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“Inspiration for the Future – the Essential of Educating the Community”¹

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People need to understand why corruption is a bad thing; it is not a self-evident proposition. Then they need to understand how they can individually play their part in the fight against it. A crucial part is to come forward to the authorities and report what they believe to be happening. But there are many causes that make people unwilling to do that. Ambivalence, indifference, apathy, tolerance, resignation and fear have to be addressed if information is to start flowing. This is the immediate objective of the public education and support element of the strategy. The more important, long-term objective is to bring about a complete change in people’s attitude to corruption. For the moment it is the close link between the enforcement and public education elements of the strategy that deserves emphasis.

As regards the public education and support element of the strategy, let us first consider what educating the whole community entails. There are two objectives: one that must be reached quickly, the other that can be achieved only in the long term. First, investigating corruption needs information from those who know what is going on. But people are usually most reluctant to provide information to the authorities. They must quickly be encouraged to do so in order that the enforcement side of the strategy can show the results that the community wants to see. The long-term objective is nothing less than bringing about a change of attitude to corruption in everyone in the community, an objective that many have dismissed as impossible but that has been shown in a few places to be entirely feasible.

We should realise that educating the whole community means every sector and every age group, every rank from the highest to the most humble. Our leaders – politicians, senior officials and judges – need to understand as much as do schoolchildren and students why corruption is a bad thing (not a self-evident proposition) and what each of them can do to help fight the problem.

As in any other sphere, the means of getting the messages across are broadly two: face-to-face communication (meetings, talks, seminars, training, etc) and mass communication (radio, television, print media, posters, internet, etc).

¹ This paper is based on the relevant chapter of the book “Overcoming Corruption – the Essentials” by Bertrand de Speville 2010 (ISBN 978-0-9564788-0-1).

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It is clear that the task of educating the whole community is much too large for the anticorruption body alone. It will never have the means to recruit enough educators and communicators. It must therefore make use of the community's own teachers and leaders.

Like the work of prevention, the work of education and public support can be programmed. An obvious division of labour separates the mass communication work from the face-to-face work. Two divisions of specialists planning their work for the year ahead in consultation with the other two operational departments, investigation and prevention, produces the coordinated approach essential to success. The face-to-face division will target its audiences, whether senior officials, judges, police recruits, business managers, schoolchildren or business school graduates. The message to be conveyed will be tailored accordingly. The mass communication division will divide its budget between the different means of communication, and its messages will convey particular themes. There is no limit to the creativity of educators and communicators in getting the anticorruption message across, especially with the help of their advisory committee.

It is now generally recognised that an anticorruption body on its own, or even the government on its own, cannot succeed in defeating corruption. A widespread problem that has affected the whole community requires public support if it is to be overcome.

By 'public support' is meant the active participation of the community, not merely the expression of support for the cause from the sidelines. But active public support is hard to come by. People do not see why they should become actively involved when it is the anticorruption body that has been given the job. Surely the community can breathe a sigh of relief that it is not their job and need only approve of the efforts of the anticorruption body.

That view is profoundly mistaken. Unless the community's active support is developed, the anticorruption body alone cannot beat corruption. It is worth repeating that the support of the community is one of the essentials of success against corruption. Without it, any anticorruption strategy fails. If the anticorruption strategy can be regarded as the spear of the nation against corruption, the anticorruption body as the spearhead can achieve little without the shaft of public engagement. The anticorruption body must engage the public service institutions, the private sector enterprises and the community-based organisations in active participation.

When an anticorruption body has been created, there is a real risk that the departments, agencies and ministries of the administration itself will sit back. They will leave it to the anticorruption body without providing their active help. The public sector is a major part of the problem of corruption. It is incumbent on the management of the entities of the public sector to ensure that each of those entities plays its role in being part of the solution.

A number of measures are needed to ensure that active public support is developed. They should be taken by the anticorruption body itself and by the national administration, the legislature, the judiciary, the business sector and all the other sectors of the community. This paper considers the measures that should be taken by each of these participants. First, however, it describes the general approach to bringing the community on side.

