



Revisiting the Link between Corruption Prevalence and Implementation Failure in Anti-Trafficking Policies

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ABSTRACT

We have revisited the link between corrupt practices among public officials and implementation failure in national policies against human trafficking by replicating previous analyses using more refined quantitative measures of both corruption and anti-trafficking policies. In line with the results of Zhang & Pineda (2008) and Cho, Dreher, and Neumayer (2011), we consistently found statistically significant inverse correlations between various indicators of corruption and a composite index of compliance with international standards for anti-trafficking policies. The results confirm the link between corruption among relevant public officials such as law enforcement officers and failures in the overall implementation of anti-trafficking policies. Contrary to expectations, the statistical relationships between corruption and the constituent measure of Prosecution were weaker than those with the constituent measures of Prevention and (victim) Protection. The suggestion is made to reexamine this relationship using an improved, more objective measure of performance in the domain of investigation/prosecution.

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One of today's most important priorities in international criminal policy is the fight against human trafficking. Manifestations of the political will to address this form of transnational crime are the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 of the USA and the adoption and widespread ratification of several international legal instruments. The UN Palermo Protocol against Trafficking in Persons, a supplement to the UNTOC, has by now been ratified by 147 member states. The Council of Europe's Warsaw Convention on Action against Human Trafficking of 2005 counted 39 State Parties by March 2013.

The USA State Department issues Annual Reports of Trafficking in Persons, ranking countries with respect to their actions in fighting human trafficking (distinguishing between four different tiers). The American Congress has mandated the administration to impose sanctions on countries placed in the fourth tier (no compliance with international standards). The conference of state parties of the Palermo protocol has to date failed to reach agreement on a monitoring mechanism (GAATW, 2012). On a more positive note this UN

protocol has been followed up by the adoption of a Global Plan of Action against Trafficking in Persons in 2010 (A/RES/64/293). Several technical assistance projects have been implemented, funded by a special gift from Bahrain. Also available are a Model Law against Trafficking in Persons and a Handbook for Parliamentarians to combat trafficking in persons. In spite of these efforts, UNODC official Sara Greenblatt, responsible for the UN anti-trafficking program observed that although progress had been made with the ratification process, "there has been less evidence of its effective implementation" (Greenblatt, 2012). The implementation of the Palermo Protocol leaves indeed much to be desired (Van Dijk, 2011). This is demonstrated in the lack of real progress in the fight against trafficking as exposed in reports from the Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women (GAATW, 2008), and the finding in 2009 that significant numbers of human traffickers had been convicted in only a small minority of, mainly Western, countries (UNODC, 2009). As human trafficking is generally considered to be the third largest category of transnational organized crime following drugs and arms trading,

the low number of convictions of traffickers is particularly striking. This lackluster result of punitive action against traffickers is confirmed by the first round of assessments of the Council of Europe's Group of Experts on Action against Human Trafficking (GRETA). In most member states of the Council of Europe whose anti-trafficking policies have so far been evaluated, not more than a handful of convictions have been secured. In its general report of 2012, GRETA expressed concern about the existing gaps between the numbers of identified victims and the much smaller numbers of convictions (GRETA, 2012, 2013). On the basis of quantitative indicators, based on the TIP ratings just mentioned, researchers of the University of Gottingen observed that anti-trafficking policies in most countries improved significantly between 2000 and 2003 but not or less so thereafter (Cho, Dreher, & Neumayer, 2011). The ratification procedures regarding the Palermo Protocol seem to have stirred many countries into legislative action, without a follow up in strengthening prosecution or prevention efforts.

