-Slovakia	6.8	<u>6.6</u>	1.03
34. Hungary-Slovenia	<u>8.6</u>	<u>7.7</u>	1.12
35. Hungary-Ukraine	7.2	<u>7.0</u>	1.03
36. Italy-Slovenia	6.7	6.3	1.06
37. Moldova-Ukraine	4.4	4.8	0.92
38. Poland-Slovakia	5.7	5.2	1.10

39.	Poland-Ukraine	<u>7.9</u>	4.6	<u>1.72</u>
40.	Romania-Ukraine	6.0	4.6	1.30
41.	Slovakia-Ukraine	7.5	4.2	<u>1.79</u>
42.	Belarus-Latvia	5.5	5.9	0.92
43.	Belarus-Lithuania	3.9	3.6	1.08
44.	Belarus-Russia	7.2	4.3	1.67
45.	Estonia-Latvia	<u>8.9</u>	3.4	<u>2.62</u>
46.	Estonia-Finland	<u>9.7</u>	3.9	<u>2.49</u>
47.	Estonia-Russia	5.4	<u>6.6</u>	0.82
48.	Finland-Russia	7.7	4.5	1.71
49.	Lithuania-Poland	7.7	<u>7.2</u>	1.07
50.	Lithuania-Russia (Kaliningrad)	7.2	5.4	1.33
51.	Latvia-Lithuania	<u>8.2</u>	4.7	1.74
52.	Latvia-Russia	4.6	6.3	0.73
53.	Norway-Russia	6.9	5.2	1.33
54.	Poland-Russia (Kaliningrad)	4.2	5.4	0.78
55.	Russia-Ukraine	7.6	6.0	1.27
	Mean (m)	6.3	5.2	1.21
	Standard deviation (σ)	1.46	1.33	

Key: marks in underlined bold indicate lowest means ($< m - 1 \sigma$)

From table 6 we have chosen to concentrate on the following aspects:

1) 49.1% of the areas (27 out of 55) have a similar mark for both the internal and external. This indicates that the internal and external forces for co-operation are in balance;

2) the intersecting cells between high marks (No. 3), low marks (No. 4) and high-low marks (No. 2) for the internal and external dimensions concern only a few border areas. This means there is a correlation between the two dimensions, as seen in the coefficient equal to 0.54, however in outermost cells (i.e. high and low marks) there only few areas, that is numerically reduced;

3) moreover, border areas, such as Estonia-Latvia and Estonia-Finland, which are characterised by a strong internal co-operation, do not seem to need the external dimensions for co-operation in so far as they find internally all the necessary elements for co-operation. However, in no border area, where the maximum strength for co-operation lies outside the area itself, there is a very low internal propensity towards co-operation. Namely, cross-border co-operation within an area can develop, even without external assistance. However, if there is general external support, it will strengthen some form of cross-border co-operation within the area itself.

Table 6 – High, medium and low marks of the internal dimensions in the 55 areas

Internal: mark			External: mark			Totals
			High 3 (≥ 6.6)	Medium 2 (3.9 – 6.5)	Low 1 (≤ 3.8)	
High	3	(≥ 7.7)	3	4	2	9
Medium	2	(4.7 – 7.6)	8	27	3	38
Low	1	(≤ 4.6)	0	4	4	8
Totals			11	35	9	55

Table 7 – Cross tabulation of the high and low marks of the dimensions and the single cross-border area (with the exception of the medium-medium dyad)