Engaging the community at the outset

The first of the essentials for succeeding against corruption is political will. But political will is fragile. There are ways of strengthening that fragile commodity. One of them is the government's consultation of the opinion formers of the community, the purpose of which is, first, to inform the community of the main issues that arise in fighting corruption and of the government's initial thinking and, second, to seek the views of the opinion formers on these issues. The consultation should be done before the government decides how to implement a national strategy against corruption and should involve opinion formers in all sectors and at all levels. The fact that the government takes the trouble to consult the community at once gives people the encouragement to express their views, views that will be taken into account in formulating the implementation plan. The issues themselves indicate how they will directly affect the community.

Using the teachers

Once the anticorruption body is operational, its education department will seek to reach the community broadly in two ways: mass communication and direct face-to-face communication. The intention here is not to explore the details of the methods of the education department's work, but rather to make the point that the department itself will never have enough educators and communicators to carry the anticorruption message to every part of the community. In direct communication it must rely on the leaders of the community to convey the message to their employees, members, trainees, students, audiences and congregations. It is therefore crucially important that the anticorruption body enlist the support of the community's leaders from the outset, for they are the ones who can most effectively get the message across. They will not be persuaded overnight to come on board; it takes time. Yet it must be done.

Establishing advisory committees

The anticorruption body must win and retain the trust and confidence of the public if it is to succeed. One of the best ways of doing that is to let people see that it is doing its job honestly, competently and fearlessly, and is not abusing its powers. Furthermore the advice of citizens experienced in various walks of life provides invaluable help to the anticorruption body in each of its main fields of operation – enforcement, prevention and public education – and in general policy and staffing matters.

An effective way of achieving that objective has been found in the use of advisory committees of citizens. The anticorruption body therefore should have five advisory committees of citizens selected for their experience and expertise. They should comprise citizens appointed in their own right (not as representatives of any institution or organisation) and certain members of the public service appointed by reason of the office they hold. How these committees are appointed and how they work in practice, their size, function, composition, qualities of the members, their terms of appointment, selection, method of working and cost are set out briefly here. Initially these committees should be chaired by the head of the anticorruption body or his deputy until they have settled into a regular *modus operandi*.³

It would be a mark of the importance attached to service on these committees if the appointments were made by the head of state, who would also select the members of the two

³ The initial period would vary from one committee to another but should be from one to three years.

advisory committees on policy and staff discipline. He would appoint members of the three operational committees from nominations put forward by the head of the anticorruption body since the body itself is the best judge of the operational assistance needed.

While the anticorruption body remains responsible for making the decisions, it is greatly assisted in the different aspects of its work by advice from these committees. The committees have a number of advantages. First, at general policy level a small group of prominent members of the community, meeting regularly with the head of the anticorruption body, provides advice on the shape and direction of the campaign against corruption and on personnel employment matters. Second, respected and respectable citizens with relevant experience voluntarily provide valuable advice on specialised topics for each arm of the strategy. Third, the committee considering complaints from the public on the conduct of officers provides independent consideration of the complaint and advice on disciplinary measures. Fourth, all these committees represent the community, demonstrate community involvement and, most importantly, monitor the conduct of the anticorruption body on behalf of the community.

Since public support in the fight against corruption is vital, this form of public involvement is key to developing the community's trust that builds active support. In particular, the committee working with the investigation department, as its main function, has to advise the head of the anticorruption body whether an investigation that cannot become a court case should be closed. The great majority of investigations do not end up in court, either because the informant's suspicions were mistaken or because there is no sufficient evidence. It is vitally important that the public should have confidence that the allegation has been thoroughly investigated and that the matter can properly be closed. On behalf of the public this committee considers a report of the investigation and the recommendation by the investigating officers that no further action should be taken by the anticorruption body. It decides whether to advise acceptance of the recommendation. This committee's other job is to monitor the progress of investigations to see that they proceed with all reasonable speed. Obviously it is in this committee that a high degree of confidentiality is necessary.