A possible explanation for the disappointing implementation of anti-trafficking legislation, especially in the area of investigation and prosecution and migration control, is medium and high-level corruption. Corrupt practices can interfere with government policies in multiple ways. In most cases ordinary citizens or business executives seek speedier or better treatment by officials *greasing the wheels* or paying bribes. In the case of human trafficking, the situation is more complicated. Bribes are given to consular staff, airline personnel, and border control and immigration officers to smuggle trafficked persons across borders. In addition, organised traffickers seek immunity from arrest, criminal prosecution or sentencing through payments to law enforcement and criminal justice officials⁵. Corrupt practices can undermine anti-trafficking policies in source, transit, and destination countries. Loose networks of people specializing in recruitment, transportation, or exploitation are typical of human trafficking (UNODC, 2010). In some countries many traffickers belong to mafia-type transnational organized crime groups and in many, key persons are involved in the running of illegal or semi-legal entertainment industries where trafficked persons are exploited (and sometimes recruited). "Buying" protection from the State is a necessary condition for the sustainability of such organized crime activities.

One of the leading experts on modern forms of slavery, Kevin Bales, has named rampant corruption as one of the driving forces behind human trafficking worldwide (Bales, 2005). In his informed view, bad governance in source countries is a more important driver of human trafficking than extreme poverty. He

cites examples of criminal groups involved in human trafficking that have corrupted local institutions in Thailand and Cambodia. Also Italy and Lithuania are countries where groups involved in trafficking in women and children for sexual exploitation exert strong influence on customs, police, border officials, and criminal justice institutions (UNGIFT, 2008). Further, almost all countries in Southeastern Europe suffer from problems of rampant corruption linked to human trafficking (PACO, 2000). These corrupt acts are said to range, "...[f]rom passivity (ignoring or tolerating), or actively participating in or even organizing trafficking in human beings (...)."iii In the GRETA report on Montenegro, NGOs state that corruption among law enforcement officials acts as a major impediment to tackling widespread recruitment of victims in their country (GRETA/9/Montenegro, 2012). In its report on Moldova, GRETA notes that according to various sources, corruption remains a major factor behind the high prevalence of recruitment for sexual exploitation (GRETA, 2011, 25, Moldova).

The assumed association between human trafficking and corruption has been analyzed Zhang and Pineda (2008) using a criminometric test. In this explorative analysis of quantitative data, the researchers conducted a regression analysis of the rankings of countries by the U.S. Department of State according to the quality of their anti-trafficking policies, using the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International as a key independent variable (TI,). Their results showed that of all independent variables entered, corruption ($r = -0.44$) and per capita income ($r = -0.41$) were the most strongly correlated with the TIP ranking. That is, the greater the transparency in government operations (i.e., less corruption), the lower the rank in the TIP tier rating (i.e., better implementation of anti-trafficking policies). Also, the greater the per capita income, the lower the TIP rank. If these preliminary findings could be confirmed, they would have important implications for the international fight against human trafficking. If corrupt practices are, indeed, major spoilers of the anti-trafficking policies, the efforts of the international community to tackle human trafficking should, at least in part, be refocused on measures to address corruption among relevant groups of public officials rather than on awareness raising and training. The present authors have, therefore reexamined the links between corruption and the efficacy of anti-trafficking policies, using different types of measures of corruption as well as an alternative, more refined measure of anti-trafficking policies.

Definitions And Indicators

Corruption can be broadly defined as the abuse of public power for private gain. A distinction is often made between “grand corruption,” and “petty,” or “street level corruption.” Grand corruption refers to corrupt practices that pervade the highest levels of government. Petty corruption involves the payment by individuals or companies of relatively small sums of money to gain preferential treatment from a public official in the conduct of their professional tasks. One of the most common forms of corruption is bribery, or the bestowing of (financial) benefits to unduly influence an action or decision. A further distinction can be made between “active,” and “passive bribery.” Active bribery refers to the offering or payment of bribes and passive bribery to the seeking or receiving of bribes. In relation to human trafficking, the most pertinent forms of corruption seems to be bribery of customs or immigration officers, border police officials, and police officers with responsibilities for the surveillance or detection of prostitutionⁱⁱⁱ. In some cases, types of grand corruption at the level of senior prosecutors or judges may also occur. For example, in Montenegro a former deputy prosecutor general has been mentioned as accomplice of an organized crime group involved in human trafficking for sexual exploitation (GRETA, 9 /Montenegro, 2012).