1. <u>High</u> internal/ <u>high</u> external:	H-RO	<u>7.7</u> ;	<u>7.5</u>
	A-H	<u>8.1</u> ;	<u>7.2</u>
	H-SLO	<u>8.6</u> ;	<u>7.7</u>
2. <u>High</u> internal/ <u>medium</u> external:	AL-MK	<u>7.9</u> ;	5.5
	CZ-SK	<u>8.9</u> ;	6.1
	PL-UA	<u>7.9</u> ;	4.6
	LV-LT	<u>8.2</u> ;	4.7
	EST-LV	<u>8.9</u> ;	<u>3.4</u>
3. <u>High</u> internal/ <u>low</u> external:	EST-FIN	<u>9.7</u> ;	<u>3.9</u>
	BG-RO	6.6;	<u>6.9</u>
4. <u>Medium</u> internal/ <u>high</u> external:	A-I	7.6;	<u>7.3</u>
	A-SK	6.7;	<u>6.7</u>
	H-SK	6.8;	<u>6.6</u>
	H-UA	7.2;	<u>7.0</u>
	EST-RUS	5.4;	<u>6.6</u>
	LT-PL	7.7;	<u>7.2</u>
	BG-GR	6.2;	<u>6.7</u>
	BG-MK	5.0;	<u>3.4</u>
	BY-PL	5.1;	<u>2.9</u>
5. <u>Medium</u> internal/ <u>low</u> external:	BY-UA	5.7;	<u>3.8</u>
	BG-TR	<u>2.9</u> ;	5.7
	MD-UA	<u>4.4</u> ;	4.8
	LV-RUS	<u>4.6</u> ;	6.3
	PL-RUS	<u>4.2</u> ;	5.4
7. <u>Low</u> internal/ <u>medium</u> external:	BIH-HR	<u>3.7</u> ;	<u>3.2</u>
	HR-SRB	<u>3.1</u> ;	<u>2.7</u>
	MK-SRB	<u>3.7</u> ;	<u>2.7</u>
	BY-LT	<u>3.9</u> ;	<u>3.6</u>

Diagram 14 shows very clearly the discussions held so far and localises them. The highest marks, both for internal and external dimensions, are in the heart of Central Europe, namely Austria-Hungary, Slovenia-Hungary and Hungary-Romania (Transylvania); while the highest external marks (key 4) comprise the areas that surround this same central European area, but extend from Italy-Austria, Austria-Slovakia, Slovakia-Hungary, Hungary-Ukraine, Romania-Bulgaria, Bulgaria-Greece. In addition there are some islands, such as Lithuania-Poland and Estonia-Russia. Other islands have the highest marks for internal dimensions but not external dimensions (key 2).

By contrast, the lowest marks, for both internal and external dimensions (key 8), are found in some of the Balkan areas including Croatia-Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia-Serbia, Serbia-“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”: as can be seen here, that is a constant already observed in many of the internal and external dimensions (3.3). To this can be added the area of Lithuania-Belarus.

Finally, Table 8 shows that the internal dimension (I) prevails over the external (E) in 43.6% of cross-border areas. These areas are in Central Europe (47.4%) and Baltic Europe (50%), which, as mentioned above, means that co-operation has substantial endogenous bases, even if it is not supported from outside.

The internal dimension is in equilibrium with the external dimension in 30.9% of the cross-border areas, but this is more widespread in the Balkan-Danube part of Europe (45.4%). A similar balance, however, is the low mark obtained in some areas for internal and external dimensions: this was the case for 8 of the 10 Balkan-Danube areas that are in equilibrium. Namely, the low mark of the internal characters is accompanied by an equally low mark of the external characters. In these circumstances it is difficult to develop cross-border co-operation: the most emblematic cases are represented by the following areas: Croatia-Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”-Serbia. This has been highlighted above.

Table 8 – Relationship between internal and external dimensions, for macro-regions

	in total		Balkan-Danube macro-region		Central European macro-region		Baltic macro-region	
	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%	n.	%
1 > E =	24	43.6	8	36.4	9	47.4	7	50.0
1 = E =	17	30.9	10	45.4	4	21.0	3	21.4
1 < E =	14	25.5	4	18.2	6	31.6	4	28.6
Total	55	100.0	22	100.0	19	100.0	14	100.0

Finally, in 25.5% of the areas, the marks for co-operation, internally (I) in the border area, are lower than the marks for the external context (E) in 25.5% of the areas, but these marks are higher in Central Europe (31.6%) and Baltic Europe (28.6%), which means that the internal area has a lower level of cross-border co-operation than is technically feasible, owing to the competences and opportunities of autonomy available to the border areas.

The hitherto general analysis of the report can now be made more concrete by comparing the 55 areas. This comparison can be seen in diagrams 18 and 19.

The *internal* conditions (diagram 18) of the border area have the highest marks (from 9.7 to 7.9 out of 10) for good cross-border co-operation between Albania and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” in the *Balkans* and in the *Danube* between Hungary and Romania to south-central Europe: this is due in part to the strong presence of the Albanian minority in neighbouring “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and Hungarians in Transylvania, Romania. The lowest marks for co-operation in this area of Europe are, however, between the historical border (and beyond) between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (3.7) and Croatia and Serbia (3.1), and then for the borders between Albania and Greece (4.9), Serbia and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (3.7) and Bulgaria and Turkey (2.9).

