



European
Social
Charter

Charte
sociale
européenne

COUNCIL OF EUROPE



CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

**EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF SOCIAL RIGHTS
COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DES DROITS SOCIAUX**

28 February 2018

Case Document No. 7

University Women of Europe (UWE) v. Greece
Complaint No. 131/2016

**RESPONSE FROM THE UWE TO THE GOVERNMENT'S
SUBMISSIONS ON THE MERITS**

Registered at the Secretariat on 9 February 2018

**Collective Complaint
No. 131 / 2016
9 February 2018**

**European Committee of Social Rights
Secretariat of the European Social Charter**

RESPONSE TO THE SUBMISSIONS ON THE MERITS

In : Groupe Européen des Femmes Diplômées des Universités, GEFDU
University Women of Europe, UWE

Represented by Anne Nègre, member of the Versailles Bar
10 avenue du Général Mangin, 78000 Versailles - France
Tel. +33 (1) 39 54 65 12 - +33 (6) 86 46 23 09 - anne.negre@orange.fr

v. : Greece

MAY IT PLEASE THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF SOCIAL RIGHTS

I. PROCEDURE

University Women of Europe, UWE / le Groupe Européen des Femmes Diplômées des Universités, GEFDU, lodged a collective complaint against Greece on 24 August 2016 regarding two violations of the European Social Charter:

- Firstly, concerning the lack of equal pay for women and men for equal, similar or comparable work,
- Secondly, concerning the under-representation of women in decision-making posts in private companies.

By letter dated 15 December 2016, Greece, represented by Ms Evangelia Zerva, Government Agent, Department of International Relations of the Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Social Solidarity, requested that the European Committee of Social Rights declare the collective complaint by UWE inadmissible.

By letter dated 31 January 2017, Mr Henrik Kristensen, Deputy Executive Secretary of the European Committee of Social Rights, invited UWE to submit a response to the states' observations by 28 February 2017. The same day, UWE requested equal treatment with the states in terms of receiving translations of the observations so as to avoid any misinterpretations. On 7 February 2017, UWE was notified that the deadline for submitting the responses was extended to one month after transmission of the French translation of the observations. The French translation was sent on 23 February 2017.

UWE submitted its response to the respondent state's observations on admissibility on 19 March 2017. On 19 May 2017, Greece submitted a further response to UWE's observations on admissibility.

On 4 July 2017, during its 293rd Session, the European Committee of Social Rights "declare[d] the complaint admissible in respect of Articles 1, 4, 4§3, 20 and E of the Charter".

The European Committee of Social Rights "invite[d] the Government to make written submissions on the merits of the complaint by 13 October 2017". This deadline was extended to 3 November 2017 by letter dated 21 September 2017. On 3 November 2017, Greece submitted its submissions on the merits in English; the deadline for UWE's response was set at 9 February 2018.

In its submissions on the merits of the complaint, the respondent state held that the collective complaint by UWE should be declared unfounded because Greece believed that it complied with the provisions of the Charter, and rejected UWE's claim for compensation for the time spent and expenses incurred in the current proceedings.

The European Trade Union Confederation, ETUC, intervened in the procedure on 3 November 2017 and submitted substantive observations on the merits:

"This collective complaint – as all the other 14 complaints concerning the same issues – is of

great importance for the full realisation of the very fundamental right of women to non-discrimination. In particular, the continuous denial of equal pay for work of equal value is one of the fundamental problems which still remain in European societies.

From the ETUC's point of view it is necessary to come to the following conclusions of a violation of Article 20 of the Charter in relation to

- the Gender pay gap in its substantive (see above II.C.1.a)) and procedural dimensions (see above II.C.1.b)) as well as in relation to
- the under-representation of women in decision-making bodies also in its substantive (see above II.C.2.a)) and procedural (see above II.C.2.b)) dimensions.

The Committee might thereby also in particular consider to take account of the recommendations/observations/concerns expressed by the international bodies referred to in II.A. addressed to the respondent state" (ETUC, § 112 et seq.).

UWE takes account of these observations and refers to them. UWE also reiterates the points in its complaint of 24 August 2016.

UWE would add here the European Pillar of Social Rights adopted on 17 November 2017 by joint declaration of the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission, committing member states to guarantee social rights in Europe through 20 principles. Principle 2, on gender equality, provides as follows:

“Equality of treatment and opportunities between women and men must be ensured and fostered in all areas, including regarding participation in the labour market, terms and conditions of employment and career progression.

Women and men have the right to equal pay for work of equal value” (https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-monetary-union/european-pillar-social-rights/european-pillar-social-rights-20-principles_en), Article 2).

In view of the observations in response, the European Committee of Social Rights will find violations of the Social Charter in respect of the aforementioned Articles 1, 4, 4§3, 20 and E on account of the lack of equal pay for women and men for equal, similar or comparable work and the under-representation of women in decision-making posts in private companies.

II. THE OVERALL ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENT STATE

The European Committee of Social Rights regularly reiterates the following:

“The Charter was envisaged as a human rights instrument to complement the European Convention on Human Rights. It is a living instrument dedicated to certain values which inspired it: dignity, autonomy, equality, solidarity and other generally recognised values. It must be interpreted so as to give life and meaning to fundamental social rights” (FIDH v. France, Complaint No. 14/2003, 8 September 2004, § 27, 29; DCI v. the Netherlands, Complaint No. 47/2008, 20 October 2009, § 34).

It was in this spirit of promoting dignity, autonomy, equality and solidarity so as to give life and meaning to fundamental social rights that UWE lodged this collective complaint concerning female workers in Europe and, more particularly, in the respondent state. These women are still waiting for equal pay for women and men and to be able to hold decision-making posts in line with their abilities on an equal footing with men.

There is total unanimity among all information sources and academic publications, all public and private research conducted at national, European or international level and communicated in whatever form, the statistics produced by the respondent states themselves and those from other states, and the reports by the ILO, the CEDAW, the various national, European and international institutions, as well as various forums and colloquies, that pay for women and men is unequal in all countries and that women are under-represented in decision-making posts.

The outlook of the world in which European men and women currently live is still, as ever, exclusively masculine.

Even though equality in wage terms is a driving force for the economy, even though the now-quantified cost of the violence against women in terms of unequal pay may represent a very large share of national budgets and even though remedying this would help to empower women and to combat this terrible scourge in our societies, equal pay for equal work and equal representation in decision-making posts are both sorely lacking in Greece.

The World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report (2016) estimated that it would take 170 years to close the gender gap (http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GGGR16/WEF_Global_Gender_Gap_Report_2016.pdf). In 2016, Greece was ranked 92nd on the global gender gap index (ibid., p.10).

The Global Gender Gap Report (2017) estimated that it would now take 217 years to close the global economic gender gap (http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2017.pdf, p. viii).

In 2017, Greece was ranked 78th on the global gender gap index (ibid., p. 10). Inequality is a firmly established feature of life in the country.