The best known and most widely publicised statistical indicator of corruption is the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) produced by the international NGO, Transparency International (TI, 2010). The CPI is a composite index of the perceived extent of corrupt practices in countries, both grand and petty, drawing on different sources (Lambsdorff, 2000). More recent versions of the CPI are primarily based on survey results of business people and risk assessments (Lambsdorff, 2005). Although the CPI has in many countries had a significant political impact as an awareness raising tool, its methodology has attracted serious criticism. One common criticism is that the sources used differ significantly across countries and years. Conceptual clarity and comparability of results over time have been sacrificed as a result. Another criticism is that perceptions of business leaders and experts influence each other and that high rankings could, therefore be based on the mere “echoing,” of unfounded, media-led beliefs. Perhaps the most salient criticism is that the CPI, as an index measuring perceptions of a wide range of broadly defined corruption problems, cannot accurately reflect changes in the actual extent of specific forms of corruption, such as bribe-seeking by customs officers or traffic police.

An alternative approach to the measurement of corruption is surveys of the actual *experience* of the

public with bribe seeking officials. In the second round of the International Crime Victims Surveys (ICVS), conducted in 1992, an item was added on experiences with bribe seeking. The additional item was formulated as follows:

In some countries, there is a problem of corruption among government or public officials. During 1995, has any government official, for instance a customs officer, a police officer, or inspector in your country asked you, or expected you to pay a bribe for his services?^{iv}

In a follow-up question, respondents were asked which categories of officials had asked for bribes. The category, “police officer,” was most often mentioned as receivers or seekers of bribes, followed by government officials, custom officers, and inspectors. These results confirm that corrupt practices are indeed common among officials involved in anti-trafficking policies.

The ICVS showed that in Western countries this type of corruption was not common; the rates in all countries were below 1% (Mayhew & van Dijk, 1997). On average, 17.6% of people in the developing world reported incidents involving corruption, and 12.8% in countries in nations in transition (Zvekic, 1998). In 2005, on average, 2% of the public in the 30 ICVS participating countries reported any incident of bribe-seeking, with most countries showing rates below 0.5%. Greece and Mexico were exceptional with percentages as high as of 13.5 and 13.3. As had been the case in the previous sweeps, corruption was also high in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Georgia, Hungary, and Estonia. Within Western Europe, Northern countries show lower scores than Mediterranean countries. At the city level of analysis, rates were very high in Maputo (30.5%) and Phnom Phen (29%). Rates significantly above the mean were also found in Johannesburg (15.5%), Athens (13.8%), Lima (13.7%), Istanbul (7.1%, and Budapest (6.9%).

In 2003, Transparency International (TI) contracted Gallup to conduct a public opinion survey in 64 countries among a total of 50,000 people to assess both perceptions of corruption and actual victimisation experiences (Global Corruption Barometer, TI, 2004). The question used to measure actual victimization experiences reads, “In the past 12 months, have you or anyone in your household paid a bribe in any form?” The question resembles the one used in the ICVS, but asks about the actual payment of bribes rather than payment on solicitation (i.e., “[...]were you asked or expected to pay?). The TI item asks about experiences of the household instead of the respondent himself. In spite of these

differences, the analysis of the relationship between the prevalence rates found in the ICVS and in the TI corruption barometer revealed a high degree of agreement. The two measures of victimization by petty corruption were strongly correlated ($r = 0.75$) (Van Dijk, 2008). On average, ICVS bribery prevalence rates are 9.9% higher than the Transparency International rates, as is to be expected considering the wider scope of the question used in the ICVS.