Unpaid service to the community is certainly not rare in most countries and there is no doubt about its advantages. It appeals to people who are committed to the cause and who are prepared to donate their time and expertise to the general good. It saves taxpayers' money and it limits the amount of service that can properly be asked of anyone.

Members should be asked to serve for a period of twelve months, renewable if desired. They are appointed in a way that recognises the status of the position and their standing in the community. That is why the head of state should be invited to appoint them. Their appointment should be suitably publicised. They should not be overburdened, preparing for and attending a 2–3 hour meeting once a month being the maximum that should be asked of any of them. Though unpaid, they should be reimbursed the cost of travelling to and from meetings.

Advisory committees should be serviced by staff of the anticorruption body, who should be responsible for meeting schedules, agendas, circulation of material in advance and minutes of meetings. Meeting dates should be fixed twelve months in advance so that committee members can incorporate them into their busy schedules. Draft reports and recommendations should seek the specific advice of members. Meetings are kept as short as possible and occur no more often than once a month so as not to overburden committee members. Each committee reports annually to the head of state separately from the anticorruption body itself.

Experience over many years has shown that advisory committees can be a most valuable support to the anticorruption body and a vital means of developing and maintaining the trust of the community.

The continuing role of the national administration

Having provided the initial impetus for the national fight against corruption, the administration's effort obviously cannot end there. It has to continue to provide its support in a number of ways.

- 1 The provision of necessary resources, year in, year out.
- 2 The administration needs to make clear to all its ministries, departments and agencies that the anticorruption body is there to lead the fight and that they are all to work with it and under its guidance.
- 3 The administration should instruct all its ministries, departments and agencies, including the law enforcement agencies, that all allegations and reports of corruption are to be referred, without delay and uninvestigated, to the anticorruption body.
- 4 The larger ministries and agencies, on the advice of the anticorruption body, should each be required to form an internal anticorruption unit to work with the anticorruption body in developing its own prevention and education initiatives. In the case of smaller entities of the administration, the appointment of a liaison officer will provide the link to the anticorruption body. Both the anticorruption unit and the liaison officer should be directly answerable to the head of the ministry, department or agency concerned.
- 5 The administration should make use of the anticorruption body to provide an integrity rating service so that an integrity assessment can be made of candidates for senior appointments and promotions in the public service.
- 6 The administration should ensure the rules governing the conduct of ministers and public service employees are observed.
- 7 It is the responsibility of the administration to ensure that the principle of supervisory accountability applies throughout the public service.
- 8 Given that cooperative effort between the administration and the anticorruption body is essential to success against corruption, the administration should encourage all its ministries, departments and agencies to seek the advice of the anticorruption body in preventing corruption and in educating their employees.
- 9 The administration should put in place a debarment system for preventing any entity from bidding for a government contract if it has been guilty of corruption.
- 10 The administration has a duty to ensure that corruption prevention recommendations from the anticorruption body are put into effect.
- 11 The administration can and should encourage the community to help it fight corruption in rural development.
- 12 In many democratic countries party political funding and the funding of electoral campaigns is a major source of corruption. The administration should consider how this aspect of the country's corruption problem might be tackled.
- 13 The system of immunity from criminal process is in some countries far wider than is justified in a country that is subject to the rule of law. It is incumbent on the administration to ensure that immunity from the criminal process is reviewed and adjusted if necessary so as to apply to the fewest categories of people in the least number of circumstances. Likewise, the rules for the lifting of immunity should be reviewed and simplified.

14 If the country's anticorruption efforts are taking effect, it is incumbent on the administration to broadcast that progress abroad if it wishes to attract foreign investment and improve its reputation.

The suggestion is sometimes made that the anticorruption body should post an officer, perhaps undercover, to the most corruption-prone entities of the administration to find instances of corruption. This course should not be adopted. Undercover operations have their place in an anticorruption body's work but they are delicate operations fraught with risks and should be confined to specific investigations. Even if he were not undercover, the officer would run the risk of being quickly isolated or compromised. Furthermore, such a posting would run counter to the development of the entity's ownership of its own anticorruption measures and, in particular, of the responsibility of its own personnel to report suspicions of corruption.