No country in Europe meets the requirements of the Social Charter, in terms either of equal pay for women and men for equal, similar or comparable work or of the representation of women in decision-making posts, according to an analysis from July 2017 by the European Network of Legal Experts in Gender Equality and Non-Discrimination entitled “The enforcement of the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value” (<http://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/4466-the-enforcement-of-the-principle-of-equal-pay-for-equal-work-or-work-of-equal-value-pdf-840-kb>)

On 20 November 2017, the European Commission communicated to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee its “EU Action Plan 2017-2019: Tackling the gender pay gap”, setting out eight strands of action:

- “1 - Improving the application of the equal pay principle
- 2 - Combating segregation in occupations and sectors
- 3 - Breaking the glass ceiling: initiatives to combat vertical segregation

- 4 - Tackling the care penalty
 - 5 - Better valorising women's skills, efforts and responsibilities
 - 6 - Fighting the fog: uncovering inequalities and stereotypes
 - 7 - Alerting and informing about the gender pay gap
 - 8 - Enhancing partnerships to tackle the gender pay gap”
- (ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/document.cfm?doc_id=48424).

The 1919 Versailles Treaty, on which the League of Nations was founded, provided the following (Article 427, § 7): “The principle that men and women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value” (https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_International_Labour_Office#Article_427).

In 2017, this principle is still not respected for all female workers.

You have to be very far removed from the reality of life in a private company to be unaware of the sense of betrayal felt by women who are underpaid on account of their gender. The vast majority of these women end up resigning themselves to the violations of their fundamental rights because criticising the violations is not well received in the companies themselves, in their families, among their friends or, in many cases, by the judicial system. When women workers actually notice pay gaps (although they are hardly ever able to prove them), the differences are often presented to them as being linked to them as individuals, their more limited performance, their more limited ability, their more limited flexibility or their more limited communication – always something more limited. Accordingly, very few women decide to bring legal proceedings against their employers.

Any attempts to bring such proceedings usually come up against refusal by the employers to answer requests for information, a lack of testimonies from colleagues and a lack of support from staff representatives. The relevant information is only rarely sought out by the authorities which have the power to do so. While proceedings may be successful, this will be after years of painful, time-consuming, costly and uncertain struggles. In the event of successful proceedings, employers are usually annoyed at having to pay out potentially large sums and harbour grudges against female employees who dared to bring proceedings. That is a fact. It is therefore necessary to warn women workers who are willing to bring such proceedings about the future risks of dismissal, usually for other reasons. For employers are aware of the penalties in place in various respondent states. That is common knowledge, although it is denied by the respondent states in their observations, which shows how wide the gap is between governments and practices on the ground.

“Individual proceedings are hard to bear psychologically. Women who do go ahead take great risks and they must be protected” (Rachel Silvera, article in French, http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2014/03/06/rachel-silvera-la-peur-de-la-sanction-est-un-axe-de-lutte-fort-pour-l-egalite-salariale-hommes-femmes_4378483_3224.html#3EeScStlwyXdOyTd.99).

With regard to equal pay and treatment, a Belgian flight attendant, Gabrielle Defrenne, was one of the first women to bring such proceedings, demonstrating great courage and perseverance. She appealed to the Brussels Employment Tribunal in 1970; the proceedings finally ended 10 years later (Cass. 3e ch., 5 May 1980, Pas., 1980, 1095). The case went through the domestic and European courts. Is that what states expect from the millions of

short-changed women workers? Must they bring proceedings lasting ten years at their own expense?

At best, states tell women that they have all the rights they need but fail to assert them, so it is their fault if their pay is lower than their male counterparts'. This is a ruthless syllogism.

2.1. The conclusions of conformity

The respondent state's conformity with Articles 4§3 and 20 has been checked during recent supervision cycles by the European Committee of Social Rights, which deferred its conclusions (Doc. 46). The analysis covered some of the aspects raised by this complaint. The European Committee of Social Rights may acknowledge that the standards in question are in line with the Social Charter but that the practices are disappointing or derisory and are therefore unacceptable. That is the case in Greece.

2.2. The nature of the respondent state's obligations

The respondent state against which UWE has lodged a complaint based on Articles 1, 4 §3, 20 and E of the Social Charter reiterates in its submissions, probably on a concerted basis with other respondent states, the idea already put forward in the observations on admissibility, and which did not achieve the desired aim at that stage, whereby the Charter does not impose an obligation of results but merely of means – or, to put this another way but with the same effect, only imposes an obligation of results in terms of passing legislation that meets the requirements of the Charter and possibly setting up institutions to ensure its enforcement, but not in terms of achieving the objectives set.

This is completely at odds with the established case law of the European Committee of Social Rights, which incidentally is cited by some countries, whereby the Social Charter is only complied with, admittedly subject to some exceptions, if legislation in line with its requirements is introduced. That is not enough, however.

In this connection, it is only necessary to refer to the European Committee of Social Rights' well-established case law (International Commission of Jurists v. Portugal, Collective Complaint No. 1/1998, 9 September 1999; European Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless (FEANTSA) v. France, Complaint No. 39/2006, 5 December 2007, §54; International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) v. Ireland, Complaint No. 110/2014, 23 October 2017).

States also know that they must provide the means of ensuring steady progress towards achieving the goals laid down by the Charter (Autism-Europe v. France, Complaint No. 13/2002, 4 November 2003, §53). The Committee wishes to emphasise that implementation of the Charter requires states parties not merely to take legal action but also to make available the resources and introduce the operational procedures necessary to give full effect to the rights specified therein. It points out that states parties must take steps to achieve the objectives of the Charter within a reasonable time, with measurable progress and making maximum use of available resources.

The Committee further stresses that the rights recognised in the Social Charter must take a practical and effective, rather than purely theoretical, form (International Movement ATD Fourth World v. France, Complaint No. 33/2006, 5 December 2007, § 60 to 67):

“This means that, for the situation to be in conformity with the treaty, states party must:

- a) adopt the necessary legal, financial and operational means of ensuring steady progress towards achieving the goals laid down by the Charter,
- b) maintain meaningful statistics on needs, resources and results,
- c) undertake regular reviews of the impact of the strategies adopted,
- d) establish a timetable and not defer indefinitely the deadline for achieving the objectives of each stage,
- e) pay close attention to the impact of the policies adopted on each of the categories of persons concerned, particularly the most vulnerable”.

The fact that a set of relatively formal legal documents (constitution, laws, etc.) prohibit all gender discrimination and provide that equal treatment must be ensured in practice does not mean that the relevant provisions are actually implemented. Likewise, explicit or implicit references to integrated policies, synergies or networks do not mean that approaches of that kind take hold. Vagueness is not acceptable.

The legislation must therefore produce sufficient effects, through appropriate monitoring and administrative supervision mechanisms that are reasonably regular and effective and judicial remedies that are accessible and reliable, i.e. which are not too expensive and do not involve excessively complex proceedings and are based on rules of evidence consistent with the provisions of the EU directives on discrimination, which the European Committee of Social Rights has held should be regarded as applicable for meeting the requirements of the Charter, in the same way as the concept of indirect discrimination, the provision of evidence for which requires applicants to have access to comparative information that does not identify individuals but provides sufficient insight into the treatment of colleagues or other categories of workers, in order to provide the courts with enough indications for the burden of proof to be placed on the defendants.

Those bringing proceedings must also be protected against any kind of retaliatory measures. Discounting these very ordinary and routine day-to-day retaliatory measures means being very unfamiliar with these issues in the daily lives of women workers.