To increase the number of countries that could be included in analyses, the two datasets were integrated with an adjustment of the TI data to better match ICVS data (viz., TI scores were multiplied by 109.9%). Through this operation it was possible to calculate corruption victimization rates for 92 countries for 2000-2002 (Van Dijk, 2008). The mean of the national prevalence rates of these countries was 16.4%. The results show huge regional variation in levels of street level corruption. Victimization by such corruption is almost unknown in Western Europe, North America, and Oceania but relatively common almost everywhere else.^v The highest prevalence of bribe seeking in the world was in Albania (59%). Of the European countries Moldova (35.2%), Lithuania (22.9%), Belarus (20.6%), and Russia (16.6%) were exceptional. These exceptionally high rates can be seen as remnants of the high level of corruption typical of countries in transition^{vi}. At the bottom end, Japan stands out with a rate of 0.1%. Street level corruption in Japan is apparently rare. Among the fifteen countries with the lowest scores on corruption are also grouped besides several Western countries, Botswana (0.8%, Hong Kong (1.1%), Taiwan (1.1%) and Singapore (1.1%). The latter countries have made great efforts in curbing corruption through the establishment of strong anti-corruption agencies. The location of these countries at the bottom of the scale further adds credibility to victimisation-based measures of corruption.

Since 2004 Transparency International has repeated its studies of bribery-victimisation as part of the Corruption Barometer published annually among an expanding group of countries (TI, 2010). The item on petty bribery used in 2006 has been adjusted and now asks respondents about experiences with paying bribes to nine different types of public officials (read out aloud during the interview). As a consequence of this item adjustment, prevalence rates have risen, complicating comparisons with previous findings. In its latest report in 2010, TI reports that the mean prevalence of the 86 countries participating was 25%. The global level of street level corruption has risen since 2006, especially in the

criminologically important domains of the judiciary and the police.

The results of the 2010 TI Barometer are consistent with those of the ICVS reported above. Street level corruption is rare in Australia, North America, and almost all Western European countries, with the notable exception of Greece. Street level corruption is comparatively common in most developing countries and in all ex-communist countries, most notably those in the former Soviet Union (e.g., Armenia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine). In East Asia and Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore have remained “islands of integrity,” in a region with comparatively high corruption prevalence.

Perception- Based Measures Of Corruption

The rates of actual experience of officials asking or expecting bribes according to the 2005 ICVS sweep were compared with the scores on the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International, with low scores indicating high levels of perceived corruption (Transparency International, 2005) (Figure 1). Rankings on the two indicators of corruption were strongly correlated ($r = 0.72$).

The relatively high ranking on the corruption prevalence rates of Greece, Hungary, Poland, and Estonia are confirmed by similar high scores on the Corruption Perception Index. Italy demonstrates relatively low scores on the CPI than it does on the ICVS-based victimization rate. Although the two measures are relatively strongly correlated, the correlation is not perfect. Obviously, the two indicators measure different aspects of corruption, with the ICVS item measuring the actual prevalence of victimisation by a concrete form of low-level corruption and the CPI measuring perceptions of the public or experts of the general prevalence of corrupt practices within all levels of government.

The question is which of the two indicators is the most valid and reliable measure? This issue has been examined empirically by Coalition 2000, a consortium of NGO's campaigning against corruption in Bulgaria (Coalition 2000, 2005). Within a framework of an elaborate corruption monitoring




Figure 1 | Plot of experience with bribe seeking by public officials. Prevalence & rating on TI Corruption Perception Index. Source: 2004–05 ICVS & Transparency International, 2004.

mechanism, the NGO conducted quarterly surveys of the Bulgarian public between 1998 and 2005, asking about both actual participation in corrupt transactions (i.e., whether respondents have paid bribes), and “corruption pressure,” or whether or not respondents have been asked to pay a bribe, as well as about perceptions of the extent of various types of corruption. The percentage of respondents admitting to have actually paid a bribe during the past month declined from 1% in early 1999 to 0.5% in November 2004. The quarterly rates show a clear downward trend over the years. The “corruption pressure,” indicator showed a similar downward trend (Coalition 2000 2005). Interestingly, the researchers did not register any changes in their index of perceived levels of corruption during the same period. Although actual levels of “petty corruption,” had fallen significantly, the scores on the perception-based items remained relatively constant during the reference period. Perception-based indicators showed fluctuations were associated with recent media releases about corruption scandals and/or anti-corruption initiatives. According to the analysts,

ICVS-type of questions about victimization by bribe seeking or corruption pressure seem to reflect the actual movement in the level of corruption better than perception-based indicators of corruption.