Investigating corruption is usually a delicate matter. Such investigations, especially in their early stages, are fragile in the sense that evidence can quickly evaporate before it has been secured. Frequently corruption investigations that have been started by inexperienced supervisors in the suspect's organisation are referred to the anticorruption body in a state that precludes any proper outcome. These matters are best left to the specialists. That is why all ministries, departments and agencies should be required to refer all reports or suspicions of corruption uninvestigated to the anticorruption body.

As regards the integrity rating service mentioned earlier, it is perhaps obvious that the probity of the public service requires that only officers of integrity should be appointed and promoted. The anticorruption body has an important part to play in that process. From its accumulated intelligence database it should be able to provide for the administration an integrity rating assessment. Whenever a senior appointment or promotion in the public service is being considered, the appointing authority should be required to turn to the anticorruption body for an assessment of the candidate's integrity.

The administration should ensure that the public service abides by its own regulations on the conduct of its public officers. The management of the public sector needs to ensure that those for whom they are responsible know what is expected of them, that those expectations are to be complied with and that any deviations from those standards will be followed by disciplinary action. For example, do public officers make a declaration of assets as and when the law requires? Is there any general understanding in the public service of what is meant by a conflict of interests and what the public officer who finds himself in that position is supposed to do? Do public officers know how to react correctly for their own protection if they are offered a bribe? It is the responsibility of management to ensure that those for whom they are responsible understand these matters.

The regulations governing the conduct of public employees are usually difficult to access. They tend to be buried in a large volume of regulations dealing with many other matters besides conduct. The format hardly lends itself to being tucked into an inside pocket or kept in the top drawer of one's desk. The electronic version is often difficult to find on the government website. The administration should see to it that the rules governing conduct of public employees are extracted and summarised into a brief code of conduct. The code should be a tailored, handy leaflet containing only the essentials. One of the essentials would be practical advice on how to react correctly in situations where the public officer's integrity is at risk of being compromised. The leaflet would serve as both a readily accessible, quick

reference guide and, for the public, a source of information on what standards of behaviour to expect from public officers.

Any asset declaration system applicable to ministers and public service employees should ensure that the system has as its sole objective the identification of actual or potential conflict between public duties and personal interests, that it is so designed as to be able to meet that objective and that it is scrupulously observed by all those to whom it applies.

The significance of the principle of supervisory accountability, which is normally found in the regulations governing the conduct of public service employees, is often overlooked. The principle has an important bearing on the fight against corruption. If an officer under his supervision is found to have acted corruptly by taking advantage of a system falling into the supervisor's area of responsibility, the supervisor runs the risk of being found wanting in his duties of supervision and management. If he should have known of the corrupt activity and should have known of the vulnerability of the system, the supervisor's ignorance is a matter of disciplinary censure. That is why the administration should ensure that the principle of supervisory accountability is applied throughout the public service.

As regards a contract-tendering debarment system, in many countries the tendering system for public contracts gives rise to corruption. Many countries have in place a system for excluding from tendering any company or individual previously convicted of corruption. Given the perceived extent of the problem, the administration, with the assistance of the public procurement regulatory bodies and the anticorruption body, should design and adopt a debarment system that would prevent convicted entities from tendering for public contracts.

When it comes to giving effect to the corruption prevention recommendations of the anticorruption body, it can happen that the concerned ministry, department or agency does not implement the recommendations. The anticorruption body has no way of getting the recommendation implemented except by persuasion. If that fails, the anticorruption body has no power to compel compliance. The only effective way of proceeding then is to bring hierarchical pressure to bear on the recalcitrant ministry or department. In the absence of a satisfactory reason why the recommendations should not be promptly implemented, the anticorruption body should report the matter to the administration, which in turn should hold the recalcitrant public entity accountable.