The internal conditions (diagram 18) for cross-border areas in Central Europe are highly conducive to cross-border co-operation in four out of nineteen areas, with marks ranging from 7.9 to 8.9 out of 10). These conditions are mostly internal to borders of countries from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and to the borders of Hungary with Austria and Slovenia, the Czech Republic with Slovakia, Poland with Ukraine for the area that was part of the formerly Polish Galicia. The borders between Moldova and Ukraine (4.4) are attributed lower marks, reflecting a cultural divide between the Slavs and Romanians.

For *Baltic Europe*, internally, co-operation among the Baltic states is very strong. This includes Finland (8.2 to 9.7 out of 10). Along the borders of these countries with Russia and Belarus, however, the propensity towards co-operation is very low. This indicates that the cultural commonalities and clashes are disseminated throughout civil society, even in remote areas such as (border) states.


If we analyse cross-border co-operation in the 55 areas from the perspective of the external dimension (diagram 19), by looking at the states which include these border peripheries, we see that the states paying more attention to transborder co-operation are in Central Europe, forming an arc from Italy-Austria-Slovenia-Hungary-Slovakia-Ukraine.

In the Eastern part of Balkan-Danube Europe, the states which pay more attention to co-operation are those outside the former Yugoslavia, such as Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece. By contrast, less attention is paid to co-operation by the State central authorities of the internal border areas of former Yugoslavia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, then Serbia and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. Finally in the Eastern Baltic states co-operation is promoted by Russia and Estonia along their border area, and by Lithuania and Poland along their area of the border. As we can see, co-operation, influenced possibly by the local areas, is promoted where the internal characters for co-operation are more fragile than those in the Baltic States: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The real conditions for cross-border co-operation between the *internal* border areas and the *external* environment should support the data set out in diagrams 18 and 19.

5. SWOT variables and strategies for action


At this point we can translate these positive factors and negative factors into actions, or rather into strategies: diagram 20 indicates the most appropriate strategy for each of the 55 cross-border areas.

Diagram 19 – Marks of the external dimensions of the co-operation in each cross-border area



Key: in the red rectangle are the highest marks ($> m + 1\sigma$)
in the green rectangle are the lowest marks ($< m - 1\sigma$)

Diagram 20 – Co-operation strategy for each cross-border area



Key:

- Strategy 1: strengthening
- Strategy 3: mobilisation for context control
- Strategy 5: joint internal-external coalition for context control
- Strategy 4: control of negatives
- Strategy 6: initial recourse of the local and central will

The correlation between the six strategies and the marks for the *internal* conditions of the area and the correlation between the six strategies and the marks for the *external* conditions of each area are very high, since they are equal to -0.62 and -0.73 respectively. This means therefore that the *strategy of strengthening*, using the strengths and opportunities (*strategy 1*), is widespread and appropriate in central Europe, and that in all these areas there is a potential for co-operation which is largely endogenous in nature. In the Balkan-Danube area the first strategy is decidedly widespread along the borders of the countries outside former Yugoslavia, to which is added the border area between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, which is inhabited by Serbs. In contrast, in the Baltic States, the first strategy is appropriate for the western border areas of Lithuania and Russia (Kaliningrad) / Russia and Poland. For the rest, co-operation development requires (see Table 9) the strengths (S) and opportunities (O) to restrain the weaknesses (W) and threats (T). These negative variables hinder the allocation of only positive development. In these conditions, the most widespread strategy is therefore the fourth strategy.

A similar situation, where the *fourth strategy* could be appropriate, can be seen in Balkan-Danube Europe. In Baltic Europe and in Balkan-Danube Europe adoption of the *sixth strategy* is necessary to cope with extreme and enduring conditions. This means that in four cross-border areas (Lithuania-Belarus, Russia (Kaliningrad) / Poland, Croatia-Serbia, Serbia-“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”) both inside and/or outside the area, there is no positive dimension for co-operation (positive SWOT variables S and O). Building effective cross-border co-operation in these areas would require resources and the political and popular will.