Although the Bulgarian case study reveals the methodological vulnerability of perception-based data, it would be erroneous to dismiss Transparency International’s CPI or similar perception-based aggregated indices of the World Bank as irrelevant for analytical purposes. Surveys among the public on actual experiences with corruption may be the best option of measuring petty corruption, but cannot measure types of “grand corruption,” involving high level public officials, politicians, and connected businessmen, collaborating in the theft of state resources. Ordinary people are not personally confronted with such hidden practices. In this context, it should be emphasized that the moderately high location of Italy and Spain on the ICVS-based scale of corruption in all probability underestimates the seriousness of corrupt practices in *high circles* in these countries. The ICVS indicator and similar Corruption Barometer measures do not fully capture less visible, but potentially more damaging forms, of grand corruption. For a valid understanding of the corruption problems of countries, ICVS-based results on corruption must, in the view of the present study, be supplemented with data from other sources, including perception-based indices.

In later years, several new surveys have been designed by the World Bank and Transparency International to measure various aspects of good governance or the rule of law, including the perceived prevalence of corrupt practices. Parallel with Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, the World Bank has developed its own comprehensive indices of perceived corruption in the framework of its governance indicators program. The Bank’s composite index of Control of Corruption measures, “perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of state institutions” (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2003). One of the source variables is derived from the annual surveys among business executives of the World Economic Forum^{vii}.

As anticipated, the intercorrelations between the TI Corruption Perception Index of 2010 and the World Bank Control of Corruption Index of 2008 were highly correlated ($r = .94$), and the correlation between the ICVS-based bribery indicator of 2005 and the Control of Corruption index of 2008 was relatively weaker ($r = .71$).

Of particular interest are the risk assessments of countries made by Political Risk Services, a

consultancy agency for international companies (PRS Group, 2012). These are based on subjective assessments of a network of country editors, one aspect being the extent of political corruption. The assessments take into account ordinary bribe seeking in the corporate world as well as more hidden forms of corruption, such as secret party funding and nepotism. The most recent 2012 PRS ratings on corruption were strongly correlated with the World Bank Control of Corruption Index of 2008 ($r = +.85$) and the TI Perception Index ($r = +.82$), and the correlation with the ICVS bribe-seeking indicator was moderately strong ($r = .64$). Both types of indicators have their own merits and limitations. In analyses of the impact of corruption on criminal policies, it is advisable to apply both types of measures and to examine differences in findings.

The Organised Crime-Corruption Complex

Previous research has analysed the statistical relationships between indicators of corruption and indicators of the prevalence of organised crime activity in countries (Van Dijk, 2007). In these analyses, a composite index of organised crime comprising of both objective and subjective indicators was used. One component of the index was the number of business executives who stated that their companies had incurred serious costs because of organised crime (World Economic Forum, 2004). The results showed that indicators of corruption, such as the World Bank indices of corruption and the CPI, were strongly correlated with a composite index of organised crime (Van Dijk, 2007). The analyses have been repeated using the most recent versions of the CPI, the World Bank Control of Corruption Index, and the WEF item on organised crime (OC). The correlation between the CPI and the WEF indicator of Organised Crime was moderately strong ($r = .45$). A similar relatively strong correlation was found between the Control of Corruption index and Organised Crime ($r = .40$). These findings suggest the interconnectedness of high levels of corruption and organised crime activity. The links between corruption and human trafficking may be due to lower level public officials tolerating trafficking and/or exploitation after accepting bribes, but it might also be due to the involvement of powerful organised criminal groups in human trafficking in some countries. That is, it is likely that the impact of corruption on anti-trafficking is experienced at the level of operational work as at higher levels of decision-making.