The inspection of rural development projects undertaken by local government in a large developing country is difficult to carry out. Site inspection services are often stretched beyond their capacity. Added to that is corruption in the inspection services themselves. Some countries have successfully applied a system of community inspection or monitoring. If the beneficiary community is given the specifications (in simplified form if necessary), it can see for itself whether the project standards are being met. The thickness of a road surface or the size of construction timbers can be observed by the untrained eye. The relevant ministries of the administration should consider adopting this system of community self-help.

The funding of political parties and electoral campaigns presents a corruption problem in many democratic countries. The ever-growing demand for funding is seen as a source of serious corruption. The problem includes the misuse of state resources by electoral candidates. Rarely is funding and expenditure properly regulated. The administration would make a major and direct contribution to the fight against corruption if it were to regulate the financing of political parties and electoral campaigns.

In some countries judges, prosecutors, elected representatives, ministers and even senior civil servants enjoy immunity from criminal process on the ground that they could otherwise not perform their official functions fearlessly and impartially. These countries also have a more or less elaborate system for lifting the immunity in certain circumstances. The result is often that the incumbent cannot be dealt with even for corruption in office. The administration has a clear duty to re-examine the extent of immunities and the procedures for lifting immunity to ensure that they extend no further than is strictly necessary in a country that lives by the rule of law.

Every country makes considerable effort to project its image abroad. It is important for the world to know that the country is taking its corruption problem seriously and is not complacent about its anticorruption achievements. It falls to the administration to use all the means at its disposal, including its representative offices abroad and their contacts with foreign chambers of commerce, to convey the effectiveness of its anticorruption efforts.

The legislature's contribution

Having completed the initial tasks of enacting the legislation that established the anticorruption body, the legislature's continuing role in the fight against corruption comprises several elements.

First, it will normally have a monitoring role in examining the annual reports of the anticorruption body and its advisory committees and questioning the administration on the progress of the effort against corruption. In doing so, legislators should guard against inquiring into investigations that may be opened, are under way or have been closed. Given their role as representatives of the people, legislators find it difficult to refrain from questions they regard as being in the public interest. It is vital to the success of the fight against corruption that they should appreciate the wider public interest of confidentiality in the investigative work of the anticorruption body in matters that may not or will not reach the public domain of the criminal justice system.

Second, the legislature will consider and approve the funding of the anticorruption effort through the national budgetary process.

Third, legislators and other elected representatives, like most citizens, will not always understand their personal duty when they find themselves in a situation that creates a conflict between their official duty and the personal interests of themselves or others. It is incumbent on them to gain a clear understanding of the concept of conflict of interest and their personal obligation in such situations. They should ensure that their house rules on the matter of declaring a personal interest are unambiguous and carry effective sanctions when they are broken. The speaker of the national assembly and chairmen of local councils should ensure that, with the help of the anticorruption body, members take part regularly in refresher courses on the matter.

Fourth, just as an asset declaration system applicable to ministers and public service employees should ensure that the system has as its sole objective the identification of actual or potential conflict between public duties and personal interests, so too an asset declaration system for elected representatives should have the same objective. There is a widespread misconception that the objective of a declaration of assets system is to identify the corrupt. It

does no such thing. In the case of elected representatives, the system enables the public to know that, when a representative speaks or votes on a matter, his personal interests may be affecting his stance. If the public is to be able to identify such a conflict of interest, it is necessary that the asset declaration be accessible to the public. It is for the legislature or the local assembly itself to establish a system that allows asset declarations to be publicly accessible as far as is necessary to fulfil the objective of identifying conflict of interests.

In many countries attempts to introduce a declaration of assets system for elected representatives have failed, either because the system has never been put in place or because the rules have been honoured more in the breach than the observance by members themselves. The message thus given to the community heightens the perception that corruption is growing even among the political leadership. A refusal to declare one's assets is taken to mean that one has ill-gotten gains to hide. If there is nothing to hide, why not declare, goes this line of thinking. Yet revealing substantial assets results in the inference that they are ill-gotten. The widespread misconception referred to earlier that the objective of the system is to identify the corrupt is largely responsible. The reluctance of elected representatives to subscribe to a declaration system designed on that basis is understandable. The inference that would inevitably be drawn by disclosing that one had substantial assets would prove nothing and would be unjust. The infringement of the right to privacy enshrined in the Constitution would be unjustifiable as being an unnecessarily wide derogation from that right. The size of one's savings account, for instance, would normally be irrelevant to any question of conflict of interests.