Table 9 – SWOT variables and halo, in the cross-border areas

	SWOT variables					Total	(2)	(3)	(4)	% total (2 + 4)
	S	W	O	T	% of variables on the indicators (53)		halo	% halo on the indicators		
1. Albania-Greece	6	9	3	8	26	49.1	27	50.9*	100.0*	
2. Albania-“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”	11*	0	8	3	22	41.5	31	58.5*	100.0*	
3. Albania-Montenegro	8	4	9	5	26	49.1	23	43.4	92.5*	
4. Bosnia Herzegovina-Croatia	1	7	1	7	16	30.2	22	41.5	71.7	
5. Bosnia Herzegovina-Serbia	6	0	4	3	13	24.5	29	54.7*	79.2	
6. Bosnia Herzegovina-Montenegro	6	6	10*	7	29	54.7*	22	41.5	96.2*	
7. Bulgaria-Greece	4	2	7	3	16	30.2	15	28.3	58.5*	
8. Bulgaria-“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”	3	2	7	15	27	50.9*	18	34.0	84.9	
9. Bulgaria-Romania	5	0	11*	1	17	32.1	16	30.2	62.3*	
10. Bulgaria-Turkey	1	10*	10*	7	28	52.8*	20	34.0	86.8	
11. Bulgaria-Serbia	2	4	1	7	14	26.6	24	50.9*	77.5	
12. Croatia-Hungary	4	2	4	5	15	28.3	26	49.1	77.4	
13. Croatia-Montenegro	9	1	8	4	22	41.5	23	43.4	84.9	
14. Croatia-Serbia	0	12*	1	9	22	41.5	22	41.5	83.0	
15. Serbia-Montenegro	7	4	9	6	26	49.1	20	37.3	86.4	
16. Greece-“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”	15*	5	11	7	38	71.7*	9	17.0	88.7	

		SWOT variables				(2)	(3)	(4)		
		S	W	O	T	Total	% of variables on the indicators (53)	<i>halo</i>	% <i>halo</i> on the indicators	% total (2 + 4)
17.	Greece-Turkey	8	5	5	9	27	50.9*	10	18.9	69.8
18.	Hungary-Romania	15*	1	12	0	26	49.0	15	32.1	81.1
19.	Hungary-Serbia	4	1	3	3	11	20.8	32	60.4*	81.2
20.	“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”-Serbia	0	8	0	10*	18	34.0	21	39.6	73.6
21.	Moldova-Romania	2	1	7	6	16	26.4	15	28.3	54.7*
22.	Romania-Serbia	10*	2	6	6	24	39.6	13	28.3	67.9
23.	Austria-Czech Republic	3	10*	5	4	22	41.5	17	32.1	73.6
24.	Austria-Hungary	10*	1	13*	2	26	49.1	19	35.8	84.9
25.	Austria-Italy	10*	2	10*	3	25	47.2	25	47.2	94.4*
26.	Austria-Slovakia	10*	6	10*	4	30	56.6*	22	41.5	98.1*
27.	Austria-Slovenia	8	0	7	5	20	37.7	26	49.1	86.8
28.	Belarus-Poland	2	5	1	16*	24	43.6	22	40.0	83.6
29.	Belarus-Ukraine	5	5	0	8	18	34.0	17	32.0	66.0
30.	Croatia-Slovenia	6	4	5	5	20	37.7	17	32.1	69.8
31.	Czech Republic-Poland	9	4	6	11*	30	56.6*	16	30.2	86.8
32.	Czech Republic-Slovakia	16*	0	6	1	23	43.4	17	32.1	75.5
33.	Hungary-Slovakia	7	3	9	3	22	41.5	22	41.5	83.0
34.	Hungary-Slovenia	12*	0	13*	0	25	47.2	22	41.5	88.7