Rating Anti-Trafficking Policies

The ranking by the U.S. Department of State of countries with respect to their compliance with anti-trafficking policies, as defined by the USA, has met with criticism. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office, the rating procedures and criteria used are unclear, making the final ratings vulnerable to subjectivity (United States, 2006). Another criticism leveled at the TIP ranking is that no distinction is made between compliance in different policy domains—such as prevention, prosecution, and victim protection. Combining data from the TIP country reports and from two reports on human trafficking policies of UNODC (UNODC, 2009; Cho, Dreher, & Neumayer, 2011) have rated 177 countries with respect to their level of compliance with the Palermo Protocol. The rating was based on assessments by the researchers of compliance in the three dimensions of Prosecution, Protection and Prevention. Countries were scored on five criteria for each dimension. Separate indices were constructed on the three policy dimensions and one overall aggregate anti-trafficking policy index over the 2000-2009 period—an overall index with a maximum score of 15 was termed the 3P index. The scores on this index can be regarded as an improved version of the TIP ratings used by Zhang and Pineda (2008)^{viii}.

As mentioned above, in 2005 the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings (The Warsaw Convention), which entered into force in 2008 and by Spring 2012 counted 40 State Parties ([online:www.coe.int/trafficking](http://www.coe.int/trafficking)). The Warsaw Convention is more strongly oriented to the protection of the human rights of victims than its forerunners, including the United Nations Palermo Protocol against Trafficking in Persons of 2002 ([online:www.unodc.org/unodc/treaties/CTOC](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/treaties/CTOC)). The CoE Warsaw Convention details the obligations of State Parties in terms of legislation and institution building, as well as prosecution, protection, and prevention. A distinct feature is that it provides for the setting up of an effective and independent monitoring mechanism consisting of a group of fifteen independent experts reporting to the Conference of State Parties.

In 2009 the Committee of Ministers of the Council adopted the rules of procedure for the election of the




Figure 2 | Concurrence between 3P index scores (max 15) and GRETA reports ratings for 13 countries (max 68).

Council of Europe's Group of Experts on Action against Human Trafficking (GRETA) and elected the first members (online: www.coe.int/trafficking)^{ix}. GRETA has subsequently developed its own assessment methodology. After a choice was made GRETA for the focus of a first round of evaluations, a questionnaire was designed intended to be completed by countries under evaluation prior to a country visit. This comprehensive questionnaire covers all main areas of implementation and provides a template of key statistics. On receipt of the completed questionnaire, country visits of five working days by two GRETA members and a Secretariat representative are conducted, and during the visits the information provided, including statistics, is reviewed with relevant public officials. In the course of the evaluations NGO's are invited to also fill in the questionnaire and to be available for a meeting with the GRE

TA delegation at the beginning of the country visit. Meetings are arranged by national contact points with representatives of a broad selection of NGOs, government officials, parliamentarians, staff working for service providers, including shelter homes, police officers, prosecutors, and officials working for State Compensation Schemes. To date, reports comprising of on average 60 pages on the implementation

policies of a first selection of 13 countries have been adopted.


The first evaluation reports of GRETA cover all key treaty obligations of the Convention with their content following a more or less structured format. The first sections review compliance with legislative and institutional obligations, and subsequent sections review compliance with the sets of detailed obligations regarding investigation/prosecution, victim protection, and prevention. An in-depth analysis of the first round of reports has revealed that a country's anti-trafficking policies are assessed on the basis of 34 main items. Building on these results a tentative and unofficial scorecard was designed assessing compliance with the different, detailed policy requirements applied in the GRETA reports. Altogether, our scorecard lists 34 policy requirements^x.

The country scores of our scorecard were compared with the so-called 3P index scores. As explained, the scores of the 3P scale are largely based on the U.S. TIP Reports, supplemented by information from the UNODC reports. They are less detailed than the scorecard ratings presented above, based on the GRETA reports. To cross-validate the 3P ratings, the concurrence between the over all P3 scores for the thirteen selected countries and the scorecard ratings were analyzed (Figure 2).

The concurrence of the two ratings is relatively strong ($r = .65$). This finding suggests that in the European region the ratings of countries based on the USA TIP reports are broadly in line with the more refined evaluations by the independent group of experts of the Council of Europe.