While these objections by elected representatives to such a system have merit, there is no denying that their refusal creates a poor impression in the community and in some countries has held up accession to the UN Convention Against Corruption. In such cases it is time to return to the drawing board and, with the assistance of the anticorruption body, to draft a declaration system based squarely and solely on the object of identifying any conflict of interests when an elected or appointed representative speaks or votes on a matter at hand. The design of a system based on that objective would take into account the content of the declaration and the extent to which the declaration needs to be made publicly available.

Fifth, the regulation of the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns referred to earlier is obviously a subject of direct concern to members of the legislature. They will no doubt have much say in shaping the regulating legislation.

Sixth, if elected representatives enjoy immunity from criminal process, especially as regards corruption, they have a duty to support the anticorruption effort by cooperating with the administration in reviewing the system of immunities.

Finally, in respect of their most obvious function as legislators, members of the lawmaking body should be aware of the opportunities for corruption created by the legislation they are about to enact. Not all those opportunities can always be avoided but legislators would be wise to call on the advice of the anticorruption body's prevention specialists while the draft can still be changed.

The judiciary's contribution

Apart from the obvious duty of trying and sanctioning corrupt conduct, the judiciary has a number of contributions to make in fighting corruption.

As regards judiciary codes of conduct, judges, magistrates, presiding officers and court staff have ethical questions to resolve that do not necessarily arise in the duties of other public officials. The codes of conduct that apply to the judiciary therefore have significant differences from the general code applicable to all public servants. Like other public servants, however, judges, magistrates and their staff need practical guidance on how to react correctly and for their own protection when improperly approached. The head of the judiciary should ensure that its codes of conduct are, with the assistance of the anticorruption body, reviewed, promulgated, observed and enforced.

The earlier observation that senior people should not always be assumed to be knowledgeable about the notion of conflict of interests applies equally to the judiciary. The head of the judiciary should arrange to have instituted a regular programme of promoting a thorough understanding among the judiciary, including presiding officers and senior court staff, of the concept of conflict of interests and of the personal responsibility that rests on the individual. Again, the anticorruption body's assistance would be helpful.

Any declaration of assets system adopted for judges and magistrates should, as any such system, be based on the objective of identifying conflict of interests. That objective governs the architecture of the system. Declarations should therefore be seen by the senior judge in charge of allocating the court's business.

If judges and prosecutors enjoy immunity from criminal process, especially as regards corruption, they – like elected representatives – have a duty to support the anticorruption effort by cooperating with the administration in reviewing the system of immunities applicable to them.

The success of the national fight against corruption depends upon the effective enforcement of the laws against corruption. In turn, effective enforcement largely depends on minimum delay in the matter reaching trial. A climate of over-tolerance of applications for postponements is a major factor in the delay of cases coming on for trial. Senior judges have an important role to play in conveying and reinforcing that message to the rest of the judiciary.

Corruption cases could be given priority over other cases, which would mean a corruption case going to the top of the waiting list as soon as it was registered at the court. That could have the undesirable result of a minor corruption case leapfrogging more serious cases of other criminality. A mechanism could be devised to address this problem: a magistrate would consider an application by the prosecutor to move the corruption case to the top of the list. He would be able to weigh the importance of getting the corruption case dealt with against the nature and seriousness of the cases listed ahead of it. The endorsement of the head of the judiciary for such a system would ensure its adoption.

Special courts within the normal court system could be designated to deal with corruption cases. These courts would provide a forum for the speedy disposal of corruption cases and would develop an expertise allowing them to deal with such cases more efficiently. In the absence of corruption cases the court would deal with other cases. Again, the endorsement of the head of the judiciary and the support of his judges for creating such a court would ensure its adoption.