		SWOT variables				(2)	(3)	(4)		
		S	W	O	T	Total	% of variables on the indicators (53)	<i>halo</i>	% <i>halo</i> on the indicators	% total (2 + 4)
35.	Hungary-Ukraine	9	3	10*	3	25	47.2	22	41.5	88.7
36.	Italy-Slovenia	6	3	6	2	17	32.1	26	49.0	81.1
37.	Moldova-Ukraine	3	6	4	5	18	34.0	30	56.6*	90.6*
38.	Poland-Slovakia	5	8	8	9	30	56.6*	15	28.3	84.9
39.	Poland-Ukraine	12*	0	4	8	24	43.7	18	32.7	76.4
40.	Slovakia-Ukraine	8	1	5	7	21	39.6	28	52.8*	92.4*
41.	Romania-Ukraine	3	1	2	4	10	18.5	30	55.6*	74.1
42.	Belarus-Latvia	5	6	5	1	17	32.1	29	54.7*	86.8
43.	Belarus-Lithuania	0	7	2	6	15	28.3	26	49.1	77.4
44.	Belarus-Russia	9	4	0	5	18	34.0	27	50.9*	84.9
45.	Estonia-Latvia	15*	0	4	14*	33	62.3*	13	24.5	86.8
46.	Estonia-Finland	23*	0	4	14*	41	72.3*	10	18.9	91.2*
47.	Estonia-Russia	0	0	2	2	4	7.6	42	79.2*	86.8
48.	Finland-Russia	8	0	5	7	20	37.7	30	56.6*	94.3*
49.	Lithuania-Poland	8	0	9	0	17	32.1	34	64.1*	96.2*
50.	Lithuania-Russia (Kaliningrad)	8	0	4	3	15	28.3	30	56.6*	84.9
51.	Latvia-Lithuania	15*	3	6	10*	34	64.1*	18	34.0	98.1*
52.	Latvia-Russia	0	0	3	0	3	5.7	42	79.2*	84.9
53.	Norway-Russia	7	2	3	5	17	32.1	21	39.6	71.7
54.	Poland-Russia (Kaliningrad)	0	5	6	7	18	34.0	24	45.3	79.3
55.	Russia-Ukraine	10*	1	5	2	18	34.0	25	47.1	81.1
	Means of SWOT variables for area	6.9	3.2	5.8	5.5	21.4	39.6		43.0	82.6

6. Back to Euradria, and its spreading to Europe

Finally, we would like to look at a model which was developed by Isig (Isig, “Ritorno a Euradria”, *Isig Journal* 1, 2008), that of the Euroregion (transborder, functional networks, strategies and macro-infrastructures) which as an institution has to construct and emphasize participation, transparency and strategies as sources of cross-border co-operation. Table 10 shows the reality of this part of Europe.

The data collected for table 10 is very clear. For the 55 areas, 78.2% of the areas need to position themselves in each of the *strategies* offered by the macro-infrastructures, to enable a sort of centrality in the European context (*Euroregion of macro-infrastructures*). From this, follows the need to have a *Euroregion (transfrontier)* to promote the *participation* of the people in the new transfrontier region on a daily basis for 78.2% of the 55 areas. Finally, the need for *transparency*, demonstrated by the Euroregion functional networks, is less felt, since it concerns a more modest, although still very high, 69.1% of the 55 cross-border areas.

In general terms, it appears that at first there is a need for coordination of the strategies with the other border areas, followed by a need for civil participation, and finally a need for transparency. What should we interpret these successive needs? A first interpretation connects the need to create one internal culture in the area with the need to coordinate and strengthen the strategy of the culture's presence in, and influence on, Europe. Both a local and global European context is felt to be strictly necessary. The need for transparency of the organisation's actions is less imperative, because, we assume, it already has a standardised organisational behaviour, which is regulated and visible, and partly because transparency is a need that comes after that of participative cross-border co-operation and the strategic position of each area.

Table 10 - Euroregion from the Euradria model for three European sub-regions

Euroregion											
Europe	Cross-border			Functional networks			Strategies and macro-infrastructure				
European regions	% intra macro-region	n. "quasi" necessity	% inter macro-regions	% intra macro-region	n. "quasi" necessity	% inter macro-regions	% intra macro-region	n. "quasi" necessity	% inter macro-regions	n. euroregions	n. euroregions/n. areas
Balkan-Danube : 22 =	95.5	21	40.4	86.4	19	36.5	54.5	12	23.1	52	100.0
Central : 19 =	57.9	11	28.2	52.6	10	25.6	94.7	18	46.2	39	2.1
Baltic : 14 =	78.6	11	33.3	64.3	9	27.3	92.9	13	39.4	33	2.4
: 55	78.2	43	34.7	69.1	38	30.6	78.2	43	34.7	12	2.3
necessity	participation			Transparency			strategy			4	100.0
											2.4

If this is a general image, the system of three needs (participation, transparency, strategies) takes its shape according to different modalities and different regions considered.