Links Between Corruption Indicators And Measures Of Anti-Trafficking Efforts

The main analytical interest of Cho, Dreher and Neumayer (2011) was the possible interdependency between the anti-trafficking policies of various countries. One of their hypotheses was that main source countries might exert political pressure on source countries to adopt more effective policies. In this view, the Palermo Protocol can be seen as a vehicle used by developed countries to exert influence on developing countries. This hypothesis was tested with an economic model which included



We have repeated the analysis with a bivariate regression analysis of the 3 P index and its three sub-scores of anti-trafficking policies, using four different measures of corruption as independents (ICVS, CPI, World Bank's Control of Corruption

Although the relationships are not very strong (r between 0.29 and 0.48), they are all statistically significant. The link between corruption and implementation failures in the fight against human trafficking is confirmed, regardless of the measure of corruption used. Countries with poor track records on implementing anti-trafficking standards such as several Arab countries, Azerbaijan, India, and Indonesia tend to be weak on corruption control as well. Within Europe the main source countries of human trafficking (Bosnia, Estonia, Lithuania,

Moldova, Rumania, and Ukraine) suffer from rampant corruption in public institutions.

The statistical relationship between various measures of corruption and the quality of anti-trafficking policies might of course be spurious in the sense that it is caused by a third factor related to both the dependent and the independent. A such possible third factor could be the level of economic wealth. We have carried out a multiple regression analysis with GDP as control variable. The results confirmed a statistically significant relationship between Control of Corruption and PRS and the 3P index of human trafficking policies, controlling for GDP per capita (C of C: $\beta = .27$; $p < 0.05$; PRS: $\beta = .33$; $p < 0.05$). A high prevalence of corruption seems to impact negatively on the implementation of anti-trafficking policies regardless of a country's GDP.

We have, finally looked at the correlations between the Worldbank Control of Corruption Index and the PRS index of corruption and the three constituent components of the 3P index regarding prevention, prosecution and protection respectively. The correlation between the CC index and the constituent measure of prosecution as weaker ($r = .270$) than those with protection ($r = .374$) and prevention ($r = .436$). In the case of the RPS index too the correlation with the Prosecution subscore although statistically significant, was somewhat weaker ($r = .346$) than the ones with Prevention (.412) and protection (.474). The latter finding sheds doubt on the hypothesis that corruption is primarily an impediment of adequate investigation and prosecution policies and calls for careful consideration from both a methodological and substantive perspective.

Discussion

Although country rankings in terms of crime and corruption tend to attract most attention from the media, the real test of the usefulness of such criminometrics is their use in analytical work on the determinants and impact of corruption. With a view of the disappointing implementation results of the Palermo Protocol, a topical issue is the possible impact of corruption among law enforcement officers, consular staff, prosecutors and judges on implementation failures in the fight against human trafficking. We have replicated previous analytical work on the possible obstructive impact of corruption on the execution of global policies against human trafficking, using different measures of both corruption and anti-trafficking policies. We examined correlations between indicators of