At the same time, there must be systematic awareness-raising for all parties concerned with the issue of gender equality in employment, pay and positions of responsibility, and the necessary funding must be provided for support measures, in particular, childcare options and all work-life balance measures capable of compensating for the stickiness in representation and the distribution of social roles.

Lastly, irrespective of the indicators showing the final outcomes in terms of gender equality of all the strategies implemented, the results achieved by the various mechanisms must give rise to reliable statistics concerning the action taken: number of checks performed, cases processed by the courts, offences found, penalties imposed and compensation measures ordered by administrative or judicial bodies such as employment tribunals and civil and criminal courts. Neither reducing matters to criminal law nor going too far in the direction of decriminalisation is acceptable. Training for judges, police officers, labour inspectors and other groups is also vital. The EU has produced best practice guides in this connection

(http://www.equineteurope.org/IMG/pdf/handbook_on_equal_pay_-_electronic_version-2.pdf).

In the present case, the information provided by the respondent state – and it is odd that the submissions made regarding the complaints in question criticise the general nature of the complaints while the state itself mostly only makes general comments – still merely takes the form of a description of the legal and institutional framework, there being a general lack of clarifications which could serve to determine the conformity of the policies followed with the requirements of the Charter. This prevents proper assessment regarding the following:

- the relevant powers, staffing levels, numbers of checks, funding, administrative supervisory bodies
- the efficiency of judicial regulation, proceedings, costs, independence, reliability
- the scale of supporting and awareness-raising policies and their proportionality in relation to the seriousness of the stereotypes to be eradicated
- the relevance and accuracy of the figures and statistics supplied, if any, which are mostly too broad or too limited whereas there are public documents from another source which provide more sophisticated or more extensive information
- the lack of a timetable for the measures introduced, the expected evaluation of the results within given timeframes
- case law in the country is almost non-existent and therefore has no impact.

The wide range of relevant bodies between which powers that in any case are limited are shared in a manner probably unclear to the women workers concerned is less a sign of dynamism than of dispersion of the efforts made.

It is accordingly in vain that the respondent state, having failed to provide the above-mentioned clarifications either directly or by making specific reference to other accessible and informative sources, refers insistently to the recent adoption of a new body of rules and the recent setting up of new institutions.

However promising they may be, these initiatives do not allow the conclusion that the state concerned has succeeded in meeting the requirements of the Charter. The European Committee of Social Rights has always held that it could not regard the introduction of new rules or new institutions – for which it cannot be predicted whether or not they will produce significant effects within a reasonable time – as contributing from the outset to the conformity of states' policies with the Charter.

2.3. The impact of the crisis

The European Committee of Social Rights has, admittedly, consistently acknowledged that states could not all achieve the objectives set out in the Charter and, as appropriate, any national legislation for that purpose without regard being had to their social conditions, degree of economic prosperity or any adverse circumstances.

However, in the case of gender equality as in other areas, the crisis cannot serve as a pretext for totally or partially giving up the implementation, and still less the pursuit, of the objectives set out in the Charter or legislation passed to implement it, or for placing limits on the efforts

involved. The crisis has been very severe in Greece, and women were the prime victims, with an unemployment rate of 29.5%. At the same time, their employment rate was 43.3% in 2014, according to Eurostat figures.

In view of these requirements, the respondent state manifestly fails to meet the specific obligations of the Social Charter; there is a clear lack of resource planning and result measurement. The Social Charter is clearly violated in respect of both complaints (analysis entitled “The status of women in Greece in times of crisis and austerity. Shedding light on the new European economic governance” by Catherine Sophie Dimitroulias, Association des Femmes de l’Europe Méridionale, pp. 65 et seq. in “Women in the Mediterranean, First monitoring report”, <http://www.iemed.org/publicacions-en/historic-de-publicacions/coedicions/femmes-en-mediterranee.-premier-rapport-de-suivi-de-la-fondation-des-femmes-de-12019euro-mediterraneeen-de-conferences-ministerielles>).

III. THE COMPLAINT OF UNEQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK

3.1 The lack of appropriate measures

In its reply, the respondent state merely refers to the applicable legislation and the major public policy exercises such as the various equality plans which are vital in mobilising the various stakeholders. However, there is no sign of gender mainstreaming in the policies concerned, decision-making, access to resources, procedures and practices, methodology, implementation, monitoring or evaluation. There is no monitoring body and, above all, no checks are provided for or carried out. These are significant shortcomings.

Little or no account is taken of many areas, for instance, the courses of study chosen by women, which all too often are non-scientific and unambitious, the greater number of vocational training courses of a higher standard available for men, the large number of benefits in kind for men and the small number for women, horizontal and vertical segregation in employment, the centuries-old division of roles in the family, with no economic value being attached to the time spent on housework, forced part-time working, and failure to ensure proper work-life balance.

In the few tables submitted by the respondent state, the hourly wages do not include the above-mentioned benefits in kind (respondent state’s submissions, pp. 14-15).

Given the inadequacy of the conventional tools for combating discrimination and protecting victims, the respondent state has failed to take appropriate measures, in particular with regard to a number of points examined below.

- **The employment equality policy** is not fully effective. It is disparate in nature and refers to negotiation at company level. It is also inconsistent. The various bodies are not provided with basic training in gender mainstreaming to enable them to implement internal plans or measures. There is no general framework. The respondent state must therefore introduce one, as an overall change is needed to eradicate inequality and discrimination.

- **The protection against discrimination** does not work properly. At the normative level, there are many provisions enshrining human rights which directly or indirectly address discrimination in the 1975 constitution, as amended in 2001 and 2008.

“Nevertheless, it should be added that it is extremely difficult to derive specific enforceable rights from these general principles. Article 25 of the Greek Constitution is immensely important, because it clearly states that private employers must also respect the constitutional rights of their employees (e.g. the rights of equality and non-discrimination). In the Civil Code (civil law), there are also certain open-ended clauses which could be invoked by people who have experienced discrimination and are seeking equal treatment and non-discrimination in their working life. However, in practice, such claims are rarely made, except in the employment sector, where the equal treatment principle is often invoked, but only with regard to equal pay and not based on the five discrimination grounds” (European Network of Legal Experts Country report, Non-discrimination, 2017, <http://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/4480-greece-country-report-non-discrimination-2017-pdf-2-07-mb>, pp. 5-6).

The Equal Treatment Law (4443/2016) clearly states that the principle of equal treatment applies to all persons in the public sector as well as the private sector, but there has not yet been any real assessment of its effectiveness.

As regards criminal law, however, there are no provisions outlawing general discriminatory practice, but there are criminal laws prohibiting discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin, although these are never applied in practice.

While a mechanism to reverse the burden of proof has been introduced in limited circumstances, which is not indicated in the respondent state’s submissions (submissions, p. 5), the result of this change is not known, as no court rulings are available (Article 9 of Equal Treatment Law 4443/2016; European Network of Legal Experts, Country report, Non-discrimination, 2017, <http://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/4480-greece-country-report-non-discrimination-2017-pdf-2-07-mb>, p.15).

One can only express surprise at this lack of complaints, which is unexpected to say the least. It is probably largely explained by the reasons of complexity and social stigma mentioned above.