In many developing countries customary courts deal with relatively minor offences at local district level. These courts are usually the most numerous and are spread throughout the country. They provide the closest contact with the justice system that the citizen will normally have. Justice is dispensed summarily and swiftly, there is usually no backlog of cases and the accused has the right to be tried in a higher court if he wishes. And again, the support of the senior judiciary for the use of these courts would carry great weight. The active encouragement of their use in appropriate cases could have a profound effect on the problem of delay.

A system of cautioning offenders in minor cases could be used. Given the anticorruption body's essential policy of investigating with a view to prosecution every allegation of corruption capable of being investigated, it is inevitable that many of their cases will be trivial instances of bribery. These cases contribute to the backlog of cases in the courts. In several countries there exists for appropriately minor criminal cases a system of formally cautioning the offender without taking him to court. The matter is disposed of by a formal caution administered by a senior officer and the caution is noted on the offender's record. Certain preconditions would apply: the matter was trivial, the suspect admitted the offence, the suspect had not previously been cautioned for a similar offence and the prosecutor had given prior agreement to the matter being dealt with by way of caution. Additionally the number of such disposals would be included in the statistics contained in the anticorruption body's annual report.

A specialised unit in the public prosecutor's office to deal with corruption cases should be considered. The obvious advantage of such a unit acquiring an expertise in handling corruption cases is the resulting speed and efficiency. Given the importance of processing corruption cases rapidly, a specialised prosecution unit would provide an important support to the national anticorruption effort.

Involving the business sector

The ethical dilemmas of the private sector differ considerably from one part of that sector to another. The ethical questions of the financial sector are not those of the construction industry or the retail trades. One code of conduct cannot apply to all. The private sector umbrella organisations and the anticorruption body should together assist each part of this sector to prepare a model code of conduct for adoption by enterprises within that part of the sector.

The role of the private sector in affecting the community's attitude to corruption can hardly be overstated. It is therefore crucially important that the representative organisations of the business sector should join in partnership with the anticorruption body in promoting ethical conduct in business. Small and medium enterprises in particular, which lack the resources for an in-house corporate compliance unit, need help. Experience shows that an ethics resource centre can provide that help efficiently and cheaply. A partnership with the anticorruption body, making use of one of its centrally placed branch premises and of its personnel to man the centre, allows the centre to be run by a board of business people which sets the centre's policy and directs its activities.

Promoting sectoral model codes of conduct, providing advice to business companies and helping the anticorruption body spread the anticorruption message throughout the private sector have been demonstrated to improve the climate for doing business.

Since the investigation of corruption depends on information from the public, private sector employees are an essential source of information on corruption in both the public and private sectors. The private sector's umbrella organisations can have a positive effect in influencing employers to encourage employees to report corruption and to ensure protection from subsequent discrimination. The umbrella organisations, with the help of the anticorruption body, should mobilise their member enterprises for a 'report corruption without fear' campaign, emphasising that all reports to the anticorruption body are made in strict confidence.

Community participation

The professions, the trade unions, the community based organisations like sports associations, the religious bodies and the non-governmental organisations have an active part to play in the same way as described for the private sector in the preceding paragraphs. The anticorruption body should help them develop model codes of conduct. They should make a point of encouraging their members and adherents, as responsible citizens, to support the fight against corruption by reporting suspicions of corruption to the anticorruption body.

Concluding remarks

In recognising that public support is one of the essentials for beating corruption, we must also realise that that support will not spring up overnight. Overcoming resignation, apathy and fear can be a slow process. Yet it must be done. Trust in the anticorruption body and active support of its leadership in fighting corruption must be developed methodically and continuously. It is equally important to realise that community trust is fragile; it can be lost overnight. That thought has proved to be the strongest incentive for proper conduct by the officers of the anticorruption body.

In a country that has suffered widespread corruption for a long time, it is often said that it is impossible to change the community's attitude to corruption. In a few places in the world that has been proved to be untrue. The heartening fact is that the community's attitude to corruption can change for the better. That change is surely the true mark of success against this crippling phenomenon.