corruption and two measures of anti trafficking policies. As corruption indicators we used the ICVS-based indicator of experiences with corruption and three perception –based corruption indicators of the World Bank, Transparency International and the Political Risk Group respectively. As dependent variables we used two measures of implementation failure, the ratings in the Trafficking in Persons Reports by the US State Department and a composite index of compliance with international standards for anti-trafficking policies constructed by Cho, Dreher & Neumayer. This so-called 3 P index was cross-validated with the contents of the first thirteen reports of the monitoring mechanism of the Warsaw Convention. A moderately high level of congruence was found between the overall 3 P index and the monitoring reports. This results lends support to the use of the 3P index as measure of anti-trafficking policies. The link between corruption and failures in the implementation of anti human trafficking policies was confirmed by the results of our quantitative analyses. The results were consistent across the various measures of corruption and anti-trafficking policies used. Contrary to expectations, though, the hypothesis that these relationships would be strongest for the dimension of investigation/prosecution policies was not confirmed. In our view the latter findings might partly be caused by inadequacies in the measure based on the TIP reports. Although the scoring procedure used by the Goettingen team is more refined than the tier rating by the State Department, the assessments is still largely based on subjective judgments.. One of the principal criteria for the quality of prosecution was compliance of the national criminal code with the Palermo protocol. The substance of law- in- the- books, however, may have little bearing on the investigative and prosecutorial efforts and achievements on the ground. Although the TIP assessment are partly based on information on actual arrests and prosecutions, these data are often missing. The dimension Prosecution therefore probably reflects mostly the extent legislative compliance rather than the quality of investigation and prosecution. Questions can also be raised about the inclusion of sentence severity as a aspect of compliance. Sentences tend to be more severe in some developing countries and especially in ex-communist countries than in Western European countries (Van Dijk, 2008). It is doubtful whether or not severe sentences as such can be seen as proof of better compliance with the Palermo Protocol. In other words, there are several reasons why countries with high levels of corruption may have received higher scores on the prosecution dimension than they

deserved, thereby blurring the relationship between corruption and anti-trafficking compliance^{xiii}.

For a more definite test of the corruption-prosecution link, a better measure of prosecution performance is probably needed. A more objective measure could be constructed based on statistics on the numbers of arrests, prosecutions and convictions per country. These statistics should be used to calculate metrical performance indicators such as the ratio between total numbers of officially identified victims and numbers of arrests and the proportion of arrests resulting in convictions. Using such hard measures of law enforcement and prosecution performance in the fight against human trafficking, the corruption-anti-trafficking link should be re-examined.

From a policy perspective, the established link between the prevalence of corrupt practices in a country and the quality of its overall anti-trafficking policies suggest that more attention should be given to the integrity of anti-trafficking implementation. Best practices in anti-corruption programmes should be harnessed to strengthen the implementation of anti-trafficking policies. Promising measures include stringent screening of officials in key positions in relevant institutions such as vice squads, consular offices, customs and immigration. For these positions intensive supervision and job rotation seem to be called for. Priority should also be given to targeted investigations into allegations of misconduct by anti-trafficking officials. The future success of anti-trafficking policies seems in many countries to hinge more on the introduction of such integrity promotion measures than on anything else.

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housing inspectors. To the extent that they become more involved in anti-trafficking policies they will be more exposed to bribe-giving by traffickers.

In the questionnaire used in 2000 in Central-Eastern Europe respondents were also asked whether in their opinion it was likely that a given official of various state institutions would ask for a bribe or would expect to be bribed. The large majority confirmed that in their experience all types of officials mentioned would routinely accept bribes. Of the various categories nurses and doctors, police officers and custom officers were mentioned most often as ready receivers of bribes (Alvazzi del Frate and Van Kesteren, 2004).

³ The WEF item on corruption asks business executives how common it is for firms in the country to pay undocumented irregular payments or bribes to various state institutions (WEF, 2011).

⁴ In its formal recommendations GRETA distinguishes between the verbs urging, considering and inviting. In the informal scoring procedure applied by the authors, countries received a zero score if GRETA urged changes in the implementation of a policy requirement, a score of one if the recommendations considered or invited changes. A score of two was given if no recommendations about a policy requirement were made.

⁵ Bartolow (2010) using the CPI of Transparency International as one of its independents and the TIP ratings as dependent also reports on a significant correlation between these two factors. Neither Bartolow nor the Goettingen team seem to have been aware of the publication of criminologists Zhang and Pineda (2008).

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Author contributions

Include information

Additional information

¹ It is often said, that successful prosecutions of traffickers are hampered by the lack of convincing testimony from victims. A promising strategy for traffickers seeking immunity from prosecution would seem to combine intimidation of victim-witnesses and/or their family with bribe-giving to investigators and prosecutors.

² In recent years more attention is given in some developed countries to trafficking for labour exploitation. Policies in this field are implemented by a different set of officials such as labour or