The new provisions of Equal Treatment Law 4443/2016 combine separate jurisdictions – private and public – under one equality body, the Ombudsman, who appears to have limited powers. Therefore, the Committee for Equal Treatment, established under previous anti-discrimination legislation, will no longer have jurisdiction over discrimination in the private sector and will thus be abolished. The Ombudsman cannot bring legal proceedings, which the respondent state fails to mention in its submissions. Only the victims may take legal action, as the European Committee of Social Rights already noted in its Conclusions XX-1 (2016) concerning Greece.

“In reference to the services for the supervision and promotion of equal treatment, the General Secretariat for Transparency and Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice, within the framework of its jurisdiction for the protection of human rights and the combating of all forms of discrimination, will provide for the promotion of equal treatment. The Social Protection Directorate of the Ministry of Labour will, inter alia, monitor the application of

anti-discrimination policies in the field of labour and employment, inform employees and employers on issues related to discrimination in the field of employment and raise awareness, as well as providing scientific support to the Labour Inspectorate Body” (European Network of Legal Experts, Country report, Non-discrimination, 2017, <http://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/4480-greece-country-report-non-discrimination-2017-pdf-2-07-mb>, p. 9).

These points should be compared with the report by the European Network of Legal Experts cited above, which states that “The new law does not improve the protection framework – with the exception of very limited cases – and under no conditions does it promote the homogeneity of the various fields of protection. To a certain extent, this undermines the overall attempt to reform the law; any improvement is only on a legal or technical level, making it nearly impossible to discern the point of such a radical change. The new law does not improve the level of protection from discrimination because it does not establish any new criminal sanctions, even though the Directives call for the adoption of effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions (something that does not apply even in the case of administrative sanctions imposed by the Labour Inspectorate Body). The new law fails to resolve discrepancies in the Civil Code, i.e. the lack of provisions linking non-discrimination law to actions for damages (ibid., p. 10). The European experts believe that the new anti-discrimination legislation is not as effective as it could be.

The funding proposed for these activities seems not to have increased, unlike the case in Spain, which has just released €1 billion over five years to combat these inequalities.

Lack of supervision: The respondent state refers to the remedies in place:

“This complex co-operation makes the local units of labour inspection inform the Ombudsman immediately about complaints relating to discriminatory treatment and present to it the results of their inspections. The new legislative framework gives the Ombudsman the authority to formulate the final decision about the complaint based on the outcome of investigations conducted by the SEPE (Labour Inspectorate) or data collected by the Authority itself following its own investigation” (respondent state’s submissions, pp. 6-7). Given all the various bodies (the Ombudsman, the Labour Inspectorate, its offices, the Department for Gender Equality in Employment and the General Secretariat for Gender Equality), determining the respective remits and tasks is a complicated process.

The European Committee of Social Rights will note the following in the respondent state’s submissions:

“Although the Ombudsman investigates on a yearly basis almost 500 complaints falling within the scope of Law 3896/2010, the number of complaints relating to issues of equal pay was very limited over time. Although citizens may file with the SEPE complaints on violation of the principle of equal treatment in employment and occupation, they are reluctant to do so. As a result the SEPE has limited information about the extent of the problem. Finally it has to be noted that up to 2016 no complaints have been recorded on violations relating to issues of gender pay gap” (respondent state’s submissions, pp. 15-16).

This lack of complaints regarding unequal pay is worrying; the issue is taboo in Greece and women do not dare to raise it or, still less, take legal action seeking redress.

In terms of promoting equality, “the Social Protection Directorate of the Ministry of Labour will, inter alia, monitor the application of anti-discrimination policies in the field of labour and employment, inform employees and employers on issues related to discrimination in the field of employment and raise awareness, as well as providing scientific support to the Labour Inspectorate Body (European Network of Legal Experts, Country report, Non-discrimination, 2017, <http://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/4480-greece-country-report-non-discrimination-2017-pdf-2-07-mb>, p. 9).

In addition, the respondent state acknowledges the de facto inequality in its submissions (respondent state’s submissions, p. 10).

Reference can also be made to the Ombudsman’s reports in Greek, which reach similar conclusions: there is no real practical equality in daily life (Greek Ombudsman, *2015 Annual Report, Συνήγορος του Πολίτη, Ετήσια Εκθεση 2015*), www.synigoros.gr/resources/docs/ee2015-00-stp.pdf; Greek Ombudsman, *2016 Annual Report, Συνήγορος του Πολίτη, Ετήσια Εκθεση 2016* <https://www.synigoros.gr/resources/ee2016-00-stp.pdf>

https://www.synigoros.gr/resources/synhgoros-2016_final_all-web_eng.pdf

<https://www.synigoros.gr/resources/docs/gender-equality-special-report-2016.pdf>).

There have been no legal proceedings and no reported complaints; hence there has been no violation of the Social Charter. Rather than being proof that there is no inequality or discrimination, this lack of proceedings and reporting of wage irregularities is more like proof that the inequalities are not coming to light, probably on account of a kind of implicit or explicit dissuasion in respect of the women who are the victims.

This is confirmed in the CEDAW report submitted (Doc. 40).

Another factor which may have a negative impact on women workers is trade unions’ lack of interest in equal pay for women and men. In all major Greek trade union confederations a man usually occupies the presidential position.

The European Committee of Social Rights likes to have information on the number and content of the checks conducted by labour inspectorates, on economic and social data and funding. The respondent state has not stepped up efforts by labour inspectorates to detect discrimination in companies, as already noted. Where are the relevant statistics by gender? How many reports were drawn up? What is the level of funding? How many cases were referred to the courts at the instigation of labour inspectors?

The various reports all agree: “In Greece, the gender pay gap is not on the agenda of either state authorities or social partners and no recent studies can be found” (<http://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/4368-greece-country-report-gender-equality-2017-pdf-1-61-mb>, p. 16).

The ETUC states the following:

“Moreover, from a procedural perspective, it appears evident that there is also a violation as the result of eliminating the gender pay gap is not achieved. In particular, it is obvious that the general framework for the supervision of the satisfactory application of the principle of equal

pay is insufficient:

- in principle, the **labour inspectorate** should (be able to) ensure the satisfactory application of this important principle; despite the fact that the respondent State has ratified ILO Convention No. 81 on labour inspection it is obvious that this is not the case (in particular taking into account the nearly total lack of supervision in the SMEs);
- all **other means** to ensure the satisfactory application of the principle of equal value have proven insufficient.

From the point of view of the ETUC this illustrates that there is a violation of Article 20 of the Charter also from the procedural perspective”(ETUC, § 105 & 106).

UWE agrees with the ETUC.

- **Lack of evaluation:** As already mentioned, there is a lack of evaluation of the action taken, and the respondent state’s submissions provide no clarification here. How many appeals have there been concerning wage discrimination? How many of these have been dismissed for lack of evidence? How many cases have been referred and on what criteria? How many investigations have been conducted in companies? How many times have the labour inspectors or other relevant institutions taken action concerning specific issues?

The Committee regularly asks for updated information on the concrete measures and activities implemented to promote gender equality, particularly with regard to equal pay for work of equal value, and to reduce the gender pay gap, along with information on the results achieved in both the public and private sectors, but hardly any such information is to be found in the opposing submissions.