Table 10 shows that in the *Balkan-Danube macro-region* it is necessary to emphasise *participation* between the individual cross-border areas in the Euroregion in 21 out of 22 areas (95.5%). In addition to participation, there is a need for transparency to be pursued by the Euroregion of functional networks (19 out of 22 areas - 86.4%). Thirdly, there is a need for guaranteed strategies, which from the macro-infrastructure are currently perceived as less important (12 out of 22 areas - 54.5%), partly because of a particular structural framework in these areas, but mainly because these areas' priority is to deal their internal needs (participation and transparency), that are deficient comparing to the one in context.

In the *Central Europe macro-region* the prioritisation of the three needs results inverted. We already found that internal integration in the areas is very high, consequently the need for *participation* of civil society and for organisational *transparency*, as assured by the transfrontier Euroregion and the Euroregion of functional networks, is decisively low (57.9% and 52.6% respectively). By contrast, the need for *strategies* is widespread (18 areas out of 19 - 94.7%). This is because of a connection of these areas, which are centrally located, with the external European context. With regard to the sub-region Balkan-Danube, central Europe and its borders show a reverse tendency in relation to the three needs: the needs for *participation and transparency* are minor, whereas the need for European centrality is more significant.

Finally, the *Baltic macro-region* has an approach to the three needs for each of the three types of euroregions and their border complexities; the approach is founded on both the strong integration of the Baltic areas across their borders (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and

also Poland), as well as on the problematic integration of the Slav countries from the former Soviet Union (Russia, Belorussia and Russia (Kaliningrad)). The table shows the strong need for strategies and macro-infrastructures (13 areas out of 14 – 93%). It also shows the need to develop cross-border *participation* (owing to the complexity of the two types of cross-border areas) (11 transfrontier euroregions out of 14 areas - 78.6%). In contrast, the table shows that organisational transparency is less relevant maybe because organisational transparency is already in place, or because it is not yet felt as a real necessity (9 out of 14 areas – 64.3%).

To conclude, the detailed analysis of the three macro-regions considered (Balkan-Danube Europe, Central Europe and Baltic Europe) shows that the “theorem” is confirmed by *Euradria*, which was devised to reinforce cross-border co-operation through identification of the (three) *needs* of co-operation; the action *strategies* which need to be carried out; the *institutional forms* needed for the Euroregion to embody the requisite social values; the *structures and functions* of these three euroregions, the *interconnectivity* of these three euroregions (transfrontier, functional networks, macro-infrastructures); the possible, but not essential, *interdependency* between these euroregions, drawing on the *Euradria* model.

Within this “theorem”, we were able even to identify and explain the various connections between the cross-border areas, in euroregional form and through six action strategies. This revealed a very strong correlation ($r = 0.71$, $p < 0.001$) between the Euroregion of functional networks and the more complex positive/negative, internal/external strategies (especially the fourth and the fifth strategy). This type of Euroregion (functional networks) is particularly important when the policies for co-operation exist and are very complex, intermeshed and interconnected. In the transfrontier Euroregion where the more complex and problematic fourth and fifth strategies are implicated, there is a need for *participation* because in this case the strategies are less understandable to public and civil society. This is demonstrated by the coefficient of correlation (r) between the transfrontier Euroregion and the complex fourth or fifth strategy, which is equal to 0.28.

The *theorem of Euradria*, besides being confirmed by the analysis, differentiates between the three needs (*participation, transparency, strategy*) depending on the concrete and specific situations. Consequently it appeared that the need for *strategies* (Euroregion of macro-infrastructures) to create centrality appears very clearly when the need for participation (transfrontier Euroregion) and transparency (Euroregion of functional networks) is satisfied. The current situations in the 55 areas provides adequate evidence of this, as do the situations in the three European macro-regions considered (Balkan-Danube Europe, Central Europe, Baltic Europe).

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This study is the last one in a series of four prepared by ISIG - Istituto di Sociologia Internazionale di Gorizia (Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia), Italy at the request of the Council of Europe. It provides an overview and comparison of the state of crossborder co-operation between European countries in Central, Northern and South-Eastern Europe – examined in the first three volumes respectively – and advances the best strategies for overcoming existing obstacles and promoting greater territorial cohesion. The data were collected and analysed in 2011.