- **The measures implemented do not concern small enterprises:** The ETUC’s observations point out that the official statistics exclude small enterprises, making it possible arbitrarily to indicate better wage equality figures:

“From a substantive perspective, there are at least the following elements which should (at least in combination) lead to a violation of Article 20 ESC:

- Statistical evidence (see above para. 96) shows that there is still a gender pay gap. Even if it might have been reduced during the last time **any** Gender pay **gap** does not fulfil the non-discrimination requirement based on sex.
- The official statistics are still excluding **small (micro) sized enterprises**. It is therefore most probable that the Gender pay gap is even higher in these enterprises. From the point of view of the ETUC this illustrates that there is a violation of Article 20 of the Charter from the substantive perspective” (ETUC, § 103 & 104).

UWE agrees with the ETUC.

3.2. Statistical data

The respondent state’s submissions include only very few relevant and reliable figures. UWE has referred to women who may wish to make complaints finding it hard or impossible to obtain comparative data concerning the wages paid. Several respondent states pretend not to

understand the nature of the complaint and present irrelevant arguments concerning the risks of breaches of the principle of the confidentiality of personal data or powers which labour inspectorates allegedly have to obtain the necessary information. However, what these powers actually involve remains obscure and no figures are provided on cases where they are used.

The principle of confidentiality which the country apparently wishes to employ at least in part, but to an extent that is hard to assess, has never prevented the prohibition of discrimination between workers, the punishment of such discrimination by various procedures, the nullity of contracts which breach the prohibition or appropriate compensation.

It is no more acceptable, whether with regard to the gender pay gap or balanced participation of women and men in decision-making in private companies or indeed public bodies, for a country to use the pretext of where it currently stands compared to the European average for not having to make efforts to improve its position in relation to average performance.

The issue which all the complaints lodged by UWE seek to raise very deliberately is the persistence of a very low actual level of practical results, in spite of the protestations of good will, in most of the countries where the complaints are calling for the situation to be reviewed.

The same difficulties occur in all countries. “There is a difficulty in all countries in terms of objective measurement of income inequality. All tools are constructs based on standards set by statisticians. Is that to say that you can make figures say what you like? Certainly not, but if a social phenomenon is to be fully understood, it is necessary properly to grasp the tools used to measure it, including their upsides and downsides. Yet there is usually a great poverty of public debate on this subject. Of course, the tools have a political dimension, which is sometimes not properly mastered, but that is another story”, conclusions of an article in French (Observatoire des Inégalités, 29 August 2016, “Comment mesurer les inégalités de revenus”; <https://www.inegalites.fr/Comment-mesurer-les-inegalites-de-revenus>).

Governments must provide relevant statistical data, and they must compare the actual situation with the requirements to be achieved, the resources employed and the results obtained. The respondent state makes choices so that one or other criterion is included in its statistics and others are excluded in an attempt to conceal greater wage inequality than it admits to. However, the respondent state does acknowledge that there is inequality; that has to be noted.

3.3. Structural effects and stereotypes

Whatever the case, the existence of structural effects, the impact of stereotypes that are hard to change or the complexity of the reasons for the persistent pay gap or differences in career development between men and women cannot serve as excuses for lack of progress towards meeting the requirements of the Charter.

The CEDAW Committee states that “the Committee continues to be seriously concerned about patriarchal attitudes and deep-rooted stereotypes regarding the roles and responsibilities of women and men in all spheres of life and the State party’s limited efforts to tackle such discriminatory practices. The Committee is concerned that such customs and practices perpetuate discrimination against women and girls and that they are reflected in women’s disadvantaged and unequal status in many areas, including education, public life and decision-

making, as well as in the persistence of violence against women. It is also concerned that, to date, the State party has not taken sustained measures to modify or eliminate stereotypes and negative traditional values and practices” (Doc. 40, §18).

From this point of view, the concentration of female and male workers in different sectors, with particularly large numbers of women in the education and health and social sectors, is not acceptable as an argument for justifying the pay gaps noted when the Charter refers to equal pay for equal work or work of equal value.

It is clear that a key issue when it comes to meeting this obligation is that of classifications. Several, but not all, countries refer specifically to the issue, although in unfortunately obscure terms. What are the criteria for the classifications and for which occupations are non-neutral classifications accepted? We are left in the dark.

- **Classification systems:** With regard to classifications, Greece states that on the basis of Article 4 of Law 3896/2010, “the principle of equal pay is also furthered by virtue of other provisions that stipulate the following:

2. a) Where an occupational classification system is used to determine wages, such system should be based on common criteria for male and female workers and should exclude discrimination on the grounds of sex.

b) When designing and implementing staff appraisal systems related to their pay progression, the principle of equal treatment should be respected and discrimination on the grounds of sex or marital status should not be permitted” (respondent state’s submissions, p. 3).

Greece further states: “With the above mentioned regulation, the use of occupational classification and staff appraisal systems is not enforced on enterprises to determine wages” (ibid., p. 3).

Companies are not required to introduce classification systems and hence to start addressing these equality issues in order to resolve them. There is no indication of how many companies have taken action here. Are we to conclude that since there are no classifications, there is no pay gap calculation method for firms and no possibility of comparison? How were the pay gap figures calculated?

In its Conclusions XX-I (2016), the European Committee of Social Rights noted: “As regards equal pay for work of equal value the Committee previously asked whether it is possible to make pay comparisons across enterprises (Conclusions XX-1 (2012))”.

The Committee points out in its 2016 conclusions that equal treatment of men and women includes the issue of equal pay for work of equal value. Usually, pay comparisons are made between persons within the same undertaking/company. However, there may be situations where, in order to be meaningful, this comparison can only be made across companies/undertakings. Therefore, the Committee requires that it be possible to make pay comparisons across companies. It notes that at the very least, legislation should require pay comparisons across companies in one or more of the following situations:

- cases in which statutory rules apply to the working and pay conditions in more than

- one company;
- cases in which several companies are covered by a collective works agreement or regulations governing the terms and conditions of employment;
- cases in which the terms and conditions of employment are laid down centrally for more than one company within a holding (company) or conglomerate (Conclusions XX-1 (2012), Statement of Interpretation on Article 1 of the Additional Protocol of 1988)".

Nevertheless, the CEDAW Committee makes the following recommendations "(a)

Strengthen efforts to enhance female access to the labour market, eliminate occupational segregation, both horizontal and vertical, and adopt measures to narrow and close the wage gap between women and men and, make sure that female wages and pensions are not below the poverty limits;

(b) Carefully review and analyse the impact of the new legislation on women's opportunities in the labour market, and make necessary amendments to ensure women's equal participation in the labour market, by instituting measures to eliminate stereotypes and traditional attitudes that discriminate against women;

(c) Restore the institutions of social dialogue which provide important social services for women; and

(d) Collect data disaggregated by sex, geographical location and minority, on the situation of women and men in the area of employment in order to monitor and improve women's working conditions" (Doc. 40, § 29).

There would therefore appear to be a violation of the Charter here, given the lack of classifications and calculation methods.

Gender bias is omnipresent. For instance, the workers of a municipal parks department, who are all male, are paid a bonus, but not the employees of a municipal welfare centre's kindergartens and nurseries, who are all female; the same could apply in a big private company. An employer of good will who was aware of classifications and their harmful effects would have been able to ensure balance in the physical or mental strain experienced by his or her employees. Nobody would have had a bonus or everybody would have had one.

There would appear to be a lack of occupational categories with clearly defined classification criteria, and the pitfalls here have not yet been properly addressed. This issue should not just be dealt with through collective bargaining but clearly also by states.

Two other key issues regarding equal pay are the overall pay gap and the context in which the gap is assessed.

The pay gap: The respondent state advances an argument which is in part intrinsically contradictory and in part incompatible with the arguments put forward by the other countries. Greece does not, unlike several other countries, seem to have a sophisticated understanding of the gender pay gap because it defines it on page 14 of its submissions as corresponding to hourly pay gaps. The figures provided by age and education level are quite clearly

unsatisfactory: 12.48% in 2014, but 17.54% for the 55/64 years age group, and 22.51% for lower education levels. It is to be feared that the actual figures are higher.

Some of the statistics available, in particular the Eurostat indicator, group together – under conditions which must be clear, failing which confusion is generated – three separate phenomena: pay gaps proper; the number of hours worked during a period of employment and hence part-time work; and the consequences of stopping work for various reasons, including bringing up children, with the periods out of employment varying depending on the duration of and level of compensation for parental, maternity and paternity leave.

In February 2017, the Eurostat figures for the EU-28 for contributions to the gender overall earnings gap were as follows (Eurostat, Gender Statistics, Statistics explained http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Gender_statistics, Table2.PNG):

- The gender pay gap: 37.4%
- The gender hours gap: 30.5%
- The gender employment rate gap: 32.1%

	Gender pay gap	Gender hours' gap	Gender employment rate gap
EU-28	37.4	30.5	32.1
Belgium	18.1	47.6	34.3
Bulgaria	59.6	4.3	36.1
Czech Republic	49.4	4.6	46.0
Denmark	57.3	15.5	27.2
Germany	41.9	38.7	19.4
Estonia	68.2	12.0	19.8
Ireland	32.6	31.4	36.0
Greece	.	.	.
Spain	36.5	25.1	38.5
France	45.3	25.6	29.1
Croatia	.	.	.
Italy	11.0	32.7	56.3
Cyprus	48.6	13.5	37.9
Latvia	73.7	2.4	23.9
Lithuania	65.9	22.6	11.4
Luxembourg	14.1	39.5	46.4
Hungary	42.2	7.7	50.1
Malta	18.4	13.6	67.9
Netherlands	27.2	51.6	21.3
Austria	42.2	38.2	19.6
Poland	21.1	23.0	55.9
Portugal	53.2	14.1	32.7
Romania	15.0	3.5	81.5
Slovenia	33.2	13.0	53.9
Slovakia	46.8	6.3	46.9
Finland	73.7	18.4	7.9
Sweden	49.2	35.8	15.0
United Kingdom	39.2	38.2	22.6
Iceland	43.6	42.2	14.2
Norway	41.2	46.1	12.7
Switzerland	32.5	47.6	19.9
FYR of Macedonia	18.5	1.1	80.4
Turkey	-1.5	2.3	99.2

(¹) The gaps of the components (gender pay gap - GPG, gender hours' gap - GHG and gender employment rate gap - GERG) do not add up to the gender overall earnings gap (GOEG). However, the following relationship holds: $(1 - GPG/100) \times (1 - GHG/100) \times (1 - GERG/100) = (1 - GOEG/100)$ which can be transformed by the logarithm into the following additive relationship:
 $LN(1 - GPG/100) + LN(1 - GHG/100) + LN(1 - GERG/100) = LN(1 - GOEG/100)$. This allows calculating contributions as follows (e.g. for GPG): $LN(1 - GPG/100) / LN(1 - GOEG/100) \times 100$.

This table does not include any figures for Greece.

In Greece, the gender pay gap is reported to be 15% (European Commission, Factsheet gender pay gap 2016 – Greece, <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender->

equality/files/gender_pay_gap/2016/gpg_country_factsheet_el_2016_en.pdf).

But are the figures reliable?

Other reports reach similar conclusions: European Network of Legal Experts in Gender Equality and Non-Discrimination on “The enforcement of the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value” (ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/document.cfm?doc_id=48052) and the 2017 annual report on gender equality in the EU-28 (ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=43416).

The ETUC’s observations state the following: “According to the Commission, based on Eurostat 2014 figures, in Greece the gender pay gap stands at 15.0% (the average gender pay gap in the EU is 16.7%) and the gender overall earnings gap in Greece stands at 45.3% (the average gender overall earnings gap in the EU is 39.8%)” (ETUC, § 96).

To assess the reality of the pay gap, which is less favourable than the respondent state maintains, it must therefore be corrected or refined with other indicators and data. The indicator which the government relies on is calculated on the basis of hourly wages and therefore does not show the wage inequalities relating to the fact that women are much more likely to be confined to part-time work than men; in almost half the cases, this is not a choice but is forced on them. Nor does it show that Greek women are under-represented in the most senior posts.

- **The impact of parental leave:** The Greek government also does not analyse the impact on the pay gap of its choices in terms of the duration of and levels of compensation for parental leave (<https://www.synigoros.gr/resources/docs/gender-equality-special-report-2016.pdf>, p. 2 et seq.). However, studies show that extending paternal leave is a key alternative to the traditional methods of combating wage discrimination (OECD, Policy Brief, March 2016; <https://www.oecd.org/policy-briefs/parental-leave-where-are-the-fathers.pdf>).

Recent studies, including by the OECD, show that there is a link between the length of paid maternity leave and parental leave and the size of the pay gap (<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/upshot/the-gender-pay-gap-is-largely-because-of-motherhood.html>).

A look at the following is sufficient here:

- A chart showing the link between the length of paid parental leave and the pay gap (<https://utopiayouarestandinginit.com/2014/11/09/the-link-between-paid-parental-leave-generosity-and-a-larger-gender-pay-gap/>)
- An article by O Thévenon and A Solaz, “Labour Market Effects of Parental Leave Policies in OECD Countries”, published in OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No. 181, 2013; <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5k8xb6hw1wjf-en.pdf?expires=1512122805&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=0607E498F60AD5CC8648E59B0C051980> ; <http://paa2012.princeton.edu/papers/121481>
- 2016 RAND study on the impact of paid parental leave, including paternal leave, on wage equality (https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1666.html)

- The 2016 OECD statistics on the total length of paid maternity leave and parental leave (in weeks), which confirms this analysis (<http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=54760&lang=en>).

- **Measurement of the pay gap** is also based solely on monthly wages and does not take account of fringe benefits. However, the pay gap in fringe benefits is wider than in the case of wages themselves. It is also unclear whether a distinction is made between the public and private sectors. Once again the data are not reliable. Lastly, women are over-represented in the lowest full-time gross monthly wage categories, while the proportion of men is higher in the highest categories.

- **The assessment base** must not just be an individual company but must be extended to entities forming a working environment or a technical unit for a group of workers employed by several companies, including subcontractors. The respondent state seems not to take account of the concept of technical unit, as a result of which the scope of the regulations is very limited. Nothing is said about checks on the implementation of company reports. Likewise, the size of companies is a key assessment base and the whole range of issues is still to be addressed in many companies not covered by the legal provisions on equal pay.

It is worthwhile referring to the Committee's conclusions setting out the principles which apply to all the respondent states (Conclusions 2016, Portugal):

“The Committee recalls that it examines the right to equal pay under Article 20 and Article 4§3 of the Charter, and does so therefore every two years (under thematic group 1 “Employment, training and equal opportunities”, and thematic group 3 “Labour rights”). Articles 20 and 4§3 of the Charter require that it be possible to make pay comparisons across companies (Conclusions 2010, France). At the very least, legislation should require pay comparisons across companies in one or more of the following situations:

- cases in which statutory rules apply to the working and pay conditions in more than one company
- cases in which several companies are covered by a collective works agreement or regulations governing the terms and conditions of employment
- cases in which the terms and conditions of employment are laid down centrally for more than one company within a holding (company) or conglomerate (Statement of Interpretation on Article 20, Conclusions 2012)”.

Other key variables were not taken into account in the respondent state's submissions, although they have been covered in the work done by the ILO for forty years. In assessing a particular job, it is necessary to employ assessment grids that take account of neutral classifications and to focus on:

- The problems relating to the choice of assessment criteria and their significance
- The problems relating to the omission of certain criteria
- The problems relating to certain aspects being overemphasised
- The problems relating to the interplay of the levels and weighting of the criteria
- The problems relating to the lack of transparency in the assessment process
- The problems relating to career advancement in different employment sectors

Examples of indirect discrimination bias have been identified in job assessment and classification methods, but nothing has been done to take account of them effectively in policies:

- The criteria employed to assess jobs
- The application of these criteria in the weighting and ranking of jobs.

For instance, the responsibility recognised in a particular job is often financial or relates to line management. However, other types of responsibility exist and are not taken into account, including responsibility in relation to persons who are not subordinates, to products or to data confidentiality. Other examples are problem resolution, which is neither visible nor of strategic importance, and daily issues to be resolved, with none of these being covered in classifications. While reference has already been made to physical or mental strain, there is also the issue of the multiskilling required in posts held by women not being taken on board positively, unlike the specialisation of their male colleagues' posts.

It is clear what has to be done, so why is no corresponding action being taken? What are the timescales?

In the more specific case of Greece, the European Commission states the following (Doc. 20):

“Some of the factors that contribute to the gender pay gap are:

- Management and supervisory positions are overwhelmingly held by men. Within each sector men are more often promoted than women, and paid better as a consequence. This trend culminates at the very top, where amongst CEOs less than 4% are women.
- Women take charge of important unpaid tasks, such as household work and caring for children or relatives on a far larger scale than men do. Working men spend on average 9 hours per week on unpaid care and household activities, while working women spend 26 hours – that's almost 4 hours every day. In the labour market this is reflected by the fact that more than 1 in 3 women reduce their paid hours to part-time, while only 1 in 10 men do the same.
- Women tend to spend periods off the labour market more often than men. These career interruptions not only influence hourly pay, but also impact future earnings and pensions.
- Segregation in education and in the labour market; this means that in some sectors and occupations, women tend to be over represented, while in others men are over represented. In some countries, occupations predominantly carried out by women, such as teaching or sales, offer lower wages than occupations predominantly carried out by men, even when the same level of experience and education is needed.
- Pay discrimination, while illegal, continues to contribute to the gender pay gap” (European Commission factsheet gender pay gap 2016 – Greece; http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender_pay_gap/2016/gpg_country_factsheet_el_2016_en.pdf).

Gender mainstreaming in all cross-cutting activities is, however, required under the European Social Fund programme for 2015-2020 and the Council of Europe Gender Equality Strategy for 2014-2017, in which the respondent state was involved. On the basis of the information supplied by states, a report was issued on 19 October 2017: “Activities and measures in

member states towards the achievement of the objectives of the Council of Europe Gender Equality Strategy”, <https://rm.coe.int/gec-2017-10-implementation-ge-strategy/168075df26>).

This report sets out Greece’s latest commitments for each objective and indicates the efforts to be made to eliminate inequality and discrimination (ibid., p. 76 et seq.).

- **Economic losses of several billion euros:** There is no justification in law for this inequality, and no economic justification either.

For some fifteen years now, studies have agreed that the various types of discrimination on the labour market are ruinous and cause huge economic losses. Reducing them would generate an increase in growth and income of roughly 3% to 4% of GDP. Putting men and women on a strictly equal footing would accordingly inject billions of euros into the economy and generate billions of euros in additional tax receipts for governments because of the collection of higher levels of employee and employer contributions and taxes. And women workers would also benefit directly in terms of their living standards.

Unfortunately, the pay gap at present is such that in 2017 female employees in Europe worked for free from 3 November to 31 December.

Female workers in Greece worked for free from 8 November to 31 December 2017 (<http://www.slate.fr/story/127622/infographie-ecart-salaires-europe>).

Since 1 January 2018, one Council of Europe member state, Iceland, has prohibited unequal pay for women and men and imposed harsh financial penalties for non-compliance. This is an example to be followed in that it both respects women’s rights and benefits everybody.

In any case, EU member states are covered by EU directives and hence the rule prohibiting indirect discrimination, breaches of which play a large part in wage gaps.

The European Committee of Social Rights will accordingly uphold the complaint and declare UWE’s action well-founded.

IV. THE UNDER-REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN DECISION-MAKING POSTS

4.1. Lack of results

At issue here are access by women to positions of responsibility and the promotion of genuine equality in the occupation of those posts, as well as the elimination of pay gaps for the individuals concerned, as new female board members are less well paid than their male colleagues. Although most countries have provided much information here in terms of listing the institutions involved and the meetings held in this connection, it is not possible to determine the extent to which the relevant strategies are actually conclusive or achieve the desired objectives in reasonable proportions and within short timeframes.

4.2. Women on company boards of directors

A 2016 analysis of parity on boards by Ofi Management (“La parité au sein des conseils, un enjeu de diversité”) shows that Greece’s figure of 10.3% is below the EU average of 21% of women on boards of directors. Proper comparison may not be possible here: in Greece’s case, companies with public capital are involved, whereas the EU figures are for the major listed companies.

The country is ranked 25th in the EU (<http://www.morningstar.fr/fr/pro/api.aspx?Path=cache/documentdownloads/files/8379/revisions/1/>, p. 3).

Since 2000, Greece has had a binding mechanism to foster representation of women on boards of state or parastatal companies, but not for private firms, as the ETUC points out: “Law No. 2839/2000 of 12 September 2000 imposes a one third quota requirement for the state-appointed portion of a board of all executive bodies consisting of members appointed by the state or local authorities, including companies fully or partially state-controlled. Appointment decisions failing to respect the quota requirement are subject to annulment by administrative courts. Moreover, decisions adopted by those boards that were not formed in accordance with the quota rule are subject to annulment by civil courts.

- Law 4261/2014 on access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions, which establishes that a target has to be fixed for the underrepresented sex to participate in the board of credit institutions.
- Hellenic Code of Corporate Governance (2013), applicable to the private sector, recommends pursuing an optimum level of diversity, including gender balance, in the composition of boards and senior executive teams. It should be noted that this code was drafted at the initiative of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises” (ETUC, § 97).”

With measures of this kind, it is hard to understand that women accounted for only 9.4% of board members in Greece in April 2016. Especially since the firms concerned are fully or partially owned by the state. The under-representation of women is proven (European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender_balance_decision_making/1607_factsheet_final_wob_data_en.pdf) Moreover, the figure relates to the largest companies, so the number of women on the boards of smaller companies is much lower.

Based on European Commission figures, the ETUC states the following: “In April 2016, the average share of women on the boards of the largest publicly listed companies registered in the EU-28 Member States reached 23.3%. For Greece, the figure is only 9.4%” (ETUC, § 98).

The ETUC further states: “Concerning the (under-)representation in decision-making positions within private companies this problem has only been addressed in more recent years. As developed in Part I.B.2., this is covered by Article 20 of the Charter. If there is not sufficiently clear and wide-ranging legislation and/or if the practice shows that this equality principle is not implemented sufficiently this leads from the point of view of the ETUC to finding a violation of Article 20 of the Charter.

a) Substance

Statistical evidence (see above para. 98) shows that there is still an under-representation of women in decision-making bodies within private companies. Even if there might be relevant legislation and even if the degree of representation of women would have increased it is not to

be disputed that women are not sufficiently represented within these bodies.

From the point of view of the ETUC this illustrates that there is a violation of Article 20 of the Charter from the substantive perspective.

b) Procedure

It would appear that there are no effective legislative measures in order to ensure the sufficient representation of women in decision-making bodies within private enterprises. In practice, there is even less supervision and enforcement.

From the point of view of the ETUC this illustrates that there is a violation of Article 20 of the Charter also from the procedural perspective” (ETUC, § 107 to 111).

We are bound to agree with the ETUC’s observations.

And to be disappointed by the lack of results achieved by the policies implemented in Greece: “The majority of above mentioned measures (except those referring to the pay gap and the enterprises, that are very recent and are not yet implemented in practice) have already been put in place, yet a period of time is needed to get a response and achieve co-operation between all jointly competent parties in order to have actual results as requested by the UWE” (respondent state’s submissions, p. 13).

4.3. The legislation does not apply to management boards

“A double glass ceiling and a perimeter wall” and “a sticky floor” are the graphic terms used to describe the difficulties women in the country encounter in entering positions of responsibility in companies outside boards of directors.

The respondent state does not address this issue, as indicated in its submissions. The lack of women in decision-making posts is proven. This discrimination is established and is contrary to Greece’s various undertakings in this respect.

Greece violates the Social Charter on this claim of the under-representation of women in decision-making posts in business.

The collective complaint must be upheld on both claims.

V. THE COSTS INCURRED

With regard to the claims for a state whose policy is found to be in breach of the Social Charter to meet the costs incurred in bringing the collective complaints, the objection by all the respondent states, including Greece, is based on the idea that the European Committee of Social Rights is not a judicial authority and that there is no explicit provision in the Charter for the costs to be met. Although there is indeed no such provision, the payment of the winning party’s legal costs, as is the rule in cases before domestic courts, would be consistent with the spirit of the Charter.

Otherwise, there will be a real indirect dissuasive effect on organisations which theoretically are entitled to lodge collective complaints – as demonstrated by the fact that so few have

succeeded in doing so, regardless of how much they wanted to – to put an end to numerous well-known violations of the Charter which may or may not be noted during the supervision cycles.

In addition, the collective complaints before the European Committee of Social Rights are similar in many respects to the appeals against regulatory decisions on grounds of abuse of authority which are heard in some states by administrative courts or bodies with related powers and where the public authorities are not awarded costs if the applications by natural or legal persons are dismissed. The only exception involves fines for abuses of the right of application. The claim for costs is therefore maintained.

VI. STATEMENT BY THE COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

It should be noted that the texts of the various pillars of the Council of Europe enshrine effective gender equality, member states have adapted their legislation and the actions, strategies, recommendations and resolutions of the Council of Europe pursue this goal.

The respondent state's replies concerning the two complaints are not sufficiently precise. However, as it has signed up to the Charter, it falls to the respondent state to indicate what measures are taken in the country and the reasons for the persistent inequalities, the under-representation of women in decision-making posts, the random statistics, the plans which do not produce results and the lack of reports and assessments.

There is a lack of political will and practical action on the part of the respondent states of the kind women have been waiting for for so many years.

It is worth referring here to **the statement by Nils Muiznieck, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, dated 20 December 2017 and entitled "Gender equality in employment is still a distant promise in Europe"**, which reads as follows:

"This year once again women in Europe effectively worked without pay during the last two months in comparison to men. In addition they continued to face underrepresentation in decision-making bodies and positions. This is a gross injustice and a human rights violation. European states must tackle it much more forcefully than has been the case so far".

"Although the situation varies from country to country, it is clear that women suffer everywhere on our continent from unequal treatment and opportunities in the workplace. It would be wrong to believe that this situation is the result of employment dynamics only. In reality, discrimination against women, be it direct or indirect, in this sphere of life results from deep-rooted societal attitudes that keep women in a subordinate role. Tackling this problem therefore requires a comprehensive approach from Council of Europe member states, from laws to be changed to political, cultural and economic measures to be implemented".

"The role of state authorities, in particular governments and parliaments, is crucial. They must lead by example and fully implement the gender equality standards set out in

international and European human rights treaties. Among them, **the European Social Charter requires that state parties guarantee the principle of equal pay for work of equal value by legislation that should be implemented effectively.** This includes providing for appropriate sanctions and remedies in case of gender discrimination in the workplace. Both within the public administration and in the labour market, state authorities must make more efforts to bridge the gender pay gap. They should also remove barriers that prevent women from reaching top level posts”.

“The current situation is not only harmful for women and the economy. It is deleterious for society as a whole. Even where the gender pay gap is narrowing, this is happening very slowly. If states do not step up their efforts now, it will take several more decades before full equality is achieved. We cannot afford to wait such a long time. **European states must show more resolve in upholding the obligation to ensure gender equality in the employment sphere”.**

(<https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/gender-equality-in-employment-is-still-a-distant-promise-in-europe>).

ON THESE GROUNDS

AND SUBJECT TO ANY THAT MIGHT BE RAISED IN ADDITIONAL MEMORIALS OR MENTIONED AT A HEARING

The European Committee of Social Rights is asked:

- to declare the action by University Women of Europe, UWE / Groupe Européen des Femmes diplômées des Universités, GEFDU, well-founded;
- consequently, to hold that Greece’s failure to ensure in practice equal pay for women and men for equal, similar or comparable work and the under-representation of women in decision-making posts in Greece breach the provisions of the revised European Social Charter, particularly Articles 1, 4, 4§3, 20 and E;
- to draw any factual and legal conclusions therefrom,
- consequently, to order Greece to pay University Women of Europe, UWE / Groupe Européen des Femmes Diplômées des Universités, GEFDU, and its counsel the sum of €10 000 excluding tax by way of an initial estimate to cover the time spent and the costs incurred in connection with these proceedings.

Without prejudice
9 February 2018